The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the undercover officer to testify anonymously (see People v. Stanard, 42 N.Y.2d 74, 83-84, cert denied 434 U.S. 986; People v. Kearse, 215 A.D.2d 104, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 797). Since the record clearly establishes, as the result of the court's questioning of the prosecutor, that concerns for the officer's safety warranted maintaining her anonymity, and defendant did not challenge the People's factual claims, the court was not required to conduct an inquiry of the undercover officer herself, although that would have been the better practice (see People v. Melendez, 269 A.D.2d 292, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 868). The court prevented any prejudice by instructing the jury not to draw any inference from the fact that the officer was being identified only by her shield number (see People v. Washington, 259 A.D.2d 365, 365-366, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 1006).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.