J. PHIL GILBERT, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the Order to Show Cause why this case should not be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 3). The Court also considers the plaintiff's motion to remand this case to the Hamilton County Circuit Court (Doc. 4). Defendant Kadhiresan Murugappan ("Murugappan") has responded to the order and the motion to remand (Docs. 13 14).
Plaintiff Robert Carey Warren ("Warren") filed this suit in the Hamilton County Circuit Court on behalf of the estate of the decedent, William Warren, who was killed in an automobile accident. Warren alleges that the accident was caused by a truck driver whom Murugappan had negligently certified as qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle under the standards set forth at 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 et seq. Warren alleges that the Murugappan's negligent certification caused the decedent's death. Murugappan removed this case to this Court claiming that Warren had attempted to allege a federal cause of action for violating federal regulations. Warren asserts in his motion to remand that he alleges only a state law tort, not a federal claim. The Court issued the Order to Show Cause because it has doubts about its jurisdiction over this case.
This case is properly before the Court on removal if the Court has original jurisdiction over Warren's claims. A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The federal court has original jurisdiction sufficient for removal where the action is "founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine whether the Court has original jurisdiction over Warren's claims, it must determine (1) what those claims are and (2) whether they "aris[e] under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States."
The Court finds that Warren has pled only a state law negligence action, not a cause of action for violation of federal regulations. Under the Federal Rules, the Court, not the parties, decides which rules of law govern a dispute. International Armor Limousine Co. v. Moloney Coachbuilders, Inc., 272 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, the applicable law is state law. It is true that Warren captions Count I, "Action Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 391," and that he alleges that Murugappan acted "in violation of 49 C.F.R. Part 391." However, a thorough review of the complaint as a whole reveals that the gravamen of Warren's complaint is that Murugappan was negligent under state law negligence principles. He does not attempt to allege a private cause of action for violation of 41 C.F.R. § 391. On the contrary, Warren seeks to recover only for rights created by state law. The Court's conclusion is bolstered by Warren's own admission in his motion to remand that he is making only a state law negligence claim.
Murugappan argues that Warren's omission of a certificate of merit, as required for medical malpractice cases under 735 ILCS 5/2-622 indicates that he did not intend to bring this action under state tort law. Murugappan misses the mark. Warren does not attempt to plead a medical malpractice action. In fact, he clearly states in his complaint that Murugappan did not treat, cure or heal the truck driver. Instead, Warren attempts to plead a simple negligence action such as the kind that results from automobile accidents or barroom brawls. Thus, his omission of a certificate of merit is not a valid indication that he intended to bring a claim under federal law instead of state law. Whether Warren is actually required to file a certificate of merit for this action is a question that surely will be addressed at another stage of this litigation.
Warren's negligence cause of action does not arise under federal law such that the Court has original jurisdiction over it. It is well-settled that state tort causes of action such as negligence that are based on the violation of a federal standard do not "arise under" federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction unless federal law provides a private cause of action. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986); Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994).
Because Warren's complaint does not allege a cause of action arising under federal law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Warren's motion to remand (Doc. 4) and REMANDS this case to the Circuit Court of Hamilton County, Illinois, for all further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.