Contrary to the fourth affirmative defense, the alleged libel has a defamatory meaning (see Suozzi v. Parente, 202 A.D.2d 94, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 85 N.Y.2d 923), and contrary to the third affirmative defense, the text of the flier supports a claim for libel per se (see Chiavarelli v. Williams, 256 A.D.2d 111, 113). Contrary to the third and fourth affirmative defenses, the complained-of assertions are not loose, figurative or hyperbolic statements (cf. Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34), and they are not shielded by the opinion privilege because they "imply the existence of undisclosed underlying facts" that would support defendant's opinion and would be detrimental to plaintiffs (see Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 153), especially since they allege criminal conduct (see id. at 155). As to the second affirmative defense, defendant waived all qualified privileges, and has not demonstrated that he has any other viable defense rooted in the First Amendment. The second, third and fourth affirmative defenses are therefore dismissed, but only as to the above-specified causes of action, since plaintiffs' motion was expressly confined to those causes of action (see Dunham v. Hilco Constr. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 425, 429-430).
In all other respects we affirm the motion court's denial of summary judgment, since plaintiffs have not sustained their burden, as summary judgment movants, of demonstrating the absence of a triable question of fact. Defendant's affidavits raise a question as to plaintiffs' allegation that he created and posted the so-called modified notice, and in any event, defendant has raised a substantial issue as to his defense that the allegedly defamatory statements are true (cf. Saunders v. County of Washington, 255 A.D.2d 788, 791; see Carter v. Visconti, 233 A.D.2d 473, 474, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 811). Defendant is not collaterally estopped from proving the truth of his accusations, since plaintiffs have not shown, as was their burden (see Kappas v. T.W. Kutter, Inc., 192 A.D.2d 402, 403), that the same issue was raised in the prior administrative and Civil Court proceedings upon which they rely (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295, 303-304, cert denied 535 US ___, 122 S.Ct. 2293). The denial of plaintiffs' motion for a protective order was a proper exercise of the motion court's broad discretion with respect to the conduct of discovery (see Daniels v. City of New York, 291 A.D.2d 260). Although it would have been erroneous for the motion court to have transferred this matter pursuant to CPLR 325(d) to a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs adequate relief (see Zuckermann v. Spector, 287 A.D.2d 402), plaintiffs have no sustainable claim for relief that Civil Court is without jurisdiction to provide. Plaintiffs' demand for a prior restraint enjoining libel is barred by First Amendment principles (see Rosenberg Diamond Dev. Corp. v. Appel, 290 A.D.2d 239). As was held in a prior, unappealed order of the motion court, plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in damages (see Singer v. Romerrick Realty Corp., 255 A.D. 715).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.