J. THOMAS MARTEN, Judge.
This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment of defendant Doris Fahlstrom. The court has previously granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants in the action, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court incorporates the findings and rulings from that decision herein, and finds that the doctrine also supports granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Fahlstrom.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).
In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. "In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Plaintiff Cory has filed a response to Fahlstrom's motion, but he does not submit any sworn fact statement which would controvert the evidence submitted either by Fahlstrom, or previously by the other defendants in their respective motions. That evidence establishes that, on February 2, 1999, Doris Fahlstrom filed a petition in the District Court of Cloud County, Kansas requesting the admission for probate of the Last Will and Testament of Madeline Young. The will was admitted to probate on November 8, 1998 and Fahlstrom was named executrix. On January 19, 2000, Fahlstrom, on behalf of the Estate of Madeline Young, filed a lawsuit in Cloud County, Kansas District Court to recover assets of the estate from plaintiff Cory. On July 28, 2000, she filed a motion for default judgment. The court grated the motion and entered judgment against Cory and co-defendant Arden Krohn for $780,273.00, plus interest.
Cory and Krohn filed an appeal from the judgment on September 25, 2000. On November 8, 2000, both Cory and Krohn accepted and signed a settlement agreement under which the previous judgment amount was reduced to $400,000.00, in exchange for which Cory and Krohn would dismiss their appeal, and Cory agreed to release Fahlstrom from any claims against her. The district court conducted a hearing on November 17, 2000, and approved the settlement.
Cory's argument against the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that he was not personally served with process in the state action, and thus was never a party. While this is a correct general statement of the law, see Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 1992), it has no application here under the facts of this case.
The evidence establishes that, however much plaintiff may repeat his argument that he was not a "party" to the state court action, he unquestionably became an active litigant there, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is therefore applicable. As noted earlier, it is uncontroverted that Cory participated in the state action; his own Complaint explicitly acknowledges (1) that the state court twice found that it had jurisdiction and that service of process had been properly achieved (Complaint, at ¶¶ 12, 15); (2) that the state court entered judgment against Cory (Id., at ¶ 15), (3) that Cory filed at least two motions (seeking recusal of the judge, whom Cory alleges has been in conspiracy with the state court plaintiff) in the state action (Id., at ¶ 18, 19), (4) that Cory filed a Notice of Appeal of the state district court decision with the Kansas Court of Appeals, along with a Motion to Determine Bond and a Motion for Relief from Default Judgment (Id., at ¶ 21), (5) that Cory filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Kansas Supreme Court (Id.); that the state district court ordered Cory to show cause why he should not be held in contempt (Id., at ¶ 22); and (6) that a settlement was approved by the court (Id., at ¶ 23). The order incorporating the settlement agreement has been submitted to this court, an order signed by Cory as "Defendant," in addition to the signatures of co-defendant Arden Krohn and by the defendants' attorney. (Dkt. No. 27, Exh. A.) After this order, the defendant's counsel also submitted a Stipulated Voluntary Dismissal with the Kansas Court of Appeals in Case No. 00-85983-A (Id., Exh, C) which sets forth the general settlement.
Cory repeatedly and actively participated in the state court proceedings he now challenges, and there is no reason he could not have advanced his current arguments therein. As the principles underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are certainly applicable here, the doctrine itself should also here be given force and effect.
The court notes that this motion was submitted under an expedited briefing schedule with the consent of all parties, and allowed plaintiff Cory to incorporate all arguments he had previously raised in opposition to the other defendants' respective motions for summary judgment, and allowed defendant Fahlstrom to incorporate all arguments made by the other defendants in their respective summary judgment motions. Both plaintiff and defendant Fahlsrom were allowed to submit additional factual assertions germane to the motion decided today.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 3d day of April, 2003, that defendant Fahlstrom's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 68) is hereby granted.