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MARTIN J. MULVIHILL, Plaintiff v. SPALDING SPORTS WORLDWIDE INC. AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS, IRON SHIP BUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELPERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL LODGE 1851, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket Nos. 41 45)

MICHAEL A. PONSOR, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action by Martin Mulvihill ("plaintiff") seeking damages under the common law for wrongful discharge and defamation, and under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., for violation of the duty of fair representation. Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc. ("Spalding") and a former member of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, Local Lodge 1851 ("Local 1851").

In a hybrid claim such as this, controlling authority is clear that plaintiff must succeed on both claims to prevail. He must prove both that Spalding wrongfully discharged him and that the union failed in its duty of fair representation. The issue presented to this court by the defendants' motions for summary judgment is whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Mulvihill, are sufficient to justify jury consideration of both claims.

For the reasons set forth below, the record is insufficient to support a claim against Spalding for wrongful discharge. The inadequacy of the record is also fatal to plaintiff's defamation claim. Defendants' motions for summary judgment will therefore be ALLOWED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A court may properly allow a motion for summary judgment "where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993). "Not every discrepancy in the proof is enough to forestall a properly supported motion for summary judgment; the disagreement must relate to some genuine issue of material fact." Samuel Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991). "There must be sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 1994) (quotations and citations omitted). At summary judgment, it is this court's obligation to "review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor." LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The relevant facts, so viewed, are as follows.

Plaintiff worked thirty-two years for Spalding and was a member, and at times officer, of Local 1851. He was terminated on September 19, 2000 for a violation of Spalding's sexual harassment policy. Plaintiff maintains that Spalding lacked good cause to discharge him and that this dismissal constituted a breach of contract for which Local 1851 failed to adequately represent him.

Approximately three weeks prior to his discharge, plaintiff became aware that Amy Charest, a married female Spalding employee, was having an extra-marital affair with Mike Rattell, a married male Spalding employee, without either of their spouses' knowledge. Plaintiff had contact with Mike and his wife, Melissa Rattell, who was also a Spalding employee, on separate occasions regarding their individual concerns for their marriage. Mike and Melissa Rattell had sought Catholic Pre-Cana education from plaintiff prior to their marriage and continued to seek advice from him at various times.

Following the incident at issue in this action and filing of this lawsuit, Ms. Charest's divorce was finalized and she returned to using her maiden name, DeFilippo. However, all documents continued to identify her as Amy Charest, as will the court for these proceedings.

On or about September 8, 2000, plaintiff notified Dominic Montessi ("Montessi"), his supervisor at Spalding, of the affair. During their exchange, Montessi gave plaintiff the understanding that he should avoid any further involvement in the situation.

Parties dispute the precise form that Montessi's instruction took. Spalding contends that plaintiff was explicitly told to stay out of the situation, while plaintiff claims Montessi was not so emphatic. Although not material to the issue before the court, plaintiff's version is accepted for the purpose of this motion.

Following this meeting, plaintiff encountered Ray Perreault ("Perreault"), a friend and co-worker of plaintiff's and Amy Charest. In response to Perreault's inquiry about Charest's absence from work, plaintiff disclosed the details known to him concerning the extra-marital affair involving Charest and Rattell.

There is a dispute as to who initiated this conversation, the precise language used, and the presence or absence of obscenities used to describe the situation. While disputed, these details are not material to the issue before the court since the substantive nature of the conversation, specifically that plaintiff discussed Charest's affair, is not disputed.

Amy Charest, a non-union employee working a "flex schedule," was not at work on the day of these exchanges. On or about September 11, 2000, she returned to work and was informed of plaintiff's disclosures by Montessi. Charest was displeased that plaintiff had been discussing matters of a sexual nature about her at work and felt embarrassed that stories about her might be circulating among her fellow employees as a result. Following this conversation, Montessi met with Robert Bourdeau, Manager of Labor Relations, to discuss the situation. Bourdeau instructed him to tell Charest that "if she wishes to pursue a formal complaint against [Mulvihill's] conduct that she should come . . . and see [Bourdeau], and [he] could explain . . . what avenues she has." (Depo. Robert Bourdeau at 18)

Charest did contact Bourdeau, obtained a complaint form and submitted it, charging plaintiff with violation of Spalding's policy. Spalding's sexual harassment policy, effective June 1, 1994, includes as prohibited conduct verbal harassment, a facet of which is "spreading rumors about a co-worker's sex life." (Presser Aff. Ex. J, at 2) After receiving and reading the completed complaint, Bourdeau commenced his investigation by conducting separate interviews with Charest and plaintiff. Union officials were present during the meeting with plaintiff.

Bourdeau also met again with Montessi and was told of prior complaints Charest made regarding plaintiff's conduct and behavior. Neither prior instance raised concerns of sexual harassment.

On or about September 12, 2000, Bourdeau continued his investigation by interviewing individuals listed as witnesses by Charest on her complaint form. Bourdeau did not interview all persons listed, excluding three who did not have direct knowledge of the incident complained of by Charest.

Plaintiff claims the failure to interview all the witnesses listed generates a material issue of disputed fact. The court disagrees. The three uncontacted witnesses — Melissa Rattell, Michael Rattell and Todd Charest — had no knowledge of plaintiff's comments and were therefore not material to Spalding's investigation or its decision.

Spalding's sexual harassment policy's goal is that "[a]ll of [their] employees should be able to enjoy a work environment free of sexual discrimination or harassment which undermines the employment relationship by creating an intimidating, hostile, and offensive work environment." (Presser Aff. Ex. J, at 1) Managers and supervisors are obligated to "maintain a positive and productive work environment" and "are expected to halt any harassment of which they become aware." Id.

Bourdeau concluded, based on his investigation, that plaintiff's behavior constituted a violation of Spalding's policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Bourdeau then consulted with members of Spalding's operations group as to the disciplinary options available. Sexual harassment is "considered serious misconduct and will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination." Id. Taking into account plaintiff's entire work record and review of his personnel folder, Bourdeau concluded that termination was the appropriate disciplinary measure.

It should be emphasized that the tenor and extent of plaintiff's conduct, as found by Spalding, exceeded the court's summary here, which has focused only on undisputed facts.

Plaintiff was summoned to Bourdeau's office on or about September 19, 2000, at which time he was informed of the decision to terminate his employment and afforded an opportunity to speak on his behalf. Plaintiff thereafter exhausted the internal grievance procedure within the collective bargaining agreement between Spalding and Local 1851 without revocation of the termination.

Plaintiff has pointed out that it is disputed whether an extra-martial affair did in fact exist between Charest and Rattell, and whether there was subjective bias on the part of Charest in filing her complaint against plaintiff. Plaintiff is correct, but these facts are not material to the issue before the court. That the plaintiff made comments of a sexual nature to at least one fellow employee relating to Charest's personal life, after being told to stay away from the topic, is not disputed by either party. The truth of plaintiff's comments, or the sincerity of Charest's response, are not facts material to defendants' motions.

III. DISCUSSION A. Wrongful Discharge

Defendants had a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") which, under Article II "Management Functions," reserved to Spalding the right "to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause." (Presser Aff. Ex. A., at ¶ 2.01) The Agreement is not specific about what constitutes "proper cause" to justify the discharge of an employee. The court will therefore look to interpretations of this language set forth in the case law.

Massachusetts courts have generally recognized that employers have just cause to discharge an employee for reasons such as "lack of capacity or diligence, failure to conform to usual standards of conduct, or other culpable or inappropriate behavior." Losacco v. F.D. Rich Construction Co., 992 F.2d 382, 384 (1st. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). See also G M Emp. Ser., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 430 (1970). The courts have safeguarded employees from wrongful termination by requiring that discharge for just cause be "contrasted with discharge on unreasonable grounds or arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith." Id. at 435.

It is important to emphasize that a termination for proper cause does not require absolute proof that the employee committed the offense for which he was discharged. A useful discussion of the reasons for this is contained in the California Supreme Court's decision in Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).

In reversing a judgment in favor of an employee discharged for sexual harassment, the court held that the critical question in determining just cause was not whether the employee actually committed the offense. Rather, the key issue was "whether at the time the decision to terminate his employment was made, defendants, acting in good faith and following an investigation that was appropriate under the circumstances, had reasonable grounds for believing plaintiff had done so." Cotran, 948 P.2d at 423. (Emphasis supplied).

In this case, the simple facts are that Spalding was presented with a complaint by one of its employees alleging sexual harassment by another. In response, it conducted an investigation that yielded sufficient information and evidence to support the complaint. After consultation with the operations group, the decision was reached that plaintiff's conduct warranted his discharge. That this court might, based on its own investigation, conclude that defendant's action was rather harsh is irrelevant. Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no evidence to support plaintiff's claim that his dismissal was in bad faith or for arbitrary and capricious reasons.

An employer has an important role in safeguarding against a sexually hostile work environment. Employers are obligated by law to investigate any complaint of sexual harassment, and failure to perform this obligation may itself be actionable in court. As a result, an employer must be given "broad discretion in its efforts to eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace." Williams v. Maremont Corp., 875 F.2d 1476, 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). Such discretion includes "the right, within reason, to determine what types of speech and conduct fall within the prohibited category." Id. Where sexual harassment has been claimed, the employer must take appropriate remedial action after a good faith investigation of the complaint. Since defendant did no more than the law required on these facts, there is no basis for any claim of wrongful discharge.

B. Defamation

To succeed on a claim of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that Spalding's intentional false communications caused him injury. The undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Spalding reasonably believed that plaintiff was discussing the intimate details of his co-worker's alleged affair with other employees. After a proper investigation, its good faith determination was that the claims were accurate. The interviews, inquiries and discussions contained within its investigation do not constitute evidence sufficient to support plaintiff's defamation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the defendant discharged the plaintiff based on a reasonable belief that he violated its policy prohibiting sexual harassment. His discharge was, therefore, for proper cause and reasonable under the circumstances. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED.

The court notes Local 1852's additional motion for summary judgment under a theory of apportionment of damages. As stated earlier, to succeed on this hybrid claim plaintiff must prove both wrongful termination and failure of fair representation. For the reasons discussed, plaintiff is unable to support his claim of wrongful termination. Since summary judgment will enter on the entire claim, Local 1852's alternate arguments need not be addressed.

A separate order will issue.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 41 45) are hereby ALLOWED.

It is So Ordered.

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MULVIHILL v. SPALDING SPORTS WORLDWIDE INC
(Oct 16, 2002)