VIRGINIA M. MORGAN, United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2000, Marty Hawley applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act.See 42 U.S.C. § 416(i), 423, 1381a, 1382c(3)(A). The application was denied, and Hawley requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
A hearing was held on September 18, 2001, following which the ALJ — William J. Musseman — ruled that Hawley was not eligible for disability benefits or supplemental security income. Hawley filed a complaint in this Court on November 6, 2001, seeking reversal of Judge Musseman's ruling. The Commissioner answered the complaint, and both parties have filed a motion for summary judgment.
The case was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that judgment enter in favor of Defendant.
II. DISCUSSION
A "disability" is defined in pertinent part as the
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months
. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Sixth Circuit recently explained:
A five-step analysis is utilized for evaluating disability claims.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant must first show that she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Next, the claimant must demonstrate that she has a "severe impairment."
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A finding of "disabled" will be made at the third step if the claimant can that demonstrate that her impairment meets the durational requirement and "meets or equals a listed impairment."
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the fourth step requires the claimant to prove that she is incapable of performing work that she has done in the past.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Finally, if the claimant's impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, then other factors, including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, must be considered to determine if other work can be performed.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at this fifth step to establish the claimant's ability to do other work.
Foster v. Halter,
279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
Hawley's disability claim was based on a combination of alleged medical problems: (1) an injured left ankle, headaches, and hemi-paresis of the diaphragm, all attributed to a motorcycle accident in June of 1991; (2) a right-shoulder injury sustained in September of 1996; and (3) carpal tunnel syndrome ("CTS") in the right wrist. See tr. at 20-23. Judge Musseman determined that Hawley had "not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability." Tr. at 26. The ankle/shoulder injuries and CTS were determined to have resulted in "impairments that are severe within the meaning of the Regulations[,] but not severe enough to meet or medically equal of the impairments listed in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4." Tr. at 23. Because of the severity of the impairments, Judge Musseman further determined that the 36-year-old Hawley, who previously had been employed "as a machine operator," was "no longer capable of performing his past relevant work." Tr. at 19, 23. See Vocational Analysis (Tr. at 741) (describing the title of machine operator as "unskilled" labor with an "[e]xertional level" of "med[ium]"). However, Judge Musseman concluded that Hawley had "the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of sedentary work," and that there were "a significant number of jobs . . . in the lower peninsula of . . . Michigan" which "he could perform." Tr. at 26-27. Thus the non-disability determination was based on Judge Musseman's determination that the Commissioner prevailed at the fifth step in the "five-step analysis" described in Foster — i.e., Hawley had the "ability to do other work." Foster, 279 F.3d at 354.
Hawley's "residual functional capacity" was more specifically described by Judge Musseman as follows: "sedentary work which does not involve the use of the right supper [sic] extremity for overhead tasks, nor for pushing or pulling; nor work with air or vibrating tool; nor crawling, kneeling or climbing." Tr. at 26.
The Court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Walters v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."). Defendant asserts in its motion for summary judgment that Judge Musseman's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Defendant's Motion at ¶ 2. In his own motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff disputes that assertion.
Hawley's objection to Judge Musseman's decision relates to a "Medical Source Statement" prepared on September 4, 2001, by Thomas R. Wilson, D.O. Tr. at 1059. (hereafter, the "Statement"). According to Hawley, Judge Musseman should have accorded "controlling weight" to the Statement, but instead implicitly rejected it. Plaintiff's Brief at 14-19. Hawley asserts that rejection of the Statement "is not supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 19.
In the Statement, which is a questionnaire, Dr. Wilson described Hawley as having the following limitations:
(1) He "experience[s] . . . pain or other symptoms severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration" on a "[f]requent (75%)" basis. Tr. at 1060.
(2) His "ability to deal with work stress" is "[m]arked[ly] limit[ed] (75%)."
Id.
(3) He can "
continuously sit . . . for 60 minutes "
at one time."
Id.
(4) He can "
continuously . . . stand for 30 minutes "
at one time."
Id.
(5) During an 8-hour working day "with normal breaks," the total amount of time he "can sit and stand/walk" is "less than 2 hours."
Id.
(6) He must take 8 or more 10-minute walks in the course of an 8-hour working day.
Id.
(7) He must take "[s]everal" unscheduled 10-minute rest breaks "during an 8 hour working day." Tr. at 1061.
(8) He can "frequently" lift and carry less than 10 pounds, "occasionally" lift and carry 10 pounds, and "never" lift and carry 20 pounds.
Id.
(9) During an 8-hour work day, he can repetitively use his right hand and the fingers of his right hand only 20% of the time, and cannot repetitively use his right arm for reaching at all.
See id.
(10) His impairments are "likely" to cause him to miss work "more than three times a month." Tr. at 1062.
These limitations were not fully taken into account by Judge Musseman in ascertaining what "other work" Hawley could perform. See supra n. 1. With respect to this issue, Judge Musseman reasoned as follows:
(1) Hawley had previously applied for disability benefits, and that application was denied on April 28, 1999.
(2) There was no evidence that Hawley's impairments had worsened since April 28, 1999.
(3) Hawley's residual functional capacity was therefore the same as it was determined to be in connection with the 1999 ruling.
(4) The testimony of the vocational expert, Sandra K. Steele, during the hearing on the previous application (held January 13, 1999), remained valid given the lack of a change in Hawley's condition.
See Tr. at 18, 25.
Steele's testimony at the 1999 hearing concerning the type of jobs which Hawley could perform did not fully incorporate limitations of the type which were later outlined in the Statement. See Tr. at 1203-06. Thus Hawley is correct in asserting that Judge Musseman implicitly declined to accept the Statement at face value — a fact which Defendant concedes. See Defendant's Brief at 14 ("The ALJ . . . did not assign significant weight to . . . [certain] opinions" expressed in the Statement.). The next question is whether, as Hawley argues, this rejection mandates reversal.
"Provided that they are based on sufficient medical data, `[t]he medical opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians are generally accorded substantial deference, and if the opinions are uncontradicted, complete deference.'" Howard v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) ("Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations."). But as Howard itself acknowledges, this is a general rule. Hawley cites no case for the proposition that the rule applies even if the treating physician's opinion is contrary to an earlier finding of an ALJ. And that is the situation presented here, as the Statement does not purport to identify changes in Hawley's status subsequent to April 28, 1999. To the contrary, the Statement described limitations which, according to Dr. Wilson, had "been in effect since at least" December 17, 1996. Tr. at 1062.
The ALJ ruling of April 28, 1999, was binding on both Hawley and Defendant "absent changed circumstances." Drummond v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir. 1997). See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) ("The findings and decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing."). Since the Statement does not speak to post-ruling changes in Hawley's circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata applies. See Drummond, 126 F.3d at 840-42.
The purpose of res judicata is "to `relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.'"Id. at 840 (citations omitted). This important function would be greatly undermined if an unsuccessful disability claimant could use his treating physician's after-the-fact opinion as a means of collaterally attacking the validity of an otherwise binding decision of the ALJ. The Court should therefore conclude that evidence — even if in the form of an opinion from the claimant's treating physician — is entitled to no weight insofar as it contradicts a binding decision of the ALJ. Because the Statement is contrary to the ALJ ruling on April, 28, 1999, Judge Musseman could properly disregard it.
Perhaps recognizing that the Statement is silent on the issue of whether his circumstances had changed since April of 1999, Hawley suggests that in lieu of showing change, res judicata can be averted by the introduction of "new and additional evidence." Plaintiff's Brief at 13. Drummond does in fact refer to the need for "new and additional evidence" before "the Social Security Administration [can exercise] . . . unfettered discretion to reexamine issues previously determined." Drummond, 126 F.3d at 842. But the context makes clear that this reference is to evidence that circumstances have in fact changed since the entry of the prior decision. See, e.g., id. ("Absent evidence of an improvement in a claimant's condition, a subsequent ALJ is bound by the findings of a previous ALJ.").
Nor does it make much sense to forego res judicata if the evidence in question, while "new" in the sense that it was generated (or submitted) after the earlier ALJ decision, is "old" in the sense that it revisits the same issue previously addressed by the ALJ. As suggested earlier, this approach would greatly weaken the objective of finality which the doctrine of res judicata is designed to promote. The Court should therefore reject Hawley's contention that application of the doctrine can be circumvented via the introduction of "new" evidence which does not point to the conclusion that the claimant's impairments changed in nature or severity after entry of the prior ALJ decision.
Since Judge Musseman did not even explicitly reject the Statement, it should come as no surprise that he provided no explanation for the rejection. Hawley is correct in arguing that it was incumbent upon Judge Musseman to explain this aspect of his decision. See Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987) ("While the ALJ was not bound by the opinions of plaintiff's treating physicians, he was required to set forth some basis for rejecting these opinions." (emphasis added)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) ("We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion.").
However, Hawley cites no authority which squarely supports the dubious proposition that an ALJ's failure to explain his decision to discredit a physician's opinion mandates reversal even when, as in this case, the decision is clearly justified. Moreover, such a proposition is clearly at odds with the principle that judicial review of the Commissioner's ruling is limited to ascertaining whether (1) the "correct legal standards" were applied; or (2) the "findings of fact" are supported "by substantial evidence in the record." Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. Judge Musseman's failure to cite grounds for rejecting the Statement does not demonstrate that either of these two standards was violated. This failure therefore does not warrant reversal. Cf. Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) ("No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result.").
Hawley advanced two other arguments in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment — namely, that Judge Musseman improperly accorded res judicata effect to the ALJ's 1999 ruling, and that in examining Steele (who again testified at the hearing before Judge Musseman), he failed to pose hypothetical questions based on the limitations outlined in the Statement. See Plaintiff's Brief at 12, 20. Like the no-controlling-weight argument already discussed, however, the premise of these arguments is that Judge Musseman could not properly disregard the Statement insofar as it described limitations different from, or more severe than, those recognized in the ALJ ruling issued in April of 1999. Since that premise is incorrect, the Court should reject these arguments as well.
For the reasons discussed, Hawley's arguments in support of his motion for summary judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's own motion for summary judgment are unavailing. The Court should therefore grant Defendant's motion. Cf. Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[I]t . . . [is] utterly inappropriate for the court to abandon its position of neutrality in favor of a role equivalent to champion for the . . . party [opposing a motion for summary judgment]: seeking out facts, developing legal theories, and finding ways to defeat the motion. . . . [F.R.Civ.P. 56] requires the non-moving party to do its own work, and to assist the trial court by responding to the motion, pointing out as specifically as is reasonably possible facts that might demonstrate the existence of genuine issues.").
III. CONCLUSION
It is therefore recommended that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, Defendant's motion seeking the same relief be granted, and judgment be entered for Defendant.