PEOPLE v. CHAMBERLIN

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 02CA0853.

Attorney(S)

G.F. Sandstrom, District Attorney, M. Katherine Howard, Deputy District Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant R.D. Jorgensen, Pueblo, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

Judges

Opinion by JUSTICE ERICKSON[fn*] [fn*] Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2002.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1998, in Pueblo County case number 98CR107, Jason R. Chamberlin was charged with two felony counts: burglary and theft. The charges were resolved by a plea agreement. The burglary count was resolved by a deferred judgment and sentence that was later dismissed after successful completion of its terms. The theft count was resolved by a plea to a lesser misdemeanor theft charge, and that misdemeanor conviction remains in effect.

Defendant filed a petition to seal the criminal records arising from case number 98CR107 pursuant to § 24-72-308, C.R.S. 2002. The People objected, asserting that because the misdemeanor conviction remained, the statute did not permit sealing of the records for that case. The district court granted defendant's petition and ordered sealing of all records in case number 98CR107 after applying the statutory balancing test and concluding that defendant's interest outweighed the public interest and that separating records was impractical.

The People appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with directions to deny defendant's petition to seal the records.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the district court erred in granting a petition to seal criminal records under § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I) when the underlying criminal case (98CR107) was not "completely dismissed" because a misdemeanor conviction remained.
Whether the sealing statute permits sealing only the portion of records relating to a dismissed count or whether the statute requires the entire criminal "case" to be completely dismissed before any sealing may occur.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (The People)

The People argued that § 24-72-308 does not allow sealing of the records for case number 98CR107 because an outstanding misdemeanor conviction remained, meaning the underlying case was not "completely dismissed."
The People also argued that the statute requires the entire case to be completely dismissed and does not authorize sealing based on dismissal of only one count when another count resulted in a conviction.

Appellee (Defendant, Jason R. Chamberlin)

Defendant contended he did not seek sealing of the records related to the misdemeanor conviction, but sought sealing of the records insofar as they related to the dismissed felony burglary charge.
Defendant relied on prior appellate decisions (In re T.L.M. and People v. Bushu) to support his position, arguing the statute permitted sealing under the circumstances presented.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1993)	Supports that persons convicted of a criminal offense do not qualify for sealing of records in those criminal cases under the amended statute.	The court cited D.K.B. to show that, as narrowed in 1988, convictions render persons ineligible for sealing; it relied on that principle to hold defendant ineligible because of the remaining misdemeanor conviction.
In re T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001)	Previously applied sealing principles where all charges were resolved in favor of the defendant (dismissal or acquittal).	The court explained that T.L.M. is distinguishable and inapposite because in that case all charges were resolved favorably, whereas here one count resulted in conviction.
People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d 106 (Colo. App. 1994)	Applied sealing principles in a context where charges were resolved in favor of the defendant.	The court noted Bushu is misplaced on the facts of this case because Bushu did not involve the dismissal-of-one-count-plus-conviction-on-another scenario presented here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory eligibility language in § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I), which permits a person in interest to seek sealing of criminal records only "in any case which was completely dismissed" (among other alternatives). The court construed that language as requiring that the underlying criminal "case" be completely dismissed, and not merely that one or more charges or counts within a case be dismissed.

The court determined that because defendant has a remaining misdemeanor conviction in case number 98CR107, the underlying criminal case was not "completely dismissed" under the plain language of the statute. The court relied on People v. D.K.B. to demonstrate that, as the statute was narrowed in 1988, persons convicted of a criminal offense do not qualify for sealing of records in those criminal cases.

The court rejected defendant's arguments that (1) the records relating only to the dismissed felony could be sealed and (2) that the district court's balancing test could justify sealing despite the conviction. The court concluded there is no authorization in § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I) to seal records based on dismissal of particular counts when another count produced a conviction, and that the eligibility requirements in § 24-72-308 govern and limit any relief. The court also found that definitional provisions in § 24-72-302 do not provide an affirmative basis for sealing in these circumstances.

Finally, the court distinguished the cited appellate decisions (In re T.L.M. and People v. Bushu) because those cases involved situations where all charges were resolved in the defendants' favor; those cases did not address the dismissal-of-one-count-with-conviction-on-another scenario presented here.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court reversed the district court judgment and remanded with directions to deny defendant's petition to seal the criminal records involved in case number 98CR107. The core ruling is: REVERSED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DENY THE PETITION TO SEAL.

Implications: As applied to the parties, the direct effect is that defendant may not obtain sealing of any records in case number 98CR107 because one count resulted in a conviction, and the statute requires the underlying case to be completely dismissed to be eligible for sealing. The opinion applied existing statutory language and controlling precedent (People v. D.K.B.) and did not announce a new legal principle beyond that statutory interpretation.

Show full summary ...

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason R. Chamberlin, Defendant-Appellee.

Opinion by JUSTICE ERICKSON[fn*] [fn*] Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2002.

The People appeal from the district court judgment granting the petition of defendant, Jason R. Chamberlin, to seal certain criminal records pertaining to him pursuant to § 24-72-308, C.R.S. 2002. We reverse and remand with directions to deny defendant's petition to seal these records.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. In the underlying criminal case, case number 98CR107, defendant was charged in 1998 with two felony counts, for burglary and theft. These charges were ultimately resolved by a plea agreement. As to the burglary count, defendant received a deferred judgment and sentence which was later dismissed following successful completion of the terms imposed. As to the theft count, defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser misdemeanor theft charge, and this misdemeanor conviction remains unchanged.

Defendant thereafter filed a petition seeking to seal these criminal records pursuant to § 24-72-308. The People filed an objection to the petition, asserting that, in view of the outstanding misdemeanor conviction, the statute did not allow the sealing of these records because the underlying criminal case was not completely dismissed. In response, defendant asserted that he did not seek the sealing of the records regarding the misdemeanor conviction, but that the statute permitted the sealing of the records to the extent they relate to the dismissed felony charge.

Following a hearing, the district court rejected the People's argument and ordered the sealing of all of the criminal records involved in case number 98CR107. Notwithstanding the misdemeanor conviction, the court applied the statutory balancing test and found that defendant's interest in having the records sealed outweighed the opposing public interest. The court further ruled that it would be impractical to separate the records relating to the different charges and that sealing all the records was appropriate because the most serious charge was ultimately dismissed.

On appeal, the People contend that the district court erred in granting the petition to seal these records pursuant to § 24-72-308 when defendant's case was not completely dismissed and there is still a conviction as to one count of the information. We agree.

Pursuant to § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2002, a person in interest is eligible to seek the sealing of criminal records only "of official actions involving a criminal offense for which said person in interest was not charged, in any case which was completely dismissed, or in any case in which said person in interest was acquitted" (emphasis added).

Under these statutory eligibility provisions, as narrowed in 1988, persons who have been convicted of a criminal offense no longer qualify for a court order sealing their records in those criminal cases. See People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1993).

Here, under the plain language of § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I), defendant is not eligible to have any of the criminal records involved in case number 98CR107 sealed, because none of the three alternative statutory criteria has been satisfied.

Contrary to defendant's argument, the second of these criteria does not authorize the sealing of his records under these circumstances. Rather, in view of the outstanding misdemeanor conviction in case number 98CR107, the underlying criminal "case" was not "completely dismissed," as required by § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I), notwithstanding the eventual dismissal of the felony count for burglary.

Moreover, we perceive no affirmative basis for sealing under any of the definitional provisions of § 24-72-302, C.R.S. 2002, because the eligibility requirements for sealing of records are set forth in and limited by the plain language of § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I).

Contrary to defendant's further argument, there is also no basis in the sealing statute for alternatively sealing only the portion of his criminal records relating to the dismissed felony charge. As noted by the People, the pertinent language of § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I) requires that the underlying criminal "case" be "completely dismissed," rather than authorizing sealing upon the dismissal of any particular "charges" or "counts" in a case that has been filed against the person in interest.

We also note that defendant's reliance on In re T.L.M., 39 P.3d 1239 (Colo.App. 2001), and People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d 106 (Colo.App. 1994), is misplaced. In those cases, all the charges were resolved in favor of those defendants, either by dismissal or acquittal. Consequently, the issues raised in this case involving the dismissal of one count with a conviction on another count were not present or addressed in those cases.

Under the circumstances here, because defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense on one count in case number 98CR107, he does not qualify to have any of the criminal records involved in that case sealed. See § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I); see also People v. D.K.B., supra. Thus, the district court erred in reaching the balancing test under the sealing statute and in granting defendant's petition to seal his criminal records on that basis.

Accordingly, the district court judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with directions to deny defendant's petition to seal these criminal records.

JUDGE WEBB and JUDGE METZGER concur.

Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5( 3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2002. Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5( 3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2002.