SACKETT, C.J.
Holly, the mother of Devon, Kaitlyn, and Michael, filed this interlocutory appeal from the juvenile court permanency order directing the county attorney to file a petition to terminate her parental rights. She contends the juvenile court's order violates the separation of powers doctrine. She also contends the permanency order is contrary to the best interests of the children. We reverse and remand.
The county attorney also filed an application for interlocutory appeal. The guardian ad litem for the children joined both applications for interlocutory appeal. The attorney general resisted the applications.
Four-year-old Kaitlyn and three-year-old Michael came to the attention of the Department of Human Services (DHS) in July 2001 after Holly left them with their paternal grandmother, who left them with her male roommate, who called DHS stating he could not care for them. DHS filed a CINA petition concerning all three children and an application for temporary removal of Kaitlyn and Michael, who were removed from Holly's care and placed in foster care. The children were adjudicated to be in need of assistance under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (6)(g) (Supp. 2001) in September 2001. Following a staffing in December, DHS filed an application for Devon's removal from Holly's care. He was placed with his maternal grandmother. A January 2002 dispositional order confirmed Devon's placement with his grandmother and Kaitlyn's and Michael's placement in separate foster homes.
A July 2002 permanency order granted custody and guardianship of Devon to his maternal grandmother. Following a contested permanency hearing in August concerning Kaitlyn and Michael, the court found "[t]he action necessary to obtain permanency is a termination of parental rights," accepted the DHS case permanency plan for termination, and "ordered that the State of Iowa shall file a termination petition within 45 days." This interlocutory appeal followed.
Our review is de novo. In re N.M., 528 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa 1995). We review both the facts and the law and adjudicate rights anew. In re H.G., 601 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1999); Iowa Code § 232.133(1) (2001).
Appellants contend the permanency order violates the separation of powers principle and the relevant provisions of Iowa Code chapter 232 constitute an unlawful delegation of authority to the courts by the legislature. Our supreme court recently addressed these arguments in In re K.C. and S.C., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2003). The court held the juvenile court has authority to direct the county attorney to initiate termination proceedings. In the interests of a child, the doctrine of separation of powers is not violated because separate spheres of governmental authority may overlap. This does no violence to our state constitution because the statute does not effectively allow the judicial branch to encroach upon or aggrandize itself at the expense of the executive branch. Rather, the statute is constitutionally designed to allow the judicial and executive branches to share the same responsibility thereby ensuring the best interests of a child.
Id. at ___ (internal citations and quotations omitted). We conclude the principles set forth in the court's lengthy discussion of the issue apply to all the similar arguments raised by the appellants in the instant case and require the same conclusion. See id. at ___-___.
Holly also contends the permanency order is contrary to the best interests of Kaitlyn and Michael. Iowa Code section 232.104(2) provides four options for a court following a permanency hearing: (1) return the child to the child's home, (2) continue placement for an additional six months if it determines the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the additional six months, (3) direct the county attorney or child's attorney to initiate termination proceedings, or (4) transfer custody of the child to a suitable person for long term care. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(a), (b), (c), and (d). Holly argues she has made significant progress and has completed nearly all the case permanency plan goals. The only thing left for her to complete is to attend the final two of sixteen batterer's education classes. The guardian ad litem did not recommend termination. The assistant county attorney did not support termination. The local Citizen Foster Care Review Board found the parents should get more time and set its next review to occur in three months.
The DHS caseworker and the Families, Inc. service provider both submitted reports and testified at the permanency hearing that termination of parental rights was appropriate due to lack of progress on case permanency plan goals, inconsistency or tardiness for visits, failure to have finished the batterer's education program and a substance abuse aftercare program by the time of the hearing, and Holly's "chaotic" lifestyle.
The juvenile court found Holly had made progress, learned skills, and applied what she learned from parenting classes when exercising visitation. It noted, however:
In the opinion of the professional social workers, the children are so severely impacted by their previous lifestyle and the previous lifestyle of their mother and father, that it takes a lot of work to keep them improving. The parents lack the ability to provide for their children and ensure continued improvement, and they can't provide what is necessary. The mother has learned skills, but no indication she has the ability to use what she has learned on a long-term basis. She is not consistent.
From our de novo review of the record, we find Holly was making reasonable progress toward complying with the requirements of the case permanency plan and toward reunification with Kaitlyn and Michael. See Iowa Code § 232.104(1)(c). The permanency order requiring the initiation of termination proceedings is not in the best interest of Kaitlyn and Michael. We reverse the permanency order and remand for further proceedings as appropriate in this CINA case.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.