J. DEAN MORGAN, J.
Michael Newman appeals a restitution order imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing stolen property in the second degree. Newman argues that there was no causal relationship between his possession of a stolen car and the damage that prompted the restitution order. We vacate part of the restitution award. On September 18, 2000, a Pierce County deputy sheriff saw Newman in the driver's seat of a car that matched the description of one recently reported stolen. Newman drove off as the deputy drove up, but the deputy arrested him after a short pursuit. Newman later entered a Newton plea to possessing stolen property in the second degree.
A Newton plea is entered when the defendant denies guilt but pleads guilty to obtain a lesser penalty. State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 372-73, 522 P.2d 682 (1976).
The State sought $2,745.02 as restitution for damage to the car, for the costs of towing the car after Newman's arrest, and for the loss of personal property taken from the car. At the restitution hearing, Newman objected to that amount on the ground that it was not related to his offense. Newman argued that he was seen in the car a week after it was stolen and that there was no evidence that he damaged the car or took any of its contents. The State responded that Newman should be held responsible for the damage to the car if not the loss of its contents. The court granted restitution for damages to the car's paint and top, for a pair of missing sheepskins, and for towing costs, for a total award of $2442.07. The court did not award restitution for the other personal property missing from the car. Before ordering restitution, a sentencing court must find that the victim's loss was causally connected to the defendant's crime. A causal connection exists when, but for the offense committed, the loss would not have occurred. Restitution cannot be based on the defendant's `general scheme' or acts `connected with' the crime charged, when those acts are not part of the charge.
State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 682, 974 P.2d 828 (1999).
State v. Hunotte, 69 Wn. App. 670, 676, 851 P.2d 694 (1993).
State v. Woods, 90 Wn. App. 904, 907-08, 953 P.2d 834, review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1021 (1998) (citing State v. Miszak, 69 Wn. App. 426, 428, 848 P.2d 1329 (1993)).
An exception exists, however, if the defendant expressly agrees to pay restitution for crimes other than those of which he or she was convicted. Citing State v. Tetters, Newman argues that the damage to the car was not part of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. In Tetters, the defendant pleaded guilty to third degree possession of stolen property. The owner's damages included loss of personal property taken from the stolen vehicle.
State v. Johnson, 69 Wn. App. 189, 191, 847 P.2d 960 (1993).
81 Wn. App. 478, 914 P.2d 784 (1996).
The trial court awarded restitution that included such loss. Division One reversed because the loss of personal property was not shown to be causally related to the defendant's crime. `No evidence has been presented to suggest that Tetters was in possession of the vehicle either from the time it was taken, or when the items were taken from the vehicle.' In an earlier case, Division One found a causal relationship because the damage had undisputedly occurred during the defendant's lengthy possession of the vehicle. In that case, a juvenile was charged with second degree possession of stolen property. Although he admitted being in sole possession of a car from the moment he stole it until he drove it off the road 13 days later, he denied causing the loss in question. Division One upheld the restitution award, noting that the juvenile's illegal possession of the vehicle for the entire period during which the victim was out of possession permitted an inference that he had caused the damage. `[T]here is sufficient evidence that but for defendant's illegal act, the victim's property would not have been in a position to sustain the damage it did.' The link between Newman's conduct and the damage in issue is more tenuous.
Tetters, 81 Wn. App. at 481.
Tetters, 81 Wn. App. at 480 (citing State v. Harrington, 56 Wn. App. 176, 180, 782 P.2d 1101 (1989)).
Harrington, 56 Wn. App. at 177-78.
Harrington, 56 Wn. App. at 180.
There is no evidence that Newman was in possession of the car during the entire week that the victim was out of possession. The only evidence presented at the plea and restitution hearings shows that Newman was seen in the car a week after it was reported stolen and that officers recovered the car without incident shortly afterward. The State made no showing that Newman caused the damage to the car, that he possessed the car before it was damaged, or that he was present when the damage occurred. There is no way of knowing who was responsible for damaging the car or when the damage occurred. Nor is there evidence showing who possessed the car when the sheepskins were taken. Given these uncertainties, we cannot draw the inferences necessary to conclude that Newman was more likely than not the person responsible for damaging the vehicle and taking its contents.
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Newman to pay restitution for the damage to the stolen vehicle as well as for the loss of the sheepskins. The towing charges that resulted after Newman's arrest were a direct consequence of his unlawful possession of the car and were properly awarded as restitution.
We vacate those portions of the restitution order concerning the sheepskins and the damage to the car. We affirm that portion compensating the victim for the towing costs. We remand to the trial court for revision of its order.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
WE CONCUR: HOUGHTON, J., ARMSTRONG, J.