DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Since the "homestead exemption" (CPLR 5206[b]) was created to protect a homeowner against seizure of his or her dwelling to satisfy a money judgment (see Wyoming County Bank Trust Co. v. Kiley, 75 A.D.2d 477; In re Flatt, 160 B.R. 497), the appellant, as a judgment creditor, was not entitled to assert the exemption as a defense to the instant proceeding. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's motion for injunctive relief.
The appellant's three judgment liens, which are superior to the petitioner's lien, provided him with a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceeding (see Perl v. Aspromonte Realty Corp., 143 A.D.2d 824; Vantage Petroleum v. Board of Assessment Review OF Town of Babylon, 91 A.D.2d 1037, affd 61 N.Y.2d 695). However, that right did not necessarily involve the right to participate in every aspect of the proceedings (see Matter of Karl Springer Woodworking, 148 Misc.2d 626). Since the appellant was not entitled to assert the homestead exemption, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the appellant's intervention by not allowing him to serve an answer or move to dismiss the proceeding.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion pursuant to CPLR 5206(e) in appointing a receiver to conduct a private sale of the premises (see U.S. v. Vulpis, 967 F.2d 734).
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.
KRAUSMAN, J.P., McGINITY, SCHMIDT and MASTRO, JJ., concur.