Opinion By MARTIN RICHTER, Justice.
Following a non-jury trial, Jane-Ashley McMillan, court-appointed attorney ad litem, appeals a final order denying her request for attorney's fees. Appellant generally complains that the trial court erred in concluding appellee did not receive valuable services from appellant and in denying appellant's claim for attorney's fees under the theory of quantum meruit. The facts of this case are known by the parties, and we do not recite them in detail. Because all issues are well settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4 We affirm the final order of the trial court.
The theory of quantum meruit is founded on the principle of unjust enrichment. Bashara v. Baptist Mem'l. Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985). In order to state a viable claim for quantum meruit, appellant must show:
1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished;
2) for the person sought to be charged;
3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged, used and enjoyed by him;
4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged.
Id. It is not enough that the appellee received some incidental benefit, "the efforts must have been undertaken `for the person sought to be charged.'"
Id. (quoting
City of Ingleside v. Stewart,
554 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
McFarland v. Sanders, 932 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1996, no writ).
In this case, the trial judge made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The Court finds that on June 2, 1995, the plaintiff, Jane-Ashley McMillan, was appointed by the 305th District Court to represent the interests of an indigent respondent mother in Cause Number 94-1001-X-305th, a termination proceeding originally brought by the defendant, Adoption Access, Inc. The Plaintiff provided legal representation to the respondent mother during the pendency of said proceeding.
2. The Court entered a final adoption decree pertaining to the subject child on January 23, 1996.
3. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the defendant in this matter did not receive valuable services. In fact, the services were received by the respondent mother in this proceeding, and not the defendant.
4. The attorney appointed in this matter was appointed by the Court at the respondent mother's request.
We have reviewed the entire record and conclude there is legal and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).
In this case, legal services were rendered for the benefit of an indigent mother, not appellee adoption agency. Clearly, appellant's attorney-client duties lie with the indigent mother on whose behalf she was appointed, and not the appellee adoption agency. Indeed, in her capacity as attorney ad litem for an indigent mother, she worked to prevent the adoption from taking place. Appellant's claim that the adoption agency received an ancillary benefit from appellant's legal services is insufficient to hold the agency liable for the attorney's fees under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment. Bashara at 310; McFarland at 643-44.
We conclude the trial court was correct when it found, as a matter of law, valuable services were not rendered to appellee. We affirm the final order of the trial court.