DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
An abutting landowner will not be liable to a pedestrian passing by on a public sidewalk unless the landowner, inter alia, caused the defect to occur because of some special use of the sidewalk (see Kaufman v. Silver, 90 N.Y.2d 204; Hausser v. Giunta, 88 N.Y.2d 449; Ritts v. Teslenko, 276 A.D.2d 768). Here, the plaintiff tripped and fell on a public sidewalk directly adjacent to the driveway of the premises owned and used by the abutting landowners. The evidence fails to support the plaintiff's allegation that the defect was caused by the special use of the sidewalk as a driveway or that the driveway in any way contributed to the allegedly defective condition (see Moschillo v. City of New York, 290 A.D.2d 260; Benenati v. City of New York, 282 A.D.2d 418; Waldron v. City of New York, 260 A.D.2d 471; Winberry v. City of New York, 257 A.D.2d 618). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the separate motions of the defendants Bashar Dumar and Ilham P. Dumar and the defendants Rae Scotto and Leonard Frances Scotto for summary judgment.
KRAUSMAN, J.P., McGINITY, SCHMIDT and MASTRO, JJ., concur.