KURT D. ENGELHARDT, United States District Judge.
Before the Court are two motions: (1) a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60 on Behalf of Texaco Claimants, filed by Lonnie Fontenot, Wayne Thibodaux, and Alan LeBlanc; and (2) a Motion to Stay Hearing on Claimant's motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60. also filed by Fontenot, Thibodaux, and LeBlanc. For the reasons that follow, both motions are DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a March 25. 1999 bow-to-bow collision between a crewboat and a supply vessel. Fontenot, Thibodaux, and LeBlanc, were Texaco employees riding as passengers on the crewboat. Judge Edith Brown Clement conducted a bench trial in January 2001, and issued judgment in September 2001. The judgment awarded the passenger claimants damages against the crewboat and its owner, but exonerated the defendants associated with the supply boat. This judgment, as amended, is now on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Claimants now seek relief from the judgment on the basis of "newly discovered evidence that could not have been previously discovered prior to the District Court's ruling." Claimant's Motion at p. 1. They argue that "[s]ince the trial, all [three] passenger Claimants have had further medical complications." Claimant's Memo at p. 2. Since the trial, Mr. Thibodaux has begun to experience panic attacks on boats and has had further medical treatment for his cervical injury. Id Contrary to expectations at the time of trial, Mr. Fontenot's kidney removal surgery did not correct his hypertension. Id. at p. 3. Moreover, one of Mr. Fontenot's broken ribs has healed in a deformed manner, which has begun to cause him chest and cervical pain. Id. Mr. LeBlanc's "lumbar fusion has not healed as hoped," and his treating physician has recommended another surgery. Id at p. 4.
None of these circumstances qualify as "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 60. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2). To come within Rule 60(b)(2), the [n]ewly discovered evidence . . . must be evidence of facts existing at the time of the original trial." Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988); N.L.R.B v. Jacob F. Decker Sons, 569 F.2d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 1978) ("There can be no Rule 60(b)(2) relief for evidence which has only come into existence after the trial is over, for the obvious reason that to allow such a procedure could mean the perpetual continuation of all trials."). All of the facts enumerated by the claimants in support of their motion constitute posttrial developments in the claimants' medical conditions. Thus, they do not support relief under Rule 60.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60 on Behalf of Texaco Claimants and the Motion to Stay Hearing on Claimant's motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60 are DENIED.