ORDERED that the cross appeal by the defendant Cablevision of New York is dismissed as withdrawn; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the defendants Neiss Management Corporation and 82 Rockaway Limited Liability Corporation; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Cablevision of New York payable by the defendants Neiss Management Corporation and 82 Rockaway Limited Liability Corporation.
The plaintiff was an employee of Mucip, Inc., a subcontractor retained by the defendant Cablevision of New York (hereinafter Cablevision) to install and provide cable television service to its subscribers. On December 16, 1997, the plaintiff was installing a cable to the apartment of a tenant in a multiple-dwelling owned and managed by the defendants 82 Rockaway LLC and Neiss Management Corp. respectively (hereinafter collectively the Building). The plaintiff was performing his work at the direction of Cablevision in response to a request made directly by the tenant. The Building claimed that it had no prior notice of the plaintiff's presence on the premises, and had not authorized the work. While standing on an allegedly defective ladder supplied by his employer, making connections in a junction box mounted on an exterior wall, the plaintiff fell and sustained injuries when the ladder slipped.
In the ensuing personal injury action, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1). The Building cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action pursuant to Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on its cross claim for common-law indemnification against Cablevision contending, inter alia, that it was not an "owner" within the meaning of the Labor Law. The Supreme Court denied the motion and the cross motion, finding, inter alia, that issues of fact were presented as to whether the Building authorized the work (see Otero v. Cablevision of New York, 186 Misc.2d 651).
The matter went to trial on the issue of liability, with the jury finding for the plaintiff against the Buildingn. The Building and Cablevision subsequently settled the case with the plaintiff pursuant to a stipulation providing for them to equally share the expense of the settlement, but subject to this court's determination on the issue of whether the Supreme Court properly denied the Building's cross motion. We now affirm, albeit for different reasons.
Labor Law § 240(1) is to be liberally construed to effectuate the Legislature's purpose of protecting laborers (see Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290; Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 520-21; Williamson v. 16 W. 57th St. Co., 256 A.D.2d 507, 509) "who ply their livelihoods on ladders and scaffolds [and who] usually have no choice but to work with the equipment at hand, though danger looms large" (Koenig v. Patrick Const. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 318-319). In recognition of the Legislature's purpose in seeking to afford special protections to such vulnerable laborers, the Court of Appeals has consistently characterized the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) as "extraordinary" (Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assocs., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267; see Nieves v. Five Boro Air Conditioning Refrig. Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 914, 915; Melber v. 6333 Main St., 91 N.Y.2d 759, 762), and "exceptional" (Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514). By its express terms, it imposes upon owners the nondelegable duty to provide safety equipment to laborers engaged in altering a building (see Melber v. 6333 Main St., supra). It is uncontroverted that the plaintiff was engaged in a covered activity.
The Building contends that it is not an "owner" properly held liable because it did not permit or suffer the plaintiff to work upon its property, and because the plaintiff was hired as a direct result of the tenant's dealings with Cablevision. While some cases have employed such reasoning to absolve owners from liability under the Labor Law (see e.g. Brown v. Christopher St. Owners Corp., 211 A.D.2d 441, affd on other grounds 87 N.Y.2d 938; Aviles v. Crystal Mgt., 233 A.D.2d 129), we hold that the Building is an owner as a matter of law, strictly liable pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1).
The Court of Appeals has unequivocally held that "[l]iability rests upon the fact of ownership and whether [the owner] had contracted for the work or benefitted from it are legally irrelevant" (Coleman v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 821, 822; see Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 N.Y.2d 555, 560). Moreover, "an owner no longer need be the employer of the worker or one directing his labor in order to be subject to liability" (Haimes v. New York Tel. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 132, 136). The law as determined by the Court of Appeals favors the imposition of liability as against the Building.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
FLORIO, J.P., S. MILLER, SCHMIDT and COZIER, JJ., concur.