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CLARK E MASON, Plaintiff, MARIN COUNTY, et al, Defendants.

ORDER

VAUGHN R. WALKER, United States District Judge

Plaintiff's complaint, filed on February 12, 2002, arises from his prosecution in Mann County superior court for three misdemeanors: violations of California Penal Code §§ 417(a)(1), drawing, exhibiting or using a firearm or deadly weapon, 136.1(A)(2), intimidating witnesses or victims, and 148(A), resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer. See RJN, Exhs A and B. Plaintiff's complaint alleges a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during these proceedings by Mann County and a state court judge, Commissioner Gregory Jilka. Doc #1. Commissioner Jilka and Mann County have filed motions to dismiss. Docs ##15 and 18. Despite being granted multiple continuances, plaintiff has not opposed these motions.

The court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See Civ LR 7-1(b). The hearing scheduled for September 12, 2002, is hereby VACATED.

Judges are immune from civil suit stemming from a judge's exercise of judicial function. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). "Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit" which

is overcome only in two sets of circumstances. First a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i e, actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune from actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence all jurisdiction.

Id at 11-12, internal citations omitted.

Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting application of either of these two exceptions to judicial immunity. Rather, to the extent plaintiff's complaint can be interpreted to state a claim at all, Commissioner Jilka's challenged conduct falls squarely within the bounds of judicial immunity. Plaintiff's claims against Commissioner Jilka, therefore, must be dismissed.

Moreover, plaintiff's complaint, even accorded deference appropriate to a pro se complaint, is entirely vague and conclusory and fails to state a claim. It must, therefore, be dismissed in its entirety. See Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir 1982). Moreover, the court determines that it must be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's complaint merely expresses dissatisfaction with the lawyers appointed to represent him by Commisioner Jilka. Permitting plaintiff's claim to proceed would improperly interfere with a state criminal prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971). Plaintiff's claim of effective assistance of counsel is properly raised post-conviction.

Accordingly, Commissioner Jilka's motion to dismiss (Doc #18) and Marin County's motion to dismiss (Doc #15) are GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

The clerk is directed to close the file, enter judgment for defendants and terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

JUDGMENT. [FRCP 58]

This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of the defendants.

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MASON v. MARIN COUNTY
(Sep 3, 2002)