MELINA v. BROOKLYN PARK BUDGET CARS, INC., (D.Minn. 2002)

PAUL A. MAGNUSON, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff's sexual harassment and retaliation claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion.

Plaintiff Deborah Melina worked for two years at a car dealership owned by Defendants Brooklyn Park Budget Cars, Inc. and Morrie's Imports, Inc. ("Defendants" or "Morrie's"). Melina received good performance reviews and promotions, but Defendants claim that she demonstrated a uniquely uncooperative attitude during her employment. Melina claims that she experienced sexual harassment and was ultimately fired for complaining about the harassment.

Her sexual harassment claims are based on the conduct of a minority owner and supervisor, Ronald Wolff. Melina worked evenings and would frequently receive phone calls from Wolff. She claims that he would call the dealership while inebriated. During one such phone call, Wolff told Melina that he loved her and that she was the best thing that had happened to him. Neither party suggests that the two had any kind of romantic relationship, but Melina became upset and uncomfortable with the way Wolff treated her and talked to her when he called the business at night. He made nearly daily calls, ostensibly to check on the business each evening. Melina also describes two other incidents which constitute her harassment claim. Wolff scolded her one afternoon after she returned from a lunch date. He also demanded that she go straight home one night instead of going on a date with one of her friends. Melina characterizes his behavior as like a "jealous lover."

Defendants claim that Melina displayed a poor attitude, at times crossing the line to insubordination. On one occasion, she and a supervisor, Joe Ruhland, had a disagreement over the sale of a car that had been previously promised to another customer. The disagreement culminated in Ruhland sending Melina home for the remainder of her shift. Melina left the business and called her sister from a car in the parking lot. After an hour, Melina returned to speak with Ruhland. At this time, she told Ruhland about Wolff's phone calls and his inappropriate conduct. She and Ruhland agreed that she would take the rest of the day off, and he relayed her harassment concerns to human resources. Additionally, Ruhland asked Wolff to stop calling the business at night. Melina had no problems with Wolff's conduct after her meeting with Ruhland. The disagreement with Ruhland and Melina's subsequent behavior led the dealership to put Melina on suspension, pending the outcome of an investigation into her harassment claims. Upon completing the investigation and concluding that the claims were unfounded, the dealership terminated Melina.

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), which provides that such a motion shall be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996).

The burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact rests on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). In employment discrimination cases, courts should not grant summary judgment motions unless the evidence can only support one conclusion. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994), quoted in Calvin v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 99-3809, 2000 WL 995011, at *3 (8th Cir. July 20, 2002).

Melina brings this action under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn.Stat. § 363.03. Courts look to Title VII case law to analyze both claims. Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). In this case, Melina must establish the very same elements of a prima facie case under both Title VII and the MHRA for her harassment and retaliation claims.

To prove a claim of sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of the following four elements: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; and (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Beard v. Flying J., Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 797-98 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Woodland v. Ryerson Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999)). To actually alter the terms and conditions of employment, conduct must be severe and pervasive, both objectively and subjectively. Woodland, 302 F.3d at 843; Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934 (both cases citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993)).

Factors to consider when determining the severity and pervasiveness of an employer's conduct include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Woodland, 302 F.3d at 843; Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934.

The conduct in this case does not surpass the high threshold established in Harris for a hostile work environment claim. In Duncan, the prima facie case included evidence that the defendant: (1) repeatedly touched the plaintiff's hand; (2) propositioned the plaintiff; (3) asked the plaintiff to sketch a planter he displayed in his office; the planter was shaped like a man wearing a sombrero and had a hole in the front of the man's pants through which a cactus protruded; (4) showed plaintiff on multiple occasions a novelty pacifier (shaped like a penis) that he kept at work; (5) used a screen saver depicting a naked woman; and (6) made off-color gender-related jokes. The Eighth Circuit concluded that, assuming their truth, even all of these troubling allegations taken together did not pose a question of fact on whether the employer's conduct created an objectively hostile work environment and did not meet the standard necessary for actionable sexual harassment. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934. The Eight Circuit panel was able to recognize that the defendant's actions "were boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly immature." In this case, Ronald Wolff, a part owner of Morrie's, made multiple phone calls to Melina while allegedly inebriated. During one of them, Wolff professed his love for her. Melina also maintains that Wolff got angry at her for dating another man and occasionally expressed jealousy over her. These allegations fall far short of the conduct in Duncan and therefore do not exhibit the severity and pervasiveness necessary to alter a term or condition of employment.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination, Melina must show that she filed a charge of discrimination or engaged in some other protected activity, that an adverse employment action was taken against her, and that there was a causal connection between the two. Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Kipp v. Mo. Highway Transp. Comm'n, 280 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 2002). While Melina establishes the first two components of a prima facie case of retaliation, she has not established the third.

Defendants claim that Melina has failed to demonstrate the first element of her prima facie case. They argue that Melina did not engage in protected activity because her supervisor's conduct does not constitute sexual harassment as a matter of law. However, the "underlying charge need not be meritorious for related activity to be protected under the participation clause." Brower, 178 F.3d at 1006. Instead, the plaintiff must show a good faith reasonable belief that the underlying challenged conduct violated the law. Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., Inc., 216 F.3d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Wentz v. Md. Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1989)). In this case, a reasonable person could believe that Wolff's conduct violated laws prohibiting sexual harassment.

Defendants then argue that Melina fails to prove the third prong of her prima facie case: causation. Where multiple motives influence an employer's decision, the terms "causal link" or "causation" mean "that an employer's `retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action.'" Kipp, 280 F.3d at 896-97 (adopting the holding in Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1990)). "Evidence that gives rise to `an inference of retaliatory motive' on the part of the employer is sufficient to establish a causal link." Id. (quoting Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1993) and Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1989)). In this case, Melina testified that she "was being terminated for making the harassment complaint." (Smith Aff. Ex. 1 at 65-66; Strathman Aff. Ex. A at 65-66.) Additionally, other evidence in the record shows that the investigation into Melina's allegations had some bearing on Morrie's decision to discharge Melina. (See, e.g., Smith Aff. Ex. 4 at 86-87, Ex. 10; Strathman Aff. Ex. A(5), Ex. B at 86-87.) This evidence, however, does not give rise to an inference of retaliatory motive. On the contrary, this evidence shows that Morrie's fired Melina only after it concluded that her harassment allegations were not actionable. Had their internal investigation shown otherwise, the evidence suggests that Morrie's would have continued to employ Melina indefinitely. While there is evidence in the record that the internal investigation had some bearing on the ultimate employment action, the evidence shows quite the opposite of a retaliatory motive. Therefore, the record shows that Melina has not established causation.

Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title VII and the MHRA. Likewise, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the MHRA. Accordingly, after review of the record, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 27) is GRANTED.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.