R. ALLAN EDGAR, Chief United States District Judge
Defendant Chattanooga Publishing Company makes a renewed motion for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-311, FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2), and E.D. TN. LR 54.1(e)(7). [Court File No. 50]. Plaintiff opposes the motion. [Court File No. 53]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the motion will be DENIED.
Plaintiff contends the renewed motion for attorney's fees should not be decided at this time while the case is on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Plaintiff asserts that it is not yet known who is the prevailing party. However, this Court prefers to rule on the motion now so the defendant will be in a position, if it so desires, to take an appeal on the issue of attorney's fees and the entire case can be considered by the Sixth Circuit in one appellate proceeding. This Court's ruling on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees at this time will promote judicial economy.
Plaintiff Willie Jefferson brought this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201-219, the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-101-903, and Tennessee contract law. He alleges that his employer, Chattanooga Publishing Company, discriminated and retaliated against him because of his race as an African-American and failed to accommodate his religion in violation of Title VII and the THRA. Plaintiff also alleges that the defendant failed to pay him overtime wages as required by the FLSA. Finally, the plaintiff claims the defendant breached a contract by failing to provide the plaintiff with severance pay.
On January 31, 2002, this Court granted partial summary judgment in the defendant's favor pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The plaintiff's claims under Title VII and the THRA, along with his breach of contract claim, were dismissed with prejudice. Defendant now seeks to recover attorney's fees on these claims which were dismissed on summary judgment.
Under the "American Rule," parties in civil litigation are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees. The federal courts generally do not award attorney's fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority permitting such an award. Buckhannon Board and Home Care, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2001). Title VII contains a fee shifting statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that in any action or proceeding under Title VII, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs.
The standard for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants/employers in Title VII cases is different from the standard applicable to prevailing plaintiffs. In Title VII cases, a federal district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only upon a finding that the plaintiff's Title VII cause of action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see also Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 422, 432 (6th Cir. 1995); Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 1987); Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d 180, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1985).
In Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421-22, the Supreme Court explains:
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.
That § 706(k) allows fee awards only to prevailing private plaintiffs should assure that this statutory provision will not in itself operate as an incentive to the bringing of claims that have little chance of success. To take the further step of assessing attorney's fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to say, if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in bad faith there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with the attorney's fees incurred by the defense.
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547-48; Wrenn, 808 F.2d at 505.
An award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant/employer in a Title VII case is rare. The Sixth Circuit holds that an award of attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff in a federal civil rights action is an extreme sanction and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct. Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547; Jones v. The Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986).
To determine whether plaintiff Jefferson's Title VII claims of discrimination in employment were "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless," the Court considers his basis for filing this lawsuit. Riddle, 266 F.3d at 548; Smith, 754 F.2d at 183. When the standard enunciated in Christiansburg Garment Co. and its progeny is applied in the instant case, this Court concludes it is not appropriate to award attorney's fees to defendant Chattanooga Publishing Company pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Based on the facts and circumstances, the Court cannot say that plaintiff Jefferson's Title VII claims were frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation at the time when suit was initially filed. This is not an egregious case where the extreme sanction of attorney's fees should be imposed upon plaintiff Jefferson. Cf. Wrenn, 808 F.3d at 504-505.
Furthermore, the defendant is not entitled to recover any attorney's fees under TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-311. Section 4-21-311(a) authorizes a court, in its discretion, to award a reasonable fee for the plaintiff's attorney in cases brought under the THRA where the plaintiff is the prevailing party. Section 4-21-311 does not permit an award of attorney's fees to a defendant employer.
Accordingly, the defendant's renewed motion for attorney's fees will be DENIED.
A separate order will enter.
ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, the defendant's renewed motion for attorney's fees [Court File No. 50] is DENIED.