WARREN K. URBOM, United States Senior District Judge
Tenneco Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Walker Manufacturing (hereafter Tenneco) has moved for dismissal of the cross-claim of Adaptive Motion Control Systems, Inc. (Adaptive) for failure to state a claim against Tenneco. The ground is that the exclusive-remedy and subrogation provisions of the Nebraska Workers Compensation Act prohibit claims for contribution or indemnity by a third-party tort-feasor against the employer of an injured worker covered by the Act.
David Wulf was working for Tenneco when he was injured using a pipe-bending machine designed and manufactured by Adaptive. Tenneco possessed a subrogation interest in any recovery against Adaptive by Wulf because of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-118. Adaptive, sued as a third-party tort-feasor, claims in its cross-claim that Tenneco is obligated to Adaptive because of "Quote No. MI-157-99" which provides, among other things, that "The customer [Tenneco] agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Adaptive Motion Control Systems for any and all damage, losses and/or injury directly or indirectly caused by a failure of or use or misuse of the services, item, or machine provided by Adaptive Motion Control Systems. . . ."
Both Tenneco and Adaptive acknowledge that there is at least one exception to the concept that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act prohibits claims for contribution or indemnity by a third-party tort-feasor against the employer of an injured worker covered by the Act. In Nebraska that exception is expressed in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Company, 229 Neb. 160, 425 N.W.2d 872 (1988), and Oddo v. Speedway Scaffold Company, 233 Neb. 1, 443 N.W.2d 596 (1989). In the Union Pacific case the court said at page 169:
We find nothing in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, by express provision or implication, and nothing in the public policy of the State of Nebraska, which prevents an employer's contractual obligation to indemnify a third party concerning a loss sustained through the third party's payments to the indemnitor's employee. Therefore, we now hold that when an employer, liable to an employee under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, agrees to indemnify a third party for a loss sustained as the result of the third party's payment to the indemnitor's employee, the employer's exclusion from liability accorded by the Workers' Compensation Act does not preclude the third party's action to enforce the indemnity agreement with the indemnitor-employer. The Union Pacific-Kaiser agreement contains no specific provision or language which excludes, exempts, or exonerates Kaiser from liability for indemnification or contribution as a contractual duty . . .
In the Oddo case the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed a judgment for $1,114,989.10 in favor the lessor of Scaffolding Equipment against the lessee-contractor based upon an indemnity agreement between those two parties. One of the lessee's employees was injured on account of a collapse of scaffolding that was found to be defective. In the lessor's cross-petition against the lessee-employer, the employer's defense was that the Nebraska Workers Compensation Act prevented recovery, but the court again allowed an indemnification agreement that was a part of the lease to support a recovery on behalf of the lessor. The court noted at pages 8 and 9 that:
The indemnity agreement between Speedway and Contractor, expressed in paragraph 11 of the scaffolding lease, contains no specific provision or language which excludes, exempts, or exonerates Contractor from indemnification as a contractual duty.
See Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., supra.
More specifically, the court said that notwithstanding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-425 (Reissue 1988), which placed upon Speedway, as the supplier of scaffolding, a duty to supply scaffolding that had been constructed in a "safe, suitable and proper manner," Speedway could obtain indemnification against the breach of its duty because "Speedway may, and did, contract for indemnification against its own negligence regarding a scaffold which it supplied." Id. at 10. (Citations omitted).
Nonetheless, Tenneco argues that the allegations of the cross-claim are, as a matter of law, insufficient. The standard in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is:
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the party moving for dismissal has the burden of proving that no claim has been stated. To prevail, the movant must show "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would entitle him to relief." This language emphasizes the limited applicability of Rule 12(b)(6) as the predicate for a final dismissal of the action, a disposition that courts generally disfavor because it summarily terminates cases on their merits.
Moore's Federal Practice 3d, § 12.34[1][a], citing, among others, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); and Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997).
The allegations of the cross-claim, filing 18 at paragraph 13, are that the machine was supplied "pursuant to Quote No. MI-157-99, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit `A'." It also alleges in paragraph 14 that "in connection with the claims of the Plaintiff, Walker Manufacturing [which allegedly is a business name under which Tenneco operates] has an obligation to indemnify and hold Adaptive Motion harmless." The issue is whether the movant, Tenneco, has shown that "beyond doubt [Adaptive] can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim [that] would entitle [it] to relief."
What Tenneco has shown is that we cannot be sure that the Quote constitutes a contract. That, however, does not constitute a showing that Adaptive could not show by evidence that the Quote was in fact and in law a contract sufficient to bind Tenneco. The cross-claim alleges that Tenneco has an obligation to indemnify Adaptive because the machine was supplied pursuant to the Quote that contains the indemnification language. What evidence can be offered to support that allegation we do not know on the basis of what is before me in this motion. No evidence outside the cross-claim has been submitted. The burden resting upon the movant, Tenneco, has not been met.
The cases cited by Tenneco do not support Tenneco's position. Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Company, supra, was decided, not on a motion to dismiss, but a motion for summary judgment. Evidence had been received on that motion. The court examined the evidence and concluded that questions of fact remained for trial. The court established the basic principle that a contract could impose liability for indemnification despite the exclusion provision of Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. It really went no further apropo this case.
Tenneco in its brief in support of its motion to dismiss at page 5 argues that in the Oddo case "the Court emphasized the parties' two-year course of dealing whereby the contractor periodically leased scaffolding from the lessor, signing the contract and keeping a copy without complaint or objection, a routine the Court called a `longstanding practice.'" That is quite true and, for all we know, similar evidence could be offered in this case if opportunity presented itself. It is the obligation of Tenneco the movant of a motion to dismiss to show that such evidence could not be offered. It has not done so. The language of the cross-claim is broad enough to allow introduction of such evidence.
Tenneco continues in its brief at page 5 that "The indemnification provision was upheld [in the Oddo case] because of the explicit uppercase bold indemnification provision in the signed written contract. . . ." between the parties. I find no such language in the opinion of the court in that case. It is true that the language in the contract was in uppercase, but I have not seen where the court made any mention of that fact as being significant in its decision. That is not to say that the uppercase feature cannot be important; it may be in a given case.
The Eighth Circuit case of Merryman v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 978 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1992) is not helpful to Tenneco in this motion to dismiss. The Merryman case, also, was decided on the basis of facts presented in connection with a motion for summary judgment, rather than a motion to dismiss. The court held that the district court's determination that the employer was not contractually obligated to indemnify the plant owner because there was insufficient evidence of an alleged contract of indemnity. Specifically, the court said at page 445:
IBP sent Allstate a standard purchase order and an acknowledgment form at the start of the project. IBP claims that the presence of the language . . . on the purchase order form, when considered in the context of the continuing business relationship between IBP and Allstate, demonstrates that an indemnity contract existed between the two parties. However, (i) there was no evidence the acknowledgment was signed by Allstate and returned to IBP; (ii) the purchase order was never signed by Allstate; (iii) no Indemnity Agreement was ever submitted to IBP by Allstate or its insurer, as ostensibly required by par. 15.d; and (iv) there was no other evidence that Allstate understood and intended to be bound by the indemnity provisions in par. 15.d.
Perhaps the same or similar facts are present in this case, but I do not know that and it is the obligation of the movant to have made that showing, if it could be made. Resolution will need to be made on a motion for summary judgment or at a trial.
With apologies to all counsel for the delay in getting this decision made,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Crossclaim of Adaptive Motion Control Systems, Inc. For Failure to State a Claim, filing 28, is denied.