EARL S. HINES, United States Magistrate Judge
This case is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for review, hearing if necessary, and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2001) and Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
I. Nature of the Case
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration's final determination denying plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits ("DIB"). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2001).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405 authorizes United States district courts to conduct judicial review of the Commissioner's final decisions regarding applications for Social Security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2001).
II. Proceedings
Plaintiff has applied for DIB twice. He first applied on July 6, 1989, alleging disability beginning March 27, 1987, due to diabetes and hip replacement. Tr. 176. Initial denial of the application was issued on September 25, 1989, and denial following reconsideration was issued on November 6, 1989. Tr. 190. After a hearing, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") denied benefits in a decision dated August 29, 1991. Tr. 174-189. That decision became final when plaintiff failed to request review by the Appeals Council and District Court within the required time. Deft.'s Br. at III.A.
Plaintiff again applied for DIB on August 15, 1994, alleging the same onset of disability date, i.e., March 27, 1987. Tr. 26, 33. Plaintiff claimed disability due to "hip prosthesis" and two heart attacks (Tr. 33), dilated cardiomyopathy, post traumatic stress disorder, and insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (Tr. 282, 287, 295).
After administrative denial of his claim initially and on reconsideration, he requested and was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). That hearing was conducted on September 25, 1995, before ALJ Arnold S. Battisse. ALJ Battisse issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim on April 19, 1996.
Applying the legal doctrine of res judicata, ALJ Battisse dismissed that portion of plaintiff's claim prior to August 29, 1991 (the date of determination of plaintiff's first application). ALJ Battisse concluded that plaintiff's evidence was "essentially duplicative to that which was considered on or before the date of the last decision" and, therefore, "reflects the presence of essentially the same facts as were documented in the earlier record." Tr. 16.
Regarding plaintiff's claim for the second period from August 29, 1991, through December 31, 1992 (plaintiff's last insured date), ALJ Battisse determined that plaintiff is not disabled under governing rules. He concluded that "claimant retains the physical capacity to perform both light and sedentary work and has a restriction against only complex work instructions, [and therefore] there are [sic] necessarily a wide range of jobs which exist in the national economy which the claimant can perform." Tr. 20.
When making both determinations, ALJ Battise refused to consider certain new medical evidence stemming from a period of hospitalization in 1993. ALJ Battisse concluded that this evidence was not material to plaintiff's claim prior to August 29, 1991, because it was "unrelated to the period of time previously adjudicated." Tr. 16. He further considered it as immaterial to plaintiff's claim after August 29, 1991 because it reflected new impairments "completely lacking in the record prior to December 31, 1992, when his insured status expired." Tr. 18.
Plaintiff was admitted to Beaumont Medical Surgical Hospital from September 03, 1993, through September 18, 1993. Hospital records reflect that he was treated for "congestive cardiomyopathy, bilateral pneumonia, alcoholism, smoking, and diabetes mellitus." Tr. 66.
Plaintiff timely requested review, but review was delayed because plaintiff's file was lost. On January 27, 2000, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. Plaintiff requested and was granted additional time to appeal the Council's decision, and the instant appeal was filed on June 16, 2000.
III. Judicial Review
Judicial review is limited. The court's abbreviated role is to determine whether (a) the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, Anthony, 954 F.2d at 292; it requires evidence relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971); Marcello v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1983).
To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's findings, the entire record must be scrutinized carefully. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 1984 (1995); Ransom v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1983). The court in reviewing the record may not, however, reweigh the evidence or review the ALJ's decision de novo. Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1462, 1466 (5th Cir. 1989); Neal v. Brown, 829 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1987). Rather, it is for the Commissioner to weigh evidence and resolve conflicts. See Anthony, 954 F.2d at 295; Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990).
If proper principles of law were applied, and if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 230, 59 S.Ct. at 217); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2001).
By local orders of the court, complaints seeking judicial review of administrative decisions denying applications for social security benefits are treated as appeals. The party seeking review is required to specify alleged points of error, and to submit a brief containing legal arguments directed to those points. The Commissioner is ordered to file a brief in response. The court limits the scope of its judicial review to the points argued in the briefs.
See Docket No. 13.
IV. Points of Error
Plaintiff's brief designates a single "Legal Issue" which reads in its entirety as follows:
"Whether the court should review the decision of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals denying Daugherty's claim for benefits pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), whether the doctrine of res judicata was properly applied for the period of disability prior to August 29, 1991 and whether Daugherty's date last insured should be extended through December 31, 1995."
Pl.'s Br. at II.
Although presented as a single point, plaintiff clearly intends to raise three separate issues: (1) whether the court can review the Commissioner's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); (2) if so, whether ALJ Battisse erred in denying that part of plaintiff's claim concerning the period prior to August 29, 1991, on the basis of res judicata; and (3) whether ALJ Battisse erred in not extending plaintiff's insured status date.
Ultimately, all three issues are interrelated. The court obviously can address the second issue only by answering the first affirmatively for plaintiff. Although not as apparent, in the final analysis, the court can reach the third issue only if it answers the second issue affirmatively for plaintiff.
V. Discussion Does Court Have Jurisdiction?
Clearly, federal courts have limited jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner to determine if the decisions are supported by substantial evidence and are otherwise in accord with applicable law. See Section III., "Judicial Review," supra. Here, plaintiff seeks to challenge ALJ Battisse's application of res judicata to bar consideration of plaintiff's claim for disability during the period March 27, 1987, through August 29, 1991. Thus, the essential inquiry is whether such challenge lies within Congress's grant of limited jurisdiction.
In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in actions seeking judicial review of a Commissioner's final decision refusing to reopen a claim for Social Security benefits. The court unanimously concluded that absent a colorable constitutional claim, such jurisdiction is absent. The court found no implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction in either the Administrative Procedure Act, or in Sections 205(g) and 205(h) of the Social Security Act. Further, the court reasoned that to allow such judicial review would frustrate congressional purpose, as evidenced in Section 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon review of the Commissioner's final decision.
5 U.S.C. § 701-706.
In Matos v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 581 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1978), the First Circuit extended the rule and rationale of Califano v. Sanders to actions seeking judicial review of final decisions denying disability claims based on res judicata. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit joined the First Circuit, and now similarly holds that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review administrative application of res judicata to prior claims. See Robertson v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 808, 810 (5th Cir. 1986); Carter v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1983); Hensley v. Califano, 601 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1979) (expressly adopting Matos v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare).
In this action, plaintiff raises no constitutional challenge to ALJ Battise's invocation of the doctrine of res judicata. Under clearly-established circuit law, this court is therefore without jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision based on res judicata. Plaintiff's first point of error fails.
Did ALJ Err When Applying Doctrine of Res Judicata?
This point is moot since the court is without jurisdiction to review a final decision denying benefits on the basis of res judicata.
Did ALJ Err When Refusing to Extend Date of Insured Status?
Plaintiff's brief argues for extension of his date last insured as follows:
"[S]ince he met the criteria of Listing 1.03(A) and (B) from March 27, 1987 through April 20, 1990, he was, by definition disabled during that period and his date last insured would be extended through December 31, 1995."
Pl.'s Br. at I.B. Plaintiff cites no statute, regulation or court decision which can support this assertion, nor does plaintiff further explain this point through legal argument except to again urge that res judicata is inapplicable. Thus, plaintiff presents nothing meaningful to review, and leaves the court in the position of essentially having to guess and construct an argument in plaintiff's behalf. Under local court procedures described earlier at page 6, the court is not required to further examine this point.
If the court were to first formulate and then address plaintiff's argument, what eventually becomes apparent is that plaintiff seeks to have the court declare that the new evidence which ALJ Battise rejected as immaterial because relevant to a time after expiration of insured status should have been considered. If the date of plaintiff's insured status were extended beyond December 31, 1992 (the last date of insured status as determined by ALJ Battise), to December 31, 1995 (the date advocated by plaintiff), evidence pertaining to plaintiff's hospitalization in 1993 would be admissible and relevant at least to plaintiff's claim for the period after August 29, 1991. Plaintiff might then argue that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because ALJ Battise failed to consider all of the relevant evidence.
The essential premises upon which such an argument would be based are somewhat arcane, but can be postulated. They stem from a seldom-utilized regulation that permits a person who is ineligible to receive benefits to nevertheless apply for a declaration of disability which, if issued, serves to extend the person's insured status.
The Commissioner's regulations allow persons to apply for declarations of a period of disability, even when they are not eligible to receive benefits for that period. 20 C.F.R. § 404.320(a). To qualify for such a declaration, an applicant must (1) have or have had a disability which lasted at least 5 consecutive months excluding the month in which disability ended, (2) be insured for disability, and (3) file an application while disabled or no later than 12 months after the period of disability ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.320(b). If a declaration is issued and establishes a period of disability, that period will not be considered when possible later benefits are determined or calculated:
"If benefits payable on [claimant's] earnings record would be denied or reduced because of a period of disability, the period of disability will not be taken into consideration."
20 C.F.R. § 404.320(a). Therefore, the practical effect of securing a declaration of a period of disability is to extend the insured period. Cf. George v. Chater,
76 F.3d 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that § 404.320(a) "contemplates applications [for a period of disability] by individuals . . . who file only to extend their insured status.").
Here, Plaintiff never sought such a declaration from the Commissioner. His effort to invoke this procedure now during judicial review, while ingenious, is simply too late. In any event, extending the date of plaintiff's insured status would depend upon establishing that plaintiff met disability standards "from March 27, 1987 through April 20, 1990." Plaintiff simply cannot satisfy this requirement. An administrative judgment denying plaintiff's claim for disability allegedly commencing in March, 1987 is final, and res judicata bars any attempt to relitigate plaintiff's disability before August 29, 1991. Thus, this point is but another futile attempt to avoid effects of res judicata.
Recommendation
Because plaintiff's points of error cannot be sustained, this appeal should be dismissed and the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed.
Objections
Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within ten days after being served with a copy of this report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 1(a), 6(b), and 72(b).
A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).