DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the father's contentions, the hearing examiner's support order was not erroneously based upon income imputed to him from an apartment building that he previously, but no longer owns, or upon any of his other past business ventures. Rather, the hearing examiner based the support order "solely upon [the father's] reported rental income" on his 1999 tax return, which was derived from rents collected from the remaining building that he owned. We note that the hearing examiner properly discredited the father's attempt to deduct depreciation from his rental income, as this is not an actual expense and has no bearing on his ability to provide support for his children (see Matter of Calabrese v. Johnston, 274 A.D.2d 971; Haas v. Haas, 265 A.D.2d 887; Matter of Mireille J. v. Ernst F.J., 220 A.D.2d 503). Moreover, in light of the father's admission that the majority of the tenants of that building paid their rent in cash, the hearing examiner providently exercised her discretion in imputing income to the father beyond the amounts reported in his tax return (see Matter of Scomello v. Scomello, 260 A.D.2d 483, 484; Graziano v. Graziano, 285 A.D.2d 488; Matter of Graves v. Smith, 284 A.D.2d 332, 333).
The parties submitted little documentary evidence. Thus, the determination of the hearing examiner was based largely upon her assessment of the parties' credibility (see Matter of Grant v. Grant, 265 A.D.2d 19, 22-23; Matter of Andre v. Warren, 192 A.D.2d 491). Such determinations are best made by the hearing examiner, who had a first-hand opportunity to see and hear the witnesses (see Matter of Cattell v. Cattell, 254 A.D.2d 357; Matter of Rolle v. Murphy, 254 A.D.2d 285; Matter of Tyler v. Minott, 206 A.D.2d 537, 538). Inasmuch as the hearing examiner's determinations were supported by the record, they were properly sustained by the Family Court over the father's objections (see Matter of Musumeci v. Musumeci, 295 A.D.2d 516; Matter of Ferraro v. Nash, 293 A.D.2d 538, 539; Matter of Doyle v. Doyle, 230 A.D.2d 795, 796).
The hearing examiner correctly calculated the father's support obligation, as the noncustodial parent, without calculating the mother's obligation. In this case, the father's obligation is essentially the same regardless of the income of the custodial mother (see Besharov, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act, § 413, at 96). Indeed, notwithstanding the absence of documentary proof of the mother's income, her testimony established that her annual income was of $20,828. That figure, when added to the father's total annual income, which is $62,086.97, yields a combined income of $82,914.97. The parties' combined basic support obligation for their three children, based on the statutory percentage of 29%, is $24,045.34 (see Family Ct Act § 413[b][3][iii]). The mother's income is approximately 25% of that of the father. Thus, her proportionate share of support is $6,011.33, leaving the father's 75% share at $18,034.01. This amount is essentially what the hearing examiner found, attributing an annual support obligation of $18,000 to the father, excluding arrears.
The father's remaining contentions are without merit.
FEUERSTEIN, J.P., S. MILLER, FRIEDMANN and COZIER, JJ., concur.