DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Anthony R. London ("London" or "plaintiff"), sues the defendant Berkshire Life Insurance Co. ("Berkshire" or "defendant") for breach of an insurance contract. The plaintiff moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and for leave to file an amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. The defendant cross-moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Oral argument was heard in Albany, New York, on June 28, 2002. Decision was reserved.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff, a cardiologist, purchased a disability insurance policy from defendant in 1981. As a cardiologist, London provided patient care in the office, stress tests, holters, pacemaker clinics, and insertions. He was also required to conduct hospital rounds and be on call some nights and weekends. London worked over eighty-six hours per week.
In May 1997, plaintiff was diagnosed with a heart condition consisting of severe triple coronary artery disease necessitating five bypasses coming from one artery. Plaintiff did not work at all for a few months, then resumed patient care part time. London's doctors recommended that he reduce stress, work fewer hours, and avoid night work. He now works approximately 3½ days per week, seeing approximately ten to fifteen patients per day. Previously he had worked 4½ days per week and saw fifteen to twenty-five patients per day. The only work activity that he does not do at all is insert pacemakers. However, plaintiff's hospital rounds and night and weekend work has been significantly reduced.
Plaintiff seeks to obtain benefits for total disability under Berkshire's disability policy. The disability insurance policy provides that the insured is totally disabled when he is unable "to perform the material and substantial duties of [his] occupation." (London Aff. at Exhibit B.) There is also a residual disability provision that applies when an individual is unable to perform "one or more of [his] important daily business or professional duties." The residual (partial) disability benefits provision requires disclosure of financial information to determine eligibility for benefits.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, the legitimate inferences that could be drawn from that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and the applicable burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In determining a motion for summary judgment, all inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the exhibits and depositions "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, "the litigant opposing summary judgment `may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials' as a vehicle for obtaining a trial." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)).
B. Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiff contends that the "material and substantial duties" language in the definition of "totally disabled" in his insurance policy is ambiguous. He argues that he works more like a consultant now than a cardiologist and should get total disability benefits under the policy. The defendant argues that the language of the policy is clear, and that the undisputed facts show that plaintiff can perform the material and substantial duties of the cardiologist occupation.
As a threshold matter, it must be determined whether the competing interpretations urged by the parties render the contract ambiguous. Under New York law, the question of whether a writing is ambiguous is a question of law. See W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990). If a contract is found to be ambiguous, summary judgment is not appropriate and its meaning becomes a question of fact. See Revson v. Cinque Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir. 2000). A contract is ambiguous where its terms "suggest more than one meaning" when viewed objectively by a reasonably knowledgeable person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement. Alexander Alexander Servs. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 136 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1998). If contractual terms have a definite and precise meaning and are not reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations, they are not ambiguous. See Seiden Assocs. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir. 1992).
The mere fact that the parties urge different interpretations of the contract is not necessarily sufficient to render it ambiguous. See United States v. Local 1804-1, International Longshoremen's Assn., 44 F.3d 1091, 1097 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Stroll v. Epstein, 818 F. Supp. 640, 643 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1537 (2d Cir. 1993)). Competing interpretations render a contract ambiguous only where each of the competing interpretations is objectively reasonable. See United National Ins. Co., v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1993).
The material and substantial duties language in the policy is not ambiguous. Even if it were ambiguous and construed in favor of the insured, plaintiff would not be entitled to total disability benefits. Plaintiff contends that he is unable to perform the material and substantial duties of his job because he can no longer perform pacemaker insertions. Additionally, to support his argument that he is totally disabled he points to the fact that he has limited his night and weekend call work, as well as hospital rounds. (London Dep. at 26-29.)
When plaintiff first obtained his insurance policy with Berkshire, he was required to fill out a "Description of Occupation" form. (Siegel Aff. at Exhibit F.) On that form he was required to list the most important duties and activities of his job and the approximate number of hours he spent on those jobs per week. The first and most important job, according to plaintiff, was his office work. (Id.) His office work includes patient visits, stress tests, holters, and pacemaker clinics. (Id.) Plaintiff spent approximately forty-eight or more hours per week on office duties. (Id.) Plaintiff listed hospital duties as his next most important activity as a cardiologist. (Id.) Included in this description was inserting pacemakers, stress tests, holters, "admission," and "rounds". (Id.) Plaintiff spent only ten hours per week on hospital duties. (Id.) Lastly, plaintiff listed night calls as part of his duties. (Id.) He spent approximately twenty-eight hours per week on night calls. (Id.)
The only duty listed in plaintiff's Description of Occupation that he is now unable to perform is pacemaker insertions. This duty was grouped together with other duties, including admissions, rounds, stress tests, and holters, that plaintiff only attributed ten hours of an eighty-six hour work week to all these activities combined. (Id.) Plaintiff admits that he is able to perform all the other functions of his job, but has chosen, upon advise, to cut back his work schedule. Otherwise, he engages in an active medical practice, well beyond incidental activities.
Accordingly, it is found that the language of the insurance policy is clear and that plaintiff does not meet the criteria for "totally disabled" as described in the policy. As such, there is no need to discuss plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Plaintiff Anthony R. London's motions for summary judgment and for leave to file an amended complaint are DENIED;
2. Defendant Berkshire Life Insurance Co.'s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and
3. The complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.