JACOB HAGOPIAN, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Frank Bertram, pro se, currently incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institution ("ACI") Cranston, Rhode Island, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff names fourteen defendants, five who are located in Rhode Island — Wall, Spaulding, Marocco, Bansal, and White (hereafter referred to collectively as the "Rhode Island defendants"); and nine who are located in Connecticut — Rittenband, Armstrong, Tokarz, Strange, Blanchett, Furey, Silvis, Luka, and Pasanti (hereafter referred to collectively as the "Connecticut defendants").
To the date of this writing, plaintiff has only served two of the Rhode Island defendants. On May 23, 2002, this Court ordered the plaintiff to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for a lack of personal jurisdiction over the nine Connecticut defendants. Plaintiff filed a timely response and this matter is currently before the Court. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the instant Complaint be dismissed for a lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), as to the nine Connecticut defendants — Rittenband, Armstrong, Tokarz, Strange, Blanchett, Furey, Silvis, Luka, and Pasanti.
Background
Plaintiff Frank Bertram was sentenced to the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections ("RI DOC") in 1989. In 1991, pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact, the RIDOC transferred the plaintiff to the custody of the Connecticut Department of Corrections ("CDOC").
While in Connecticut in the custody of the CDOC, plaintiff began experiencing headaches, neck pain, and back pain. Over time, his symptoms worsened. He sought medical attention and was examined by defendant Lukas, a registered nurse at the CDOC. Lukas scheduled an appointment for the plaintiff to see a CDOC doctor. Defendant Dr. Silvis thereafter examined the plaintiff and ordered that tests be conducted.
After completion of the tests, Dr. Mark Kane (non-defendant) reviewed the results and determined that the plaintiff had degenerative changes in his spine. Thereafter, plaintiff was seen again by Dr. Silvis. Dr. Silvis advised him that his condition was just part of the aging process and that he will be in some discomfort for the rest of his life. Dr. Silvis prescribed medication and gave him restrictions on his work and recreational activities.
Plaintiff thereafter contacted defendant Jerry Imhoff, a staff member from mental health department at the CDOC. Plaintiff conveyed his concerns to Imhoff regarding his health and his ongoing pain. Imhoff offered the plaintiff stronger medication, but the plaintiff declined.
Plaintiff's symptoms became increasingly worse. Defendants Drs. Silvis and Blancehett thereafter ordered the plaintiff to undergo a MRI procedure the University of Connecticut Medical Center ("U Conn"), where he was admitted. During his hospitalization, an MRI was done, as well as other diagnostic procedures. The doctor at U Conn that conducted the examinations of the plaintiff found nothing wrong, and discharged him. The doctor did not order any further follow-up treatments. Plaintiff then returned to the Connecticut prison's infirmary.
When he returned to the Connecticut prison, plaintiff was examined again by Dr. Silvis. Plaintiff complains that Dr. Silvis criticized the plaintiff's credibility and accused the plaintiff of exaggerating his claims. Plaintiff asserts that other members of the medical staff made entries in his record expressing that the plaintiff seemed to be exaggerating his symptoms.
Nonetheless, Dr. Silvis ordered that more test be conducted. Plaintiff complains that the tests took too long to be scheduled. Plaintiff asserts that in order to receive medical treatment, approval first had to be obtained by the URC Board (plaintiff does not identify what this entity is) and Rhode Island officials. Plaintiff asserts that since his condition wasn't life threatening, it wasn't considered a priority.
Plaintiff was again taken to U Conn for a lumbar MRI, but was not admitted to the hospital. Plaintiff asserts that the results from this MRI showed bulging disks in two locations, bilateral neuroforaminal stenosis, spinal stenosis and scoliosis, as well as other abnormalities.
Unsatisfied with the treatment he was receiving, and with the pace of the treatment, plaintiff decided to leave the prison infirmary where he had been housed and returned to general population in order to pursue legal remedies. Plaintiff complains that he spent eight weeks in the infirmary stripped of most of his privileges, with no result.
Plaintiff however continued to complain to Dr. Silvis and medical personnel about his alleged symptoms. Dr. Silvis and the medical staff dismissed plaintiff's complaints, since Dr. Silvis determined that the plaintiff was asymptomatic. Plaintiff claims that Dr. Silvis was hampering and discouraging his treatment.
On February 28, 2001, plaintiff reported to the infirmary and explained that his numbness was progressing to the bottom of his rib cage. The nurse, however, did not provide any type of treatment. Plaintiff thereafter was again called to see a doctor in the infirmary. Both the doctor and the nurse informed him that they could not provided him care until they received approval from the Rhode Island authorities.
Plaintiff asserts that the delays caused by the Rhode Island authorities in providing approval caused him additional injuries, and complicated his current medical conditions. Plaintiff asserts that the Rhode Island authorities refused to provided any more expenditures for plaintiff's medical treatment, and he was classified as a "conservative management" case.
Plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Warden Strange, at the Connecticut prison, indicating that the plaintiff was not satisfied with his treatment. Plaintiff also wrote to A.T. Wall, the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, John Armstrong, the Connecticut Corrections Commissioner and Lynn Miller, the interstate coordinator at the CDOC, explaining the problems with his treatment.
Plaintiff thereafter received a response from defendant Wall, indicating that Joseph DiNitto (non-defendant) of the RI DOC would address his concerns. Wall also explained defendant Dr. Anne Spaulding of the RI DOC will make an assessment and correspond with the CDOC medical staff. Plaintiff's letter was also forwarded to Joseph Marocco, Hospital Administrator at the RI DOC.
On April 27, 2001, plaintiff discovered that the URC forwarded their recommendations to the RI DOC and was awaiting their approval before proceeding. On May 7, Rhode Island officials approved a neuro-surgical consultation at U Conn.
On May 23, 2001, plaintiff was transferred back to the ACI in Rhode Island. He was immediately seen by a prison doctor and referred to an orthopedic and neurosurgeon for a consultation. Plaintiff complains that the consultation was not forthcoming. In an effort to expedite the process, he contacted to Dr. Spaulding. He also informed defendants Wall, DiNitto, Marocco and Gadsen about his on-going delays in receiving treatment.
Plaintiff thereafter saw defendant Dr. Basal, and she provided the plaintiff with medication for his problems. While with Dr. Bansal, Dr. Bansal discovered that his request for consultations were never sent out. She promptly faxed those requests. On August 7, 2001, Marocco advised the plaintiff that his orthopedic and neurological consult had been approved and would be scheduled at Rhode Island Hospital.
Plaintiff also filed a civil action in the Connecticut state courts. Plaintiff claims that the court refused to permit discovery, to allow him to call witnesses, and to have expert testimony. The Honorable Judge Richard M. Rittenband, also named as a defendant, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
Discussion
The exercise of personal jurisdiction hinges on satisfaction of a two prong test: First, the forum in which the federal district court sits must have a long-arm statute that grants jurisdiction over the defendant; and second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with Constitutional Due Process requirements. Pritzker v. Yari 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994) citing Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994). The Rhode Island long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state . . . that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this state shall hold such foreign corporations and such nonresident individuals . . . amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33(a).
Pursuant to this statute, a court may exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the full extent allowed by the U.S. Constitution. See Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 F.2d 305, 307 (1st Cir. 1986) citing Almeida v. Radovsky, 506 A.2d 1373, 1374 (R.I. 1986). Thus, plaintiff need only meet the burdens imposed by the due process clause.
B. Due Process
To ensure constitutional due process to a non-resident defendant, certain minimum contacts with the forum state are required "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A determination as to the minimum contacts that will satisfy the requirements of due process will depend upon the facts of each particular case. However, they must be substantial enough "that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
1. General Personal Jurisdiction
"In analyzing minimum contacts, [courts] have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General jurisdiction exists when the litigation is not directly founded on the defendant's forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state." United Electrical v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1st Cir. 1992) citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 n. 9 (1984).
Here, nothing in plaintiff's Complaint or in his response to the Court's Order to Show Cause demonstrates that any of the Connecticut defendants were engaged in systematic and continuous activity in Rhode Island. Since it is the plaintiff's burden to establish facts sufficient to sustain general in personam jurisdiction, see, e.g. Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 207 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1994); Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1986), and since plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any systematic and continuous activity by any of the Connecticut defendants in Rhode Island, I find that general personal jurisdiction is lacking.
2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Specific personal jurisdiction is narrower in scope than general personal jurisdiction and may only be relied upon "where the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant's forum-based contacts." 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d at 1088-89 citing Helicopteros Nacionales 466 U.S. at 414. The plaintiff must show that such contacts were the result of a defendant "purposefully avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State."Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Exercise of a court's jurisdiction may still be defeated if it would unreasonable to hale defendant into court there. See, Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 206 citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
Again, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any contacts by any of the individual Connecticut defendants with the state of Rhode Island. Plaintiff does however cite the Interstate Corrections Compact. The Compact allows Rhode Island authorities to transfer inmates to other jurisdictions for confinement. However, the Compact is insufficient to demonstrate individual contacts by any of the Connecticut defendants with the state of Rhode Island. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 13 (1983) ("Jurisdiction over an employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which employs him . . . Each defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (The requirements of International Shoe . . . must be met as to each defendant over whom a court exercises jurisdiction). In fact, this cause of action has nothing to do with the Interstate Corrections Compact, but rather, alleges mistreatment by individual Connecticut prison employees. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate specific personal jurisdiction as to any of the Connecticut defendants. Accordingly, the Connecticut defendants should be dismissed from this action, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). I so recommend.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that the Connecticut defendants — Rittenband, Armstrong, Tokarz, Strange, Blanchett, Furey, Silvis, Luka, and Pasanti, be dismissed from this action, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Any objection to this report must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision.United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).