BEELER v. BANCO INDUS

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Docket Number

Case No. 3D02-502

Attorney(S)

William L. Richey and H. Eugene Lindsey, for appellant. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster Russell and Brian T. James and Lawrence A. Gordich, for appellees.

Judges

FLETCHER, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Joseph Beeler, P.A. (Beeler) successfully defended Esperanza de Saad against federal money laundering charges. Under their fee agreement, Ms. De Saad owes Beeler over one million dollars in attorney’s fees and expenses. The agreement included an assignment to Beeler of any rights Ms. De Saad had to sue her former employer, Banco Industrial de Venezuela (BIV). After the federal case, Ms. De Saad filed a lawsuit against BIV for breach of her employment contract and indemnification. Approximately eight months into that litigation, Beeler moved to intervene and requested a 30-day stay of proceedings. BIV opposed the motion. The trial court denied Beeler’s motion to intervene, reasoning that intervention would impede the orderly progression and resolution of the case. Beeler appealed this denial.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Joseph Beeler, P.A. has a sufficient legal interest to intervene in the ongoing litigation between Esperanza de Saad and Banco Industrial de Venezuela.
Whether the trial court properly denied the motion to intervene on the basis that intervention would impede the orderly progression of the litigation.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1992)	Defines the test for intervention: the intervenor must have a direct and immediate interest in the litigation that will be affected by the judgment.	The court applied this test to conclude Beeler has a direct legal interest through the assignment from Ms. De Saad, entitling it to intervene.
Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 78 So. 14 (1918)	Supports the principle that intervention requires a direct and immediate interest in the matter in litigation.	Referenced as foundational precedent for the intervention test cited in Union Central.
John G. Grubbs, Inc. v. Suncoast Excavating, Inc., 594 So.2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)	Approves intervention by a successful bidder in a dispute challenging bidding procedures.	Used as an example of courts permitting intervention where the intervenor's interest is similar to Beeler's.
Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating Plumbing Co., 398 So.2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)	Approves intervention by a pledgee entitled to sums paid to pledgor in litigation against a stock purchaser.	Analogized to Beeler’s interest in the assigned claims from Ms. De Saad.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the motion to intervene under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 and the Florida Supreme Court’s established test for intervention. The rule permits anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation to intervene, subordinate to the main proceeding unless otherwise ordered. The court applied the test from Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, which requires the intervenor to have an interest that is direct and immediate, such that the intervenor will gain or lose by the judgment’s effect. Because Beeler holds an assignment of Ms. De Saad’s rights against BIV, its interest is sufficiently direct and immediate to warrant intervention. The court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that intervention would impede the case, noting that the litigation was still in early discovery and that intervention would not disrupt the orderly progression of the case.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the trial court’s denial of Beeler’s motion to intervene and REMANDED the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The direct effect is that Beeler is entitled to participate in the litigation as an intervenor. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond applying established intervention standards to the facts at hand.

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JOSEPH BEELER, P.A., Appellant, v. BANCO INDUSTRIAL DE VENEZUELA, etc., et al., Appellees.

FLETCHER, Judge.

Joseph Beeler, P.A. [Beeler] appeals the denial of its motion to intervene in the instant action. For the reasons which follow, we reverse.

Beeler successfully defended Ezperanza de Saad on money laundering charges brought by the federal government. As a result, under their fee agreement, Ms. De Saad owes the firm over one million dollars in attorney's fees and expenses. As part of the fee agreement, Ms. De Saad assigned to Beeler any rights she may have to sue her former employer, Banco Industrial de Venezuela [BIV]. Subsequent to the federal litigation, Ms. De Saad filed the instant action against BIV for breach of her employment contract and for indemnification. Approximately eight months into the proceedings, Beeler moved to intervene in the action and to stay proceedings for 30 days. BIV opposed the motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied Beeler's motion after concluding that intervention "would only serve to impede the orderly progression and resolution" of the case.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 provides:

"Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion."

The Florida Supreme Court has stated the test to determine an interest which entitles a party to intervene as

"`[T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene . . . must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation."

Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992) (citing Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 238-39, 78 So. 14, 15 (1918)). In accordance with this test, appellate courts have approved intervention by a health insurer entitled to repayment of medical expenses in a lawsuit against a tortfeasor, Union Central, 593 So.2d at 505; by the successful bidder in an action by another bidder challenging the bidding process against the county, John G. Grubbs, Inc. v. Suncoast Excavating, Inc., 594 So.2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); by a pledgee entitled to sums paid to pledgor of stock in an action against purchaser of stock, Citibank, N.A. v. Blackhawk Heating Plumbing Co., 398 So.2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); and by a complaining property owner in an action to determine a school's rights under a special use zoning ordinance. We conclude that Beeler's interests herein are similar in nature, and that Beeler therefore is entitled to intervene in the action. We further respectfully disagree with the trial court's conclusion that such intervention will impede the orderly progression of the litigation, which at the time of Beeler's motion was in the early stages of discovery.

Accordingly, the order denying appellant's motion to intervene is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.