We note defendants' attorney's acknowledgment before the motion court that he does not represent Sandoval, and his resulting lack of standing to prosecute the appeal on Sandoval's behalf (see Wehringer v. Douglas Gibbons-Hollyday Ives, 49 A.D.2d 109, 111, lv dismissed 38 N.Y.2d 919). Although the motion court's denial of plaintiffs' cross motion for Sandoval's arrest moots defendants' argument that the cross motion should have been denied because it was not served in accordance with Judiciary Law § 756, we note that the cross motion was made pursuant to the July 31st contempt order, not Judiciary Law § 756. The record establishes that defendants were served with the summons and complaint, the default judgments, the information subpoenas, the contempt motion, and the July 31st contempt order, and "it defies credulity," as the motion court put it, that Sandoval himself was unaware of these and all related documents. Accordingly, Sandoval can be punished for defendants' contempt, even though not a party to the underlying action, upon such notice as the court deems appropriate and accords with due process (see Citibank v. Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, 86 A.D.2d 828, 829; cf. Matter of McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583).
Motion seeking leave to supplement record denied.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.