NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR., Senior United States District Judge
This cause comes before the court upon the plaintiffs' applications for review and objection to magistrate judge's orders. This order addresses two separate appeals. The first appeal was filed on August 16, 2002, and the second was filed on September 25, 2002. Upon due consideration of the applications, the responses thereto, and the parties' memoranda and exhibits, the court is ready to rule.
In the first appeal the plaintiffs move this court to overrule Magistrate Judge Bogen's August 2, 2002, order granting the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' expert designation of Harvey Hall. The plaintiffs timely designated Hall as an expert in the field of safety engineering but provided an incomplete report which they subsequently supplemented. The magistrate judge found, however, that the report, even after supplementation, was insufficient to comply with the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B) because the opinions expressed appeared to rely entirely on allegations in the complaint and were not scientifically based.
Having reviewed the magistrate judge's order and the documents upon which he based his decision, the court finds that the order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The plaintiffs' August 16, 2002, appeal is, therefore, denied.
In the second appeal the plaintiffs move the court to overrule Magistrate Judge Bogen's September 9, 2002, order granting the defendant's motion to strike four of the plaintiffs' lay witnesses. Magistrate Judge Bogen granted the motion to strike because the plaintiffs' response was untimely. The court also addressed the merits of the motion and found that the plaintiffs had designated these four witnesses only eight days before the discovery deadline without valid reason for the delay.
The plaintiffs' argue that their response was timely. This court disagrees. The defendant filed its motion to strike on August 15, 2002. Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the computation of time and provides that "the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included." The rule further provides that when the time period allowed is less than eleven days, intermediate weekends and legal holidays are to be excluded in the computation. Additionally, a three-day period for service by mail is allowed when responding to a "notice or paper" also served by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e). "The procedure followed in the Northern District of Mississippi for periods of time less than 11 days is to count the mail time first, followed by the ten day or less period." U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. King Enterprises, Inc., No. 3:94CV184-S-A, 1998 WL 433950, at *1 (N.D.Miss. May 28, 1998). This court does not exclude weekends and holidays from the three-day mail period.
Following the guidelines provided by Rule 6 and this court's standard procedure, the court finds that the plaintiffs' response to the defendant's motion to strike was due on August 30, 2002. The plaintiffs appear to have calculated the time period by adding the three-day mail period to the end and by excluding weekends and holidays from that three-day period. The response was dated September 3, 2002, but was not received by Magistrate Judge Bogen's office until September 6. Uniform Local Rule 7.2(C)(2) provides that the court may grant a motion as unopposed if a party fails to respond within the time allotted. The magistrate judge was, therefore, correct in granting the defendant's motion to strike, as the plaintiffs' response was clearly untimely.
Though, by virtue of Local Rule 7.2, the magistrate judge was not required to address the merits of the plaintiffs' response, Judge Bogen chose to consider the arguments raised and found that the defendant would be prejudiced by the plaintiffs' unjustified delay in identifying the four witnesses. This court finds that the magistrate judge's order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). The plaintiffs' September 25, 2002, appeal is, therefore, denied.
It is, therefore, ORDERED:
That the plaintiffs' application for review and objection to magistrate judge's order, filed August 16, 2002, is DENIED and
That the plaintiffs' application for review and objection to magistrate judge's order, filed September 25, 2002, is DENIED.