DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
A defendant's right to be present during trial is not absolute. The defendant may be removed from the courtroom if, after being warned by the trial court, the disruptive conduct continues (see CPL 260.20; Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 338; People v. Sanchez,
65 N.Y.2d 436, 444; People v. Robinson,
285 A.D.2d 478). Under the circumstances of this case, the court's removal of the defendant from the courtroom after repeated warnings and renewed opportunities to be present, was proper (see People v. Johnson,
37 N.Y.2d 778; People v. Epps,
37 N.Y.2d 343, 349, cert denied
423 U.S. 999; People v. Jones,
288 A.D.2d 107; People v. Davis,
270 A.D.2d 162; People v. Gloster,
175 A.D.2d 258; People v. Cornelius,
107 A.D.2d 757).
The defendant's contention that Penal Law § 125.25(2) is unconstitutionally vague is without merit (see People v. Johnson, 87 N.Y.2d 357, 361; People v. Cole, 85 N.Y.2d 990, 992; cf. People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 384). A contrary ruling by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Jones v. Keane, NYLJ, June 7, 2002, at 25, col 3) is not binding on this court (see Matter of DeBellis v. Property Clerk of City of N.Y., 79 N.Y.2d 49, 57; People v. Brown, 235 A.D.2d 344).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
GOLDSTEIN, J.P., ADAMS, TOWNES and CRANE, JJ., concur.