ARMSTRONG, J.
Bradley Jevons appeals a summary judgment dismissing his personal injury claim against the State. Jevons, an employee of a company the Department of Transportation (DOT) hired to build a bridge, fell from the bridge and was badly hurt. He sued DOT, contending that it owed him a duty of care because it retained control over the project.
Because the State retained control only over whether the contractor met contract goals, not the method or means of doing so, we affirm.
FACTS
The Department of Transportation hired Wilder Construction to build a bridge on SR 101. Bradley Jevons operated a Bidwell paving machine for Wilder. One day, Jevons jumped off the Bidwell onto the plywood deck of the incomplete bridge. The deck was supported by beams that did not conform to Wilder's DOT-approved construction plan. Jevons fell through the deck and was seriously injured when he landed about 75 feet below.
Jevons sued DOT for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, ruling that DOT owed no duty to Jevons. Specifically, the court found that DOT was not liable as a landowner, that DOT did not retain control over Wilder's work and was not liable under common law, and that DOT did not have supervisory authority over Wilder's work sufficient to invoke Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) liability. Chapter 49.17 RCW. On appeal, Jevons contests only the trial court's finding that DOT was not liable under common law and WISHA.
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo. In doing so, we consider whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude judgment as a matter of law. Iwai v. State, 129 Wn.2d 84, 96, 915 P.2d 1089 (1996). To show that DOT was negligent, Jevons had to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. Iwai, 129 Wn.2d at 96. The issue here is whether Jevons could show that DOT owed him a duty.
I. Common Law Duty of Care
Jevons contends that DOT retained sufficient control over the workplace to give rise to a common law duty. He claims that this control is evident in the construction manual, from several DOT employees who said they looked at safety issues on site, and because one DOT employee told the contractor to correct a safety problem that he had encountered after nearly falling from the bridge.
Whether DOT had a duty to ensure a safe workplace for Jevons depends on whether Wilder was an independent contractor. Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wn.2d 114, 119, 52 P.3d 472 (2002). An "independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 119 (quoting Restatement Second of Agency sec. 2(3)). Employers cannot control the manner in which the independent contractor works; thus, the employer is not liable for injuries independent contractors (or their employees) incur. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 119.
The `proper inquiry [is] whether there is a retention of the right to direct the manner in which the work is performed, not simply whether there is an actual exercise of control over the manner in which the work is performed.' Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 121. `It is not enough that [the employer] has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. . . .There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.'
Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 121 (quoting Restatement Second of Torts § 414 cmt. c (1965)).
In Kamla, the Space Needle Corporation hired an independent contractor to set up a fireworks display. An employee of the independent contractor was injured when an elevator snagged his safety line. Space Needle had agreed to provide the site, crowd control, firefighters, permit fees, and technical assistance and support. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 122. But the court found that this did not create a common law duty of care on the part of Space Needle because it `did not retain the right to interfere with the manner in which [the independent contractor] completed its work, nor did Space Needle affirmatively assume responsibility for workers' safety.' Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 121-22.
Here, DOT required the contractor to comply with all laws, to indemnify the State against any claims arising because the contractor violated a law, and to be responsible for the safety of its workers. DOT's project engineer had the right to inspect work and materials for conformity with the contract. If the engineer noticed a legal violation, he was to notify the contractor and attempt to get voluntary compliance. If the contractor did not comply, the engineer could notify the responsible agency; he could also suspend the work if he noticed unsafe conditions that the contractor refused to correct. But the project engineer's approval or advice did not relieve the contractor of any of its obligations under the contract. As in Kamla, DOT did not retain the right to control the manner in which Wilder completed its work; nor did it affirmatively assume responsibility for Wilder's employees' safety. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 121-22. DOT merely retained the right to ensure that Wilder followed the contract, used proper materials, and performed in a timely manner. DOT's ability to bring violations to the contractor's attention does not mean that it retained the right to control the manner in which the work was performed.
But Jevons insists that several facts show that DOT retained control over the manner of work. He cites the construction manual, which provided guidance to the DOT inspectors but was not part of the contract. The manual urged inspectors to check falsework and formwork — safety measures that failed, leading to Jevons' fall — carefully because of the potential for major injury or loss of life. He also highlights the fact that, after a DOT inspector had a near fall due to improper formwork the week before Jevons fell, the inspector told the contractor to check the rest of the deck. Contrary to Jevons' view, these facts support DOT's contention that it did not retain control over the manner in which Wilder completed its work. The manual instructs the inspectors that they are responsible to ensure that the contractor meets contract provisions and follows safety regulations. It also directs the inspectors to bring any issues, violations, or problems first to the contractor and, if that fails, to the appropriate regulatory agency. The DOT inspector followed this procedure when, following his near fall, he reported to the contractor and told the contractor to make sure that the rest of the deck was safe (rather than reporting to DOT and having DOT check deck safety). And it is not enough that DOT could have stopped work or made suggestions. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 121. "The retention of the right to inspect and supervise to insure the proper completion of the contract does not vitiate the independent contractor relationship." Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 120-21 (quoting Hennig v. Crosby Group, Inc., 116 Wn.2d 131, 134, 802 P.2d 790 (1991)) (quoting Epperly v. City of Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 777, 785, 399 P.2d 591 (1965)). DOT did not owe Jevons a common law duty of care based on retained control; it did not retain control over the manner in which Wilder conducted its work.
II. Statutory Duty of Care
Jevons next contends that DOT retained sufficient supervisory authority over Wilder's work and that it had a specific duty to ensure that Wilder and its employees complied with WISHA.
General contractors have a nondelegable duty to ensure compliance with all WISHA regulations. Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wn.2d 454, 464, 788 P.2d 545 (1990). WISHA does not impose this duty on jobsite owners unless the jobsite owner retains control over the manner in which an independent contractor completes its work. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 125. '[A] general contractor is in the best position, financially and structurally, to ensure WISHA compliance or provide safety equipment to workers,' but the same is not always true for jobsite owners. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 124. Thus, the general contractor bears the primary responsibility for its workers' safety. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 124.
The Kamla court found that where Space Needle — a jobsite owner — did not retain sufficient control to impose common law liability, it did not retain sufficient control to impose WISHA liability. Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 125. Similarly, here DOT did not retain the right to control the manner in which Wilder completed its work; thus, it owed Jevons no duty under WISHA.
The facts here differ from the Kamla facts in several aspects. For example, unlike the Space Needle Corporation in Kamla, DOT placed inspectors at the jobsite daily to ensure that Wilder complied with contract specifications, including safety measures. Kamla does not foreclose the possibility that a jobsite owner could have a duty to comply with WISHA; it just holds that the owner, by reason of ownership alone, has no such duty. An owner or developer is liable under WISHA if they hold a position similar to a general contractor. Doss v. ITT Rayonier Inc., 60 Wn. App. 125, 127-28 n. 2, 803 P.2d 4 (1991); Weinert v. Bronco National Co., 58 Wn. App. 692, 696, 795 P.2d 1167 (1990). General contractors have a duty to comply with WISHA because they "have the greater practical opportunity and ability to insure compliance with safety standards," and have `innate supervisory authority' over the workplace. Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 462, 464 (quoting Alber v. Owens, 66 Cal.2d 790, 427 P.2d 781, 59 Cal.Rptr. 117 (1967)). But here, DOT did review and approve Wilder's construction and safety plans. This, however, does not mean that DOT was in the best position to comply with and enforce safety standards. Stute distinguishes a general contractor who oversees and runs the entire project from a subcontractor who has more limited resources and who has no control over the project as a whole. Here, although DOT did inspect Wilder's plans and work for contract compliance, Wilder ran the project. Wilder chose the method and manner to carry out the planned construction. And Wilder demonstrated its innate supervisory authority over the site by holding safety meetings and checking for and correcting safety problems, such as those discovered by an inspector's near fall. Further, unlike Doss, where the court found a duty, DOT did not assign a safety supervisor to the job. Doss, 60 Wn. App. at 126.
In conclusion, DOT did not retain the right to control the manner in which Wilder built the bridge. DOT inspectors were at the jobsite merely to ensure contract compliance. Accordingly, under Kamla, the State did not owe a duty to Jevons simply because it retained the right to inspect for contract compliance, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to DOT.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MORGAN, J. and HUNT, C.J., concur.