ELIZABETH E. BROWN, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant s Bill of Costs and the Plaintiff s Objection thereto. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and being further advised in the premises, hereby
FINDS that the Plaintiff's Complaint sought a determination of dischargeability of debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523 ("Section 523") on a debt owed for unpaid rent. The Debtor had attempted to pay past due rent with a check, drawn on an account which held insufficient funds to cover the check. It was undisputed that Debtor warned Plaintiff at the time he gave it the check that it would "bounce," but that he hoped he would have the funds to cover the check at a future date and he asked Plaintiff to hold the check. Despite the prior warning, Plaintiff negotiated the check and it was dishonored due to insufficient funds. In this action, Plaintiff attempted to assert nondischargeability on the basis that passing a bad check constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation.
FURTHER FINDS that, for the reasons stated on the record on June 6, 2002, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, Plaintiff s Complaint was not substantially justified. Section 523(d) provides that the Court shall award fees and costs to the debtor when a creditor challenges dischargeability of a consumer debt, and the debt is discharged, absent special circumstances that would make the award unjust. The underlying obligation was for unpaid rent. Rent is a "consumer debt." In re Thomas, 258 B.R. 167 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2001); In re Bagby, 218 B.R. 878 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn. 1998). No such special circumstances exist here to make an award of fees and costs unjust.
FURTHER FINDS that, at the Court s request, the Debtor filed a Bill of Costs. He is seeking an award based on: (1) copying costs; (2) postage costs; (3) parking fees and mileage at the Internal Revenue Service rate for his trips from Fort Collins to the Bankruptcy Court in connection with this case; (4) attorney s fees for initial consultation with an attorney, for which he has attached an invoice from his attorney; and (5) charges for his time at his hourly rate of $43.67 (based on his substantiated year-to-date earnings, for his time spent conducting his own legal research, typing his pleadings, photocopying, traveling to and attending court hearings, and preparing his defense.) These "costs" aggregate $2,296.20.
FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff objects to all but $28.44 (representing postage and photocopy charges.) The Objection is two-fold: (a) attorneys fees may not be awarded absent a prayer for relief in the answer requesting the same, as required by Bankruptcy Rule 7008(b); and (b) only those types of costs enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 may be awarded.
FURTHER FINDS that Plaintiff has provided this Court with no precedent to indicate that Bankruptcy Rule 7008(b) applies to Section 523(d) awards. This Court is persuaded by the reasoning set forth in In re Williamson, 181 B.R. 403, 409 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1995) (citations omitted), which held that:
Section 523(d) was enacted to discourage frivolous objections to discharge of consumer debts incurred for expenses reasonably necessary to debtor s support. Congress was justifiably concerned that creditors would be able to use the threat of a section 523 nondischargeability proceeding to extract settlements from debtors whose debts would be dischargeable if litigated. The only way to prevent creditors from obtaining leverage over debtors by first filing a suit, and considering its merits later, is to require the creditor to pay the costs, including reasonable attorney s fees, incurred by a debtor who must defend against a frivolous suit. . . .
The language is mandatory, so creditors are on notice of its potential applicability. There is no basis for departing from the plain language of the statute by requiring that the debtor pray for such relief prior to trial.
FURTHER FINDS that there is a split of authority as to what costs may be assessed in connection with a Section 523(d) award. For example, in In re Mull, 122 B.R. 763 (Bankr.W.D.Okla. 1991), the court awarded the debtor s request for photocopies, mileage, tolls and parking fees. In In re Vazquez, 221 B.R. 222 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1998), the court refused to award the debtor lost wages, but did award punitive damages against the creditor in the amount of $10,000. In In re Williamson, supra, the court compensated the debtor at his regular hourly rate for the time he spent defending against the action. The Court acknowledges that the Williamson court appears to stand alone in allowing lost wages or other compensation for the debtor s time spent on defense. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the Williamson court s reasoning in granting this award:
Where, as here, the debtor is not represented, he is similarly entitled to recover the costs incurred in preparing his own defense. Otherwise, creditors would bear no risk in bringing unjustified suits against the most vulnerable debtors, those without counsel.
Id. at 409. For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that, within twenty days of this Order, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant costs in the aggregate amount of § 986.51, representing $12.42 for postage, $14.49 for photocopies, $336.00 for attorney s fees, $524.04 for 12 hours of the 37.50 hours spent by Debtor, $85.56 of the $243.64 claimed for mileage (which represents only the mileage for trips to court to attend hearings), and $14.00 of the $28.00 claimed for parking fees (representing the two trips to attend court hearings.)