PELLOT v. PELLOT

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Docket Number

2002-03547

Attorney(S)

Dennis Marc Reisman, Great Neck, N.Y., for appellant. Saltzman, Chetkof Rosenberg, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Lee Rosenberg of counsel), for respondent.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Benjamin Pellot, Jr. (plaintiff husband) and Jeanette Pellot (defendant wife) entered into a stipulation of settlement on May 16, 1996, which included provisions for child support payments of $800 per month and the distribution of two automobiles. The plaintiff paid the stipulated child support amount until June 1, 2000, when he unilaterally reduced payments to $400 per month. The stipulation was never merged into any judgment or court order. The defendant sought a child support order in Family Court, which, after hearing, set the plaintiff’s child support at $102.11 per week and required a retroactive payment of $80.18. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced a divorce action. The defendant moved for summary judgment on counterclaims for retroactive child support and the value of a certain automobile, alleging breaches of the stipulation. The plaintiff cross-moved to dismiss these counterclaims. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion and granted the plaintiff’s cross motion, dismissing the counterclaims. The defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defendant’s counterclaim for retroactive child support based on the stipulation of settlement, which was not merged into a judgment or order, is rendered academic by the Family Court’s child support order.
Whether the child support provisions of the stipulation are enforceable despite lacking specific “opt-out” recitals mandated by the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA).
How to properly calculate retroactive child support when the stipulated amount does not align with CSSA guidelines.
Whether summary judgment is appropriate on the defendant’s counterclaim regarding the monetary value of a certain automobile when the stipulation’s relevant provision is ambiguous.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant wife moved for summary judgment on her third counterclaim for retroactive child support and fourth counterclaim for the value of an automobile, asserting breaches of the stipulation by the plaintiff.
She contended that the plaintiff’s unilateral reduction of child support payments violated the stipulation.

Respondent's Arguments

The plaintiff husband cross-moved to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing that the Family Court’s child support order rendered the defendant’s claim for retroactive child support academic.
He also contended that the stipulation’s child support provisions were void and unenforceable because they lacked specific "opt-out" recitals required by the CSSA.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Doty v. Doty, 262 A.D.2d 349	Family Court orders cannot supersede surviving settlement agreements; supported spouse retains right to sue on contract for differences in child support amounts.	Used to hold that the Family Court order did not render the wife’s claim for retroactive child support academic since the stipulation was not merged into a judgment or order.
Sparacio v. Sparacio, 248 A.D.2d 705	Supports principle that parties can enforce child support provisions in settlement agreements notwithstanding Family Court orders.	Reinforced that the wife could enforce the stipulation’s child support provisions and recover differences.
Gonzalez v. Norrito, 256 A.D.2d 440	Contract interpretation aims to give fair meaning to all language to realize parties’ reasonable expectations.	Applied to determine that the child support amount in the stipulation should be recalculated according to CSSA guidelines using the husband’s 1996 salary.
Joseph v. Creek Pines, 217 A.D.2d 534	Supports principles of contract interpretation focusing on practical and reasonable construction.	Used alongside Gonzalez to support recalculation of child support amount.
W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162	Whether a writing is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.	Applied to find that the stipulation’s automobile provision was ambiguous, precluding summary judgment.
State of New York v. Home Indem. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 669, 671	Ambiguous contract language allows extrinsic evidence and resolution by trier of fact.	Supported the conclusion that issues of fact exist regarding the automobile provision, barring summary judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the Family Court’s order reducing child support and requiring retroactive payment, noting that because the stipulation was never merged into a judgment or order, the Family Court’s order did not extinguish the wife’s contractual right to enforce the stipulation. The court relied on established precedent holding that Family Court orders cannot supersede surviving settlement agreements. It rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the stipulation was unenforceable due to lacking specific CSSA “opt-out” recitals, finding instead that the parties intended to comply with the CSSA guidelines, as evidenced by the stipulation’s language. The court held that the stipulated child support amount should be recalculated according to the CSSA using the husband’s salary at the time of the stipulation, as supported by the Family Court’s factual findings. The court also explained that in calculating retroactive support, credits for amounts already paid above the recalculated amount and the retroactive amount paid pursuant to the Family Court order should be considered. Regarding the defendant’s counterclaim for the automobile’s value, the court found the relevant stipulation language ambiguous. Because contract ambiguity is a question of law and extrinsic evidence may be necessary, the court concluded that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on this claim.

Holding and Implications

The court modified the Supreme Court’s order by granting the defendant wife’s motion for summary judgment on her third counterclaim for retroactive child support and denying the plaintiff husband’s cross motion to dismiss that claim. The order was affirmed as modified, costs awarded to the appellant, and the case remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, to determine the amount of retroactive child support owed consistent with the opinion.

The court’s decision allows enforcement of child support provisions in a settlement agreement not merged into a judgment, clarifies the necessity of recalculating child support according to CSSA guidelines when stipulated amounts are incorrect, and confirms that ambiguous contract provisions require fact-finding before summary judgment. No new precedent was established; rather, the ruling applied and clarified existing principles regarding enforcement of settlement agreements and contract interpretation in family law.

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BENJAMIN PELLOT, JR., respondent, v. JEANETTE PELLOT, appellant.

DECISION ORDER

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by (1) deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment on her third counterclaim for retroactive child support and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) deleting the provision thereof granting the cross motion and substituting therefor a provision denying the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the appellant, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a determination of the amount of retroactive child support owed by the plaintiff in accordance herewith.

On May 16, 1996, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement governing, among other matters, the payment of child support by the plaintiff and the distribution of two automobiles. The stipulation required the plaintiff to pay $800 per month as child support for their two children. It is undisputed that the plaintiff paid the amount of child support set forth in the stipulation until June 1, 2000, at which time he unilaterally reduced his child support payments to $400 per month. The stipulation was never merged into any judgment or order.

In June 2000 the defendant sought an order of child support in the Family Court, Queens County. After an evidentiary hearing, the Family Court entered an order dated February 21, 2001, which decreased the plaintiff's child support obligation to $102.11 per week, and required him to pay retroactive child support in the total amount of $80.18. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the present action for a divorce and ancillary relief. The defendant moved for summary judgment on her counterclaims for retroactive child support and the value of a certain automobile, based upon the plaintiff's alleged breaches of the terms of the stipulation. The plaintiff cross-moved to dismiss those counterclaims. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion in its entirety, finding, in part, that the defendant's claim for retroactive child support was rendered academic by virtue of the Family Court's issuance of an order of child support after a hearing. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's cross motion, dismissing the wife's third and fourth counterclaims. We modify.

It is well-settled law that "[u]nlike an order of the Supreme Court, which can modify the provisions of a divorce judgment, a Family Court order can neither supersede the provisions of a surviving settlement agreement, nor divest the supported spouse of the right to sue on the contract in a plenary action to collect the difference between the amount provided for in the settlement agreement and the reduction directed by the court" (Doty v. Doty, 262 A.D.2d 349; see Sparacio v. Sparacio, 248 A.D.2d 705). Since it is undisputed that the stipulation was never merged into any judgment or order, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the wife's counterclaim for retroactive child support as academic.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention that the stipulation's child support provisions are void and unenforceable because they do not contain the specific "opt-out" recitals mandated by the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter the CSSA; see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][h]), a review of the stipulation reveals that the parties clearly did not intend to "opt-out" of the CSSA guidelines but instead, intended to follow them. Indeed, the stipulation specifically states that "the amount of child support provided for herein is the presumptive amount of the basic child support obligation determined pursuant to the guidelines of the Child Support Standards Act." Since the child support provisions of the stipulation cannot be interpreted as an "opt-out" of the CSSA guidelines by the parties, the stipulation was not required to contain the additional recitals regarding the amount of child support that would have been calculated under the CSSA and the parties' reasons for not utilizing this amount (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][h]). Moreover, the stipulation comports with the requirements of the statute, in that it contains a recitation that the parties were advised of the provisions of the CSSA, and that the basic child support obligation provided for therein would presumptively result in the correct amount of child support to be awarded. As such, the wife is entitled to enforce these provisions of the stipulation and to recover the difference between the amount of child support agreed to in the stipulation and the reduced amount set by the Family Court (see Doty v. Doty, supra; Sparacio v. Sparacio, supra).

However, despite the parties' clear intention to follow the CSSA guidelines in setting the amount of basic child support, the amount actually contained in the stipulation is incorrect and should be adjusted. When interpreting a contract, the court should arrive at a construction that will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized (see Gonzalez v. Norrito, 256 A.D.2d 440; Joseph v. Creek Pines, 217 A.D.2d 534). Since there is no indication in the stipulation that the parties intended anything other than to compute the amount of basic child support in accordance with the CSSA guidelines, the amount of basic child support should be re-calculated utilizing the husband's annual salary at the time the stipulation was entered into: May 16, 1996. The Family Court made a specific finding that the plaintiff's annual salary in May 1996 was $42,000 based upon the plaintiff's W-2 form and the couple's 1996 joint tax return, both of which, the court noted, were submitted into evidence by the defendant. Therefore, the amount of retroactive child support to be awarded to the defendant should be calculated based upon the difference between the amount the parties intended the stipulation to reflect, i.e. $786 per month (the amount calculated in accordance with the CSSA guidelines), and the amount ordered by the Family Court, $102.11 per week. In calculating the total amount of the award, the Supreme Court should take into account any amounts paid by the plaintiff in excess of the $786 per month, as well as the retroactive amount of $80.18 paid by the plaintiff pursuant to the Family Court order of support, as credits against the total amount awarded.

The defendant's fourth counterclaim is premised upon the plaintiff's alleged failure to transfer ownership of a particular automobile to her as allegedly required by the stipulation. However, we find the relevant provision of the stipulation to be ambiguous. It is well settled that whether or not a writing is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the courts (see W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162). Where the language of a contract is susceptible to varying but reasonable interpretations, the parties may submit extrinsic evidence as an aid in construction, and the resolution of the ambiguity is for the trier of fact (see State of New York v. Home Indem. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 669, 671). Given the ambiguity of the stipulation's automobile provisions and the conflicting interpretations which can be made, issues of fact exist which preclude the granting of summary judgment to either party on the defendant's fourth counterclaim.

SANTUCCI, J.P., FEUERSTEIN, McGINITY and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.