WILLIAM F. SANDERSON, JR., United States Magistrate Judge
Pursuant to the consents of the parties, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c), and the District Court's Order of Reassignment filed on August 14, 2002, came on to be considered Defendant Valley Forge Life Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss filed on July 26, 2002; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed on August 15, 2002; and Defendant's reply thereto filed on August 28, 2002.
I. Background
On June 27, 2002, Plaintiff George Ozor (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed suit against Defendants CNA Insurance Company and Valley Forge Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Valley Forge") in the 44th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violation of Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code ("Article 21.55") based on the denial of a claim for benefits payable under a life insurance policy. See, e.g., Pl.'s Original Pet. Following receipt of process in state court, Defendant Valley Forge, on July 24, 2002, removed Plaintiffs suit to this court on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., Def.'s Notice of Removal.
According to Defendant Valley Forge Life Insurance Company's Notice of Removal, CNA Insurance Company, identified by Plaintiff as a co-defendant in this litigation, is merely a registered service mark and is a non-existent entity. See Def.'s Notice of Removal at 1, n. 1.
On July 26, Defendant Valley Forge moved this court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs claim under Article 21.55 on the grounds that the same is barred by limitations. See, e.g., Def.'s Motion to Dismiss.
II. Analysis
It is not disputed that Plaintiff has alleged a violation of the prompt payment of claims provisions of Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code. See id. (Vernon Supp. 2002). As such, the only issues before the court are 1) what the applicable statute of limitations is for an Article 21.55 claim and 2) whether the prescribed limitations period expired before Plaintiff filed his suit.
It is well-settled that a denial of an insurance claim triggers commencement of the statute of limitations period for causes of action stemming from that denial. See Ehrig v. Germania Farm Mut. Ins. Assoc., No. 13-01-200-CV, 2002 WL 1758273, *3 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, July 25, 2002, no. pet.) (citing Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990)("[f]or the purposes of application of statute of limitations, a cause of action generally accrues at the time when facts come into existence which authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy")); see also Wetsel v. State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 3:02-CV-0510-D, 2002 WL 1592665, *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 18, 2002)(Fitzwater, J.) (citing Murray) (applied "legal injury" rule to Article 21.55 claim).
§ 16(d) of Art. 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code provides that:
All actions under this Article must be commenced within two years after the date on which the unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the person bringing the action discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the occurrence of the unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice. The period of limitation provided in this section may be extended for a period of 180 days if the person bringing the action proves that the failure to timely commence the action was caused by the defendant's engaging in conduct solely calculated to induce the plaintiff to refrain from or postpone the commencement of the action.
TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 21.21 § 16(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). Valley Forge contends, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the statute of limitations set out in TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 21.21 § 16(d) applies to Plaintiffs cause of action under TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 21.55.
Plaintiff contends that he has alleged a breach of contract claim and, as such, the operative statute of limitations is four years pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 16.004. See Perez v. Gulley, 829 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (citing § 16.004(a)(3)); see also FDIC v. Henderson, 849 F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (four year limitations period for breach of contract claims). Plaintiff is correct with respect to his breach of contract claim and Valley Forge concedes as much in its reply brief. See, e.g., Def.'s reply. However, to the extent that Plaintiff has also alleged a violation of Art. 21.55, the same is governed by the limitations provision of § 16(d) of Article 21.21. See Wetsel v. State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co., supra, at *3 (applied Article 21.21 § 16(d)'s two year statute of limitations to Article 21.55 claim); Easter v. Travelers Cas. Co., No. 5:00-CV-399-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14178, *6-7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2001)(Cummings, J.)(same).
Plaintiff alleges in his Original Petition that he was the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy which named Ms. Elizabeth A. Etumnu as the insured. See Pl.'s Original Pet. Plaintiff further alleges that following Ms. Etumnu's death on February 20, 1998, the benefits under the life insurance policy become payable to him on or about April 23, 1998. See id. Taking all evidence in favor of the Plaintiff as the court must, Plaintiffs cause of action under Article 21.55 accrued, at the latest, on June 30, 1998, the date Valley Forge denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits. See Wetsel v. State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co., supra, at *3 (two year limitations period for an Article 21.55 claim accrued on the date insurer denied coverage); Easter v. Travelers Cas. Co., No. 5:00-CV-399-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14178, *6-7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2001)(Cummings, J.)(same). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff's Article 21.55 claim is governed by a two year statute of limitations and the same was not filed until June 27, 2002 — approximately two years after the expiration of the limitations period (i.e., June 30, 2000) — the court finds that Plaintiffs claim is time barred. Id.
However, in his Memorandum in Opposition to Valley Forge's instant motion, Plaintiff contends that Valley Forge denied his claim for benefits on June 30, 1998. See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 2, ¶ 6.
III. Conclusion
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiffs claims under Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code, and all associated claims for penalties, interest, attorneys' fees, and court costs, are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.