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JOHN DOE Plaintiff v. REVEREND JESSE S. LINAM, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF GALVESTON-HOUSTON, MOST REVEREND JOSEPH A. FIORENZA, HIS PREDECESSORS AND SUCCESSORS, AS BISHOP OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF GALVESTON-HOUSTON, Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

SAMUEL B. KENT, United States District Judge

Plaintiff John Doe brought this action alleging that he was sexually abused by a Roman Catholic Priest. Plaintiff alleges that as a direct result of the abuse, Plaintiff has suffered tremendous emotional, physical, and sexual difficulties that even plague Plaintiff today. This Court dismissed Plaintiffs claim on August 20, 2002, as barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.003. Now before the Court are the timely Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Prior Order") and Defendants' Response thereto. In his Motion, Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider its Prior Order and to toll the applicable statute of limitations because Plaintiff was of unsound mind "from the time of the sexual abuse through the time of this lawsuit." Despite the fact that Plaintiffs present Motion states such, Plaintiffs Original Complaint does not contain any factual allegations that Plaintiff was of unsound mind from the time that the abuse occurred. Without demonstrating to the Court that Plaintiff did indeed allege that he was of unsound mind continuously from the time of the abuse to within two years of Plaintiff filing this action, the Court finds no reason to alter its previous decision. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.001(d) ("A disability that arises after a limitation period starts does not suspend the running of the period."). Moreover, the test is not whether Plaintiff had serious emotional and psychological difficulties, which the Court does not doubt, but whether he was legally incompetent. See Freeman v. American Motorists Ins. Co, 53 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 Dist.] 1994, no writ) (explaining that "unsound mind" refers to a legal disability, although an actual adjudication of incompetence is not required); Hargraves v. Armco Foods, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (stating that insane persons and persons of unsound mind are generally synonymous); Casu v. CBI Na-Con, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1994, no writ). Although the Court deplores awful and tragic events such as those that Plaintiff alleges, this Court cannot simply act on the basis of moral justice in the absence of lawful jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby respectfully DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DOE v. LINAM
(Oct 1, 2002)