Opinion By DOUGLAS S. LANG, Justice.
Bennett Royce McNulty appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, of murder. The trial court assessed punishment at twenty-three years confinement. In his sole point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss for the State's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (the "IADA"). For reasons that follow, we overrule his sole point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Factual and Procedural Background On March 10, 1998, Donna Patterson drove to the residence of the victim, Monty Bly, with appellant as passenger. After they arrived, Patterson shot and killed Bly. The grand jury indicted appellant for murder on April 9, 1998. Before he could be tried in the Bly murder, however, a federal court convicted appellant on March 17, 2000 for the federal offense of felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced him to seventy months in federal prison. On July 30, 2000, the trial court in Grayson County issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to have appellant brought before it to stand trial for the Bly murder. Federal authorities transferred appellant to Grayson County on November 2, 2000. Appellant remained there for nine months but was returned to federal custody on July 31, 2001 without having been prosecuted for the Bly murder. On September 11, 2001, the trial court issued a second writ of habeus corpus ad prosequendum to have appellant brought before it once again. Before his second transfer from federal prison, appellant wrote a letter to the Grayson County District Attorney on September 28, 2001 requesting "final disposition of all indictments, information or complaints on which [his] detainer [was] based." Federal authorities re-transferred appellant to Grayson County on November 2, 2001, and trial began on February 25, 2002. In his sole point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in not dismissing his case for the State's failure to comply with the IADA. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act A. Applicable Law The IADA provides a mechanism for a person incarcerated in one jurisdiction with charges pending against him in another jurisdiction to be tried on the pending charges before being released from incarceration in the first jurisdiction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, art. I (Vernon Supp. 2003). Either the defendant or the jurisdiction where charges are pending may demand that the defendant be tried on the pending charges. Id. arts. I, III, V. The IADA mandates that trial must begin within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state. Id. art. IV(c). 1. Prisoner's Request Under Article III of the IADA Under article III, a prisoner may make a request for final disposition of the pending case in the other jurisdiction. If the defendant properly makes the request for final disposition, he must be tried for the offense within 180 days or the charge must be dismissed with prejudice. Id. art. III(a), (c). To request final disposition under article III, the defendant must cause "to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment." Id. art. III(a). The request must be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner stating the following: (1) the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held; (2) the time already served; (3) the time remaining to be served on the sentence; (4) the amount of good time earned; (5) the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner; and (6) any decision of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Id. The IADA provides that the defendant can satisfy the requirement for "sending" the written notice and request for final disposition under Article III by giving it to the official having custody of him, who must then forward it to the appropriate prosecuting official and court via registered or certified mail. Id. art. III(b). Of course, the defendant may send the request to the court and prosecutor of the other jurisdiction himself, but if he does so, he is responsible for seeing that the notice is sent in the form required by the IADA. Burton v. State, 805 S.W.2d 564, 575 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). 2. The State's Request Under Article IV of the IADA Article IV of the IADA allows the State to make a request for the presence of an individual serving a prison term in another state, against whom an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, so that the individual may stand trial on the outstanding charges. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14, art. IV(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). To do so, the requesting state must present the state holding the prisoner with a written request for temporary custody and must allow a period of thirty days for the request to be honored so that the governor of the sending state may have the opportunity to disapprove the request. Id. Once the request is received, the appropriate authorities of the state having the prisoner in custody must furnish the receiving state with the following: (1) a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held; (2) the time already served; (3) the time remaining to be served on the sentence; (4) the amount of good time earned; (5) the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner; and (6) any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Id. art. IV(b). B. Application of Law to the Facts 1. Appellant's Letter to the District Attorney Appellant first contends his September 28, 2001 letter triggered the IADA. We disagree. Whether appellant triggered the IADA by his own request is governed by article III. Although his letter specifically mentions article 51.14, appellant failed to comply with the provisions of the IADA in several respects. First, the letter was not mailed via registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Second, appellant only sent his letter to the Grayson County district attorney; thus, the letter was not "delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction." See id. art. III(a) (emphasis added). Third, the letter was not accompanied by a certificate from the appropriate official having custody of appellant. Fourth, although appellant's letter purports to inform the district attorney on the amount of time he had already served, it wholly failed to disclose each of the following as required by article III: (1) the term of commitment under which he was being held; (2) the time remaining to be served on his sentence; (3) the amount of good time earned; (4) the time of his parole eligibility; and (5) any decision of the state parole agency which related to him. Because appellant made the decision to send the request letter himself, it was ultimately his responsibility to see that the provisions of the IADA were satisfied. See Powell, 971 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.); Burton, 805 S.W.2d at 575. 2. Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum Finally, appellant argues the State's issuance of either writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum triggered the IADA. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a "detainer" for purposes of the IADA and therefore will not trigger IADA application without an earlier filed detainer. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 361 (1978). It is undisputed that a formal detainer neither preceded nor followed the two writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in this case. Therefore, the trial court's issuance of the writs alone did not trigger the application of the IADA. See id.; see also United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d 912, 915 (1st Cir. 1977) (the differences between writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and detainers "are so fundamental as to constitute each a separate, distinct avenue for obtaining custody of prisoners."). Conclusion Having concluded that the two writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum were not "detainers" for purposes of the IADA, and further having concluded that appellant failed to comply with certain provisions of the IADA, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
We are aware that this Court now resolves issues, but because appellant's brief refers to points of error, we use the term "point of error." See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e).
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
The text of appellant's letter, addressed to the named Grayson County district attorney, reads as follows:
I am making a request for final disposition of all indictments, information or complaints on which the detainer is based . . . [sic] on Art 51.14 Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. I have been incarcerated over 3 years. I was brought back to Grayson Co. and kept over 10 months and did not get to go to trial. [signed:] Bennett Royce McNulty, Jr.
Appellant's letter stated that he had been "incarcerated over 3 years." Appellant was convicted of the federal felon in possession of a firearm charge on March 17, 2000. He mailed his purported IADA request letter on September 28, 2001. While appellant may have been incarcerated under the care of both federal and state authorities for over three years from the date of his arrest for the Bly murder, the term of incarceration he had spent in federal prison is the only relevant term for purposes of the IADA, since the federal prison was the "holding" entity. Thus, appellant's disclosure of the amount of "time already served" as required under the Article III is incorrectly calculated.
See also Stewart v. Bailey, 7 F.3d 384, 390 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Trammel, 813 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1987); Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 361-62 (6th Cir. 1977).