DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
While the defendant is entitled by statute to have his counsel deliver a summation at the close of all the evidence (see CPL 260.30; Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853), the Supreme Court may limit summation to matters of evidence properly adduced at the trial (see People v. Ventura, 66 N.Y.2d 693; see People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105; People v. Middleton, 212 A.D.2d 809, 811; People v. Smith, 204 A.D.2d 140; People v. Barreau, 183 A.D.2d 904; People v. Robinson, 137 A.D.2d 564; but see People v. Luis, 189 A.D.2d 657, 659-660; People v. Reina, 94 A.D.2d 727). Here, the Supreme Court properly precluded the defendant's counsel from arguing on summation that the psychiatric testimony established that he could not have formed the culpable mental state for intentional murder where the defense failed to give timely notice of its intent to offer psychiatric evidence in support of that theory at trial (see CPL 250.10[c]; People v. Almonor, 93 N.Y.2d 571, 580; People v. Yates, 290 A.D.2d 888; People v. Rivers, 281 A.D.2d 348; but see People v. Wilcox, 194 A.D.2d 820, 821).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in ordering that the jury be sequestered notwithstanding the defendant's attempt to waive sequestration (see CPL 310.10; People v. Bello, 82 N.Y.2d 862; People v. Paul, 79 N.Y.2d 970; People v. Fernandez, 229 A.D.2d 447).
PRUDENTI, P.J., RITTER, LUCIANO and H. MILLER, JJ., concur.