WILLIAM HASKELL ALSUP, District Judge
Pursuant to the Court's order dismissing the case with prejudice, judgment is hereby entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendants. Plaintiff shall take nothing by way of his complaint.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Legal Claims
Plaintiff contends that Judge Danner "unethically" started the process of having him committed to a mental facility under California Penal Code section 1368. He asserts that at the institution he was held against his will, forced to take psychotropic medications, and denied access to the courts. He contends that Judge Mullin held the § 1368 "trial," at which his constitutional rights were violated, leading to his confinement at the mental institution. He asserts that the defendant "Superior Court" knew of these actions before they occurred and did nothing to stop them. He demands two million dollars in damages from the Superior Court and $500,000 from each judge.
The Superior Court for Santa Clara County is an arm of the state and thus under the Eleventh Amendment cannot be sued in federal court. See, e.g., Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156,1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (11th Amendment bars suit against state superior court and its employees); Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir.),amended, 127 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (state case law and constitutional provisions make clear that California Superior Court is state agency);Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (California municipal court is arm of state protected from lawsuit by 11th Amendment immunity); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1987) (11th Amendment bars suit against Superior Court of State of California regardless of relief sought). This claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's claims against the defendant judges are also barred. State judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed in his judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit for damages, not just from an ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relates to (1) the nature and function of the act and not the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to (2) the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978); see, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-13 (1991) (judge's direction to court officers to forcibly bring person before him is function normally performed by judge and taken in aid of judge's jurisdiction over matter before him); Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (judge absolutely immune for entering default judgment against prisoner who was not permitted to attend civil trial because entry of default judgment in a pending civil case is unquestionably a judicial act);Atkinson-Baker Assocs., Inc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (judge absolutely immune for decision to bar court reporter from continuing to provide services in case over which judge served as special master since said decision was judicial act). Other factors in determining whether a particular act is judicial include whether: (1) the events occurred in the judge's chambers, (2) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge, and (3) whether the events arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the `clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Stump v. Sparkman. 435 U.S. at 356-57 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 11 (judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice). As long as the judge has jurisdiction to perform the "general act" in question, he or she is immune, however erroneous the act may have been, however injurious the consequences of the act may have been, and irrespective of the judge's claimed motivation. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff contends that the judge defendants started and continued the process of having him committed pursuant to section 1368 of the California Penal Code, which relates to treatment of criminal defendants who thought not to be competent to stand trial. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1368. These actions clearly were taken in a judicial capacity, and were of the general nature of actions which judges have jurisdiction to take. These claims are barred by judicial immunity.
Plaintiff's claims against all defendants being barred, this case will be dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.