BAREFOOT SANDERS, Senior District Judge
Before the Court are Plaintiff Dallas County's Motion to Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c), filed July 15, 2003; Plaintiff Dallas County's Supplement to Motion for Remand, filed July 17, 2003; and Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, filed July 28, 2003. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED.
I. Background
On April 14, 2003, William Ross Teter ("Teter"), an attorney, filed suit against Dallas County in the 191st Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, on behalf of a putative class of individuals who sought refunds of bail bond deposits from Dallas County. On June 30, 2003, Dallas County filed claims against Teter for: (1) filing frivolous pleadings, motions, and claims; (2) fraudulent court records and claims; and (3) temporary restraining order and temporary and permanent injunctive relief. (P.'s Ex. A at 1, 5-6.) With respect to the temporary restraining order and injunctive relief, Dallas County in effect seeks to enjoin Teter's practice of law in the area of seeking refunds of bail bond deposits from Dallas County. ( Id. at 8-9.) On July 11, 2003, Teter dismissed all claims against Dallas County on behalf of the putative class and removed the case to this Court.
Dallas County filed claims against Teter in the form of a "third-party petition" in the same case as that in which Teter represents the putative class of individuals who seek bail bond refunds. It is not clear from the pleadings how these claims against Teter constitute "third-party" claims.
Specifically, in relevant part, Dallas County seeks to enjoin Teter from:
a) filing any motions, pleadings, orders, applications or other papers seeking to obtain bail bond money from Dallas County or any of its departments or officials;
b) filing any motions to refund bond deposit/cash receipt, claims for refund of bail bond deposit, and/or special bills of review relating to cash bail bonds;
c) setting, attending and/or conducting any hearings on pending motions to refund bond deposit/cash receipt, claims for refund of bail bond deposit, and/or special bills of review; [and]
d) soliciting clients to represent them in obtaining bail bond money by any means, including but not limited to solicitations by newspaper, mail, telephone, electronic mail or fax[.] (P.'s Ex. A at 8-9.)
The only claims remaining in this case are those Dallas County asserts against Teter in its "third-party petition." The parties agree that Dallas County is properly aligned as the plaintiff and that Teter is properly aligned as the defendant in this case. (P.'s Br. at 3; D.'s Resp. at 1.)
Dallas County now seeks to remand the case, asserting that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (P.'s Br. at 1.) Specifically, Dallas County contends that there is no federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because all of its causes of action against Teter arise under state law. ( Id. at 2-3.) Teter, on the other hand, asserts that the relief sought by Dallas County in its complaint would infringe upon Teter's First Amendment right to "advertis[e] his legal services in the manner approved by the United States Supreme Court in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association," 486 U.S. 466 (1988), thereby creating "a substantial federal question that is removable to a United States District Court." (D.'s Resp. at 2-3.)
The Court now turns to address the legal standards that will guide its analysis.
II. Legal Standards
As a general rule, an action brought in state court may be removed by a defendant to a district court of the United States in any case in which the district court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (2003). See also Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n. 2 (2002). The absence of jurisdiction over a removed action requires remand to the state court from which the action was removed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (2003); Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983). Whether jurisdiction exists for a removed action is determined by looking at the complaint at the time the notice of removal is filed. Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990). The "well-pleaded complaint [must] establish either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28. Finally, doubts regarding whether jurisdiction is proper should be resolved in favor of remand. See Acuna v. Brown Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Court now turns to address the merits of the motion.
III. Analysis
As noted above, Teter contends that his removal of the instant action from state court is based on federal question jurisdiction because the relief sought by Dallas County in its complaint infringes upon Teter's First Amendment right to "advertis[e] his legal services in the manner approved by the United States Supreme Court in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association." (D.'s Resp. at 2.) The Court disagrees. For purposes of removal, a defendant cannot create federal question jurisdiction by raising a federal defense. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14 (recognizing that "a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case"). This is true even if the federal defense is inevitable. See Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995) ("A defendant may not remove on the basis of an anticipated or even inevitable federal defense."). In the instant case, Dallas County's complaint asserts only state law claims against Teter, and the complaint does not assert "that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Dallas County's Motion to Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c), filed July 15, 2003, is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the 191st Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.
SO ORDERED.