SOL BLATT, Jr., United States District Judge.
This matter came before the Court on September 5, 2002 for hearing on the Plaintiff's motion to remand and on the Defendant's motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated at that hearing, the Court concludes that the complaint alleges a cause of action — specifically the Defendant's alleged negligence in failing to recall the automobile in question — grounded solely in federal law, i.e., the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ["Safety Act"], 49 U.S.C. § 30118 et seq. As such, the complaint is based in part on the resolution of a federal question, and this Court properly has jurisdiction over the entire complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The motion to remand is denied.
The Court has at least supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining products liability claims (negligent manufacture and breach of warranty) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court makes no comment at this time as to whether the Safety Act gives rise to original jurisdiction over the products liability claims.
The Court will reserve judgment, however, on the motion to dismiss. This is in part because the parties have not yet briefed the validity of the Plaintiff's allegation regarding the Defendant's duty to recall, and the effect of any breach of this duty. The Defendant shall file a brief on this subject within 30 days of the date of this order. The Plaintiff shall have 30 days thereafter to submit his response, to which the Defendant has 15 days to file any reply. The Court will then rule on all grounds for dismissal asserted by the Defendant.
The Court notes that the parties each attached documents to their briefs in support of dismissal and remand. Normally, consideration of materials outside the pleadings requires a court to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion to dismiss asserting the defense [under Rule 12(b)(6)], matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.").
However, in this case the motion to dismiss does not need to be converted. "[W]hen a plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document as part of his complaint, the defendant may attach the document to a motion to dismiss the complaint and the Court may consider the same without converting the motion to one for summary judgment." Gasner v. County of Dinwiddie, 162 F.R.D. 280, 281 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing 5 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1327, at 762-63 (2d ed. 1990)). "This ruling encompasses not only documents quoted, relied upon, or incorporated by reference in the complaint, but also official public records pertinent to the plaintiffs' claims." Id. Thus, the Defendant's attachment of the automobile warranty at issue in this case, and the Plaintiff's attachment of relevant portions of the Safety Act and portions of a booklet on the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards do not affect the status of the motion to dismiss.
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that the Plaintiff's motion to remand is denied, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss is taken under advisement, pending the briefing schedule outlined above.