Reason v. The State, A02A2453 (Ct. App. Ga. Feb. 11, 2003)

Factual and Procedural Background

Julius Reason was originally charged with armed robbery. On the date scheduled for his trial, Reason tested positive for cocaine and an accusation charging him with possession of cocaine was prepared. After a jury had been chosen for his trial, Reason decided to enter guilty pleas to both the armed robbery and the possession of cocaine charges. At the guilty-plea hearing Reason and his counsel stipulated that the State could prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The record reflects that Reason had extensive discussions with his counsel about the plea, that he understood the nature of the plea, and that the trial judge confirmed on the record that Reason fully understood the plea consequences, that he was forfeiting the right to cross-examine witnesses, that he knew the possible sentence, that no promises or threats induced the plea, and that Reason was clear-headed and not under the influence at the time. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Reason to serve twelve years for each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. Reason filed a "Motion to Vacate a Null and Void Conviction and Sentence," which the trial court denied. Reason appealed, arguing that (1) the plea was obtained improperly and (2) the accusation for possession of cocaine was void.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in denying Reason's motion to vacate on the ground that his guilty plea was obtained improperly (i.e., whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent).
Whether the accusation charging Reason with possession of cocaine was void or otherwise fundamentally defective.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Julius Reason)

He contends his guilty plea was obtained improperly and therefore his conviction and sentence should be vacated.
He contends the accusation charging him with possession of cocaine was void.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's (State's) legal arguments beyond the State's role in defending the denial of Reason's motion and the court's citations to relevant authority in support of that defense.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Harris v. State, 167 Ga. App. 153, 306 S.E.2d 79 (1983)	Trial court's duty "to ascertain that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently" before accepting a guilty plea.	The court invoked Harris to state the duty of the trial court in determining voluntariness of Reason's plea and to frame the standard for evaluating the plea-taking process.
Taylor v. State, 266 Ga. 129, 464 S.E.2d 385 (1996)	An appellate court will not set aside a trial court's factual determination of voluntariness unless such determination is clearly erroneous.	The court applied Taylor's standard of review to decline to overturn the trial court's finding that Reason's plea was voluntary absent clear error.
Hill v. State, 257 Ga. App. 82, 570 S.E.2d 395 (2002)	Referenced in discussion of motions to withdraw a guilty plea and in the context of accusation sufficiency.	The court cited Hill by analogy to characterize Reason's motion as essentially a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and relied on Hill for the proposition that the accusation here was not fundamentally flawed.
Gerrard v. State, 252 Ga. App. 767, 556 S.E.2d 131 (2001)	Trial court does not lack jurisdiction where Georgia Code permits an offense to be tried upon accusation even when defendant does not waive right to indictment by grand jury.	The court cited Gerrard to reject Reason's contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea or to adjudicate the matter based on the accusation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed Reason's claim that his guilty plea was obtained improperly. It reiterated the trial court's duty to ensure a plea is voluntary and intelligent (citing Harris) and noted the appellate standard that factual determinations about voluntariness will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (citing Taylor). The court identified multiple items of evidence supporting voluntariness in the record: Reason and counsel stipulated that the State could prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt; Reason had extensive discussions with counsel about the plea; Reason understood the nature of the plea; and the trial judge on the record confirmed that Reason understood the consequences of the plea, including waiver of confrontation, knowledge of possible sentences, absence of promises or threats, and that Reason was clear-headed and not under the influence. Because Reason presented no evidence that the plea was not voluntary, the appellate court concluded the trial court's factual determination of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous and therefore the denial of Reason's motion to vacate on that basis was proper. The court also rejected Reason's assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, citing Gerrard for the proposition that jurisdiction is not lacking where Georgia law permits trial on an accusation even without a grand jury indictment.

The court then addressed Reason's contention that the accusation for possession of cocaine was void. The court found the accusation "sufficiently described the charge" and "was not fundamentally flawed," citing Hill. The court further noted that there was no need for the police to arrest Reason for possession of cocaine because Reason was already present for his trial when he tested positive for cocaine. Based on these points, the court concluded the trial court did not err in denying the motion to void the conviction on the basis of an allegedly invalid accusation.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that Reason's convictions and concurrent twelve-year sentences for the charged offenses remain in place and his motion to vacate was properly denied. The opinion affirms the trial court's factual finding that the guilty plea was voluntary under the governing standard of review and upholds the sufficiency of the accusation for possession of cocaine. The opinion does not announce or discuss any broader new legal rule beyond application of existing precedents cited in the decision.

Show full summary ...

REASON v. THE STATE.

MILLER, Judge.

Julius Reason appeals following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine. On appeal he contends that the trial court erred in denying his "Motion to Vacate a Null and Void Conviction and Sentence," because (1) the plea was obtained improperly and (2) the accusation for possession of cocaine was void. We discern no error and affirm.

The record reveals that Reason was originally charged with armed robbery. On the date of his trial, Reason tested positive for cocaine and an accusation was prepared charging him with possession of cocaine.

After a jury had been chosen for his trial, Reason decided to enter guilty pleas to his armed robbery and possession of cocaine charges. At the guilty-plea hearing, Reason and his counsel stipulated to the fact that the State could prove that Reason was guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Reason had extensive discussions with his counsel about the guilty plea and understood the nature of the plea. In addition, the trial judge confirmed on the record that Reason fully understood the plea to the various charges against him, knew that he was forfeiting his right to cross-examine witnesses as a result of the plea, knew the possible sentence that he could face by pleading guilty, understood that no promises or threats had been made to him to induce the plea, and that Reason was clear-headed and was not under the influence of any drugs at the time of the plea. Having been satisfied that the plea was being made voluntarily, the court accepted the plea and sentenced Reason to serve twelve years for each count against him, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Following his guilty plea, Reason filed a "Motion to Vacate a Null and Void Conviction and Sentence," which the court denied. Reason appeals.

1. Reason contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence because his guilty plea was obtained improperly. We disagree.

"Before accepting a plea of guilty, the trial court has a duty to ascertain that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently." (Citation omitted.) Harris v. State, 167 Ga. App. 153(1) ( 306 S.E.2d 79) (1983). An appellate court will not set aside a trial court's factual determination of voluntariness unless such determination is clearly erroneous. See Taylor v. State, 266 Ga. 129 ( 464 S.E.2d 385) (1996).

Here ample evidence supported the trial court's determination that Reason made his plea voluntarily. Reason's motion was essentially a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Cf. Hill v. State, 257 Ga. App. 82, 83(1) ( 570 S.E.2d 395) (2002). Reason has pointed to no evidence indicating that the plea was not made voluntarily, and his argument that the trial court somehow lacked jurisdiction to decide his plea is without merit. See Gerrard v. State, 252 Ga. App. 767, 768(1) ( 556 S.E.2d 131) (2001) (trial court does not lack jurisdiction where Georgia Code permits offense to be tried upon accusation even when defendant does not waive right to indictment by grand jury). Since there was evidence here to show that the plea was proper, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Reason's motion.

2. Reason's argument that the accusation for possession of cocaine was void is also without merit. The accusation sufficiently described the charge against Reason and was not fundamentally flawed. See Hill, supra, 257 Ga. App. at 84(1). In addition, there was no need for the police to arrest Reason for possession of cocaine, because Reason was already present for his trial at the time that he tested positive for cocaine in his system. The trial court did not err in denying Reason's motion to void his conviction based on an allegedly invalid accusation.

Judgment affirmed. Johnson, P.J.and Blackburn, P. J, concur.