DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the facts and as an exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the plaintiff damages for future lost earnings, and granting a new trial with respect thereto; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs to the appellant, unless within 30 days after service upon the plaintiff of a copy of this decision and order, the plaintiff shall serve and file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, a written stipulation consenting to reduce the verdict as to future lost earnings from the sum of $1,302,000 to the sum of $700,000, and to the entry of an amended judgment accordingly; in the event that the plaintiff so stipulates, then the judgment, as so reduced and amended, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly set aside the verdict finding that the plaintiff was 35% at fault in the happening of the accident, and entered a judgment based upon the defendants' 100% fault in the happening of the accident. There was no "valid reasoning from which the jury could have concluded that the plaintiff engaged in conduct which fell below the standard required by a reasonably prudent person" (see Linszer v. Wachsman, 232 A.D.2d 530, 531).
The amount of damages to be awarded for personal injuries is primarily a question for the jury (see Schare v. Welsbach Elec. Corp., 138 A.D.2d 477, 478). The jury was entitled to credit the testimony of the plaintiff's treating physicians regarding the plaintiff's physical condition concerning future lost earnings, and to discredit the testimony of the defendants' witnesses regarding that issue (see Yacobellis v. National Amusements, supra; Teneriello v. Travelers Cos., supra; Salazar v. Fisher, supra). However, the award may be set aside when it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c]; Pellegrino v. Felici, 278 A.D.2d 212; Walsh v. Kings Plaza Replacement Serv., 239 A.D.2d 408). The award for future lost earnings is excessive to the extent indicated.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the defendants failed to rebut the presumption that the statutory interest rate of 9% was fair and reasonable (see Rodriguez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 91 N.Y.2d 76; Guido v. State of NY, 288 A.D.2d 345; Capolino Constr. Corp. v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 275 A.D.2d 347).
Further, we reject the defendants' contention that CPLR article 50-B payments are to commence after the conclusion of the appellate process (see Scannapieco v. City of New York, 298 A.D.2d 81 Brown v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 771; see also Iazzetti v. City of New York, 288 A.D.2d 127).
The defendants' remaining contentions are either without merit or unpreserved for appellate review.
RITTER, J.P., ALTMAN, H. MILLER and COZIER, JJ., concur.