DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
To invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, the Supreme Court must determine that the party's failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful, deliberate, and contumacious conduct or its equivalent. The willful and contumacious character of a party's conduct can be inferred from his or her repeated failures to appear for examination before trial, coupled with inadequate excuses for these defaults. It is also well settled that the determination whether or not to strike a pleading lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see CPLR 3126; Patterson v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 284 A.D.2d 382). The fact that a defendant has disappeared or made himself or herself unavailable is not a basis for denying a motion to strike his or her answer for failure to appear at a deposition (see Robinson v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 288 A.D.2d 367; Torres v. Martinez, 250 A.D.2d 759). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the appellants' answer based on the repeated and inadequately explained failure of the defendant Christopher Baez to appear for an examination before trial.
In addition, the defendant 85 Theodor Fremd Avenue Corp. established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on its cross claim for indemnification (see generally LePore v. DiCarlo, 272 A.D.2d 878). The appellants failed to raise an issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
FEUERSTEIN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, LUCIANO, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.