Summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' Labor Law § 240(1) claim was properly denied since the record discloses the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the railing of the construction site ramp upon which plaintiff's accident occurred constituted an adequate safety device, and, if it did not, whether such failure was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury (see Labor Law § 240; McCann v. Cent. Synagogue, 280 A.D.2d 298). Although plaintiff did not fall from the ramp, the injuries he allegedly sustained in preventing himself from falling may be compensable under Labor Law § 240(1) if shown to have resulted from a failure to provide a proper safety device in accordance with the requirements of that statute (see Dominguez v. Lafayette-Boynton Hous. Corp., 240 A.D.2d 310; Gramigna v. Morse Diesel, Inc., 210 A.D.2d 115).
Plaintiffs Labor Law § 241(6) claim was, however, properly dismissed by reason of plaintiffs' failure to allege as the requisite predicate for such claim defendants' violation of a sufficiently specific Industrial Code regulation (see Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 505).
The motion court properly declined to dismiss plaintiffs' common-law negligence claim as against Regional Scaffolding for negligent construction of the ramp to the extent that there is evidence that the slope of the ramp was too steep. There is, however, no showing to support any other theory of negligence against Regional.
Finally, plaintiffs' Labor Law § 200(1) cause of action against A.J. Contracting should be reinstated since the evidence establishes that plaintiff, at the time of the alleged accident, was directly supervised by that defendant's employees (see e.g. Crespo v. Triad, Inc., 294 A.D.2d 145).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.