DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the appeal from the order entered February 14, 2002, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order dated July 19, 2002, made upon reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated July 19, 2002, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
It is well settled that the "Supreme Court has inherent power to supervise the fees attorneys charge for legal services" (Matter of Stortecky v. Mazzone, 85 N.Y.2d 518, 525; see Matter of McCormick, 220 A.D.2d 506). When an attorney renders services for the benefit of the incapacitated person, the Supreme Court must determine whether the fee requested is necessary, fair, and reasonable (see Matter of Castano, 248 A.D.2d 382; Matter of McCormick, supra). The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the attorney's fee include: (1) the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented, (2) the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation, (3) the amount of money involved and the benefit flowing to the ward as a result of the attorney's services, (4) fees awarded in similar cases, (5) the contingency or certainty of compensation, (6) the results obtained, and (7) the responsibility involved (see Matter of Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1; Matter of Mavis L., 285 A.D.2d 509; Matter of Stark, 174 A.D.2d 746). Under the circumstances, the attorney's fee awarded to the appellant upon reargument was reasonable.
FLORIO, J.P., H. MILLER, ADAMS and MASTRO, JJ., concur.