DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the claim (see CPLR 214(6); Carnevali v. Herman, 293 A.D.2d 698), and such a claim accrues when the malpractice is committed, not when it is discovered (see Santulli v. Englert, Reilly McHugh, 78 N.Y.2d 700). Here, the act of malpractice would have occurred during the underlying civil trial which ended on January 23, 1995. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, absent any applicable tolling provisions, he had three years from January 23, 1995, to commence a timely action (see generally Brothers v. Florence, 95 N.Y.2d 290). The Supreme Court properly concluded that neither the doctrines of continuous representation (see Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d 164; Pellati v. Lite Lite, 290 A.D.2d 544) nor estoppel (see Simucki v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442; Julian v. Carroll, 270 A.D.2d 457), tolled the statute of limitations to the extent necessary to render the commencement of this action timely (see Daniels v. Lebit, 299 A.D.2d 310. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss was properly granted (see Gravel v. Cicola, 297 A.D.2d 620).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are academic in light of our determination herein.
SMITH, J.P., McGINITY, COZIER and MASTRO, JJ., concur.