COLEMAN, J.
Shortly after Denis Mahony pled guilty to misdemeanor charges of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes, he learned that an amendment effective on the day of his plea required persons convicted of that offense to register as sex offenders. Mahony moved for specific performance of his plea, arguing that there had been a mutual mistake regarding the registration requirement. The court denied the motion, but offered Mahony the opportunity to withdraw his plea. He declined to do so. Mahony now appeals the denial of his motion. Because Mahony has failed to provide an adequate record for review, we affirm.
Mahony was originally charged with two counts of first degree child molestation. The parties negotiated an agreement under which Mahony would plead guilty to reduced charges of two counts of third degree assault and two counts of misdemeanor communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. On the day Mahony entered his plea, the governor signed a bill adding communicating with a minor for immoral purposes to the list of crimes requiring sex offender registration. The legislation was effective immediately and expressly retroactive. Prior to sentencing, the parties learned of the new law and Mahony filed a motion for `specific performance of plea agreement.' In a supporting brief, defense counsel alleged that Mahony had accepted the plea offer in part `to avoid the consequences of registration as a sex offender.' Counsel also alleged that '[t]he state gave its assurances during plea negotiations, and defense counsel was of the same opinion, that registration was not a requirement of misdemeanor CMIP.' Counsel argued that Mahony was entitled to specific performance of the parties' agreement and was, therefore, not subject to the registration requirement. Following a hearing on the motion, the parties appeared for sentencing. Defense counsel then renewed her motion for specific performance. The court ruled that while Mahony was entitled to withdraw his plea, the court lacked `discretion' to order specific performance. The court also stated that, `based upon the parties' agreement,' it would grant specific performance if it had discretion to do so. Mahony contends the superior court erred in concluding it lacked authority to order specific performance. Relying primarily on State v. Miller, he argues that he was entitled to his choice of remedies because the plea agreement was based on a mutual mistake. The State argues that there was no mutual mistake, and therefore no basis for specific performance, because Mahony entered his plea before the law changed. We need not resolve these arguments because Mahony has failed to carry his burden on appeal. An appellant has the burden of providing a record sufficient to resolve the issues on appeal. Because the issue here is the availability of specific performance, the precise nature of the parties' agreement is critical. At a minimum, a defendant seeking specific performance or enforcement of an agreement must establish that the matter he seeks to enforce was a term of the parties' agreement. In addition, this court has distinguished between bargained for assurances in an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, and mere statements of the law, which may not. In this case, the record is insufficient to determine whether non-registration was even a term of the plea agreement, let alone a bargained-for assurance. Other than the written plea agreements, which do not mention registration, there is no evidence or stipulation in the record regarding the terms of the agreement. There is no transcript of the motion hearing, no affidavits, and no testimony. Nor are there findings detailing the nature of the agreement. Mahony's failure to provide an adequate record is fatal to his appeal.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 70.
CP at 71.
Mahony has filed a pro se brief joining in his counsel's argument.
State v. Miller, 110 Wn.2d 528, 756 P.2d 122 (1988).
State v. Garcia, 45 Wn. App. 132, 140, 724 P.2d 412 (1986).
Cf. Setterlund v. Firestone, 104 Wn.2d 24, 27, 700 P.2d 745 (1985) (`those who seek specific performance must prove the specificity of material terms of the agreement they seek to enforce.').
See State v. McRae, 96 Wn.App. 298, 304-06, 979 P.2d 911 (1999).
See State v. Hendricks, 103 Wn. App. 728, 748-49, 14 P.3d 811 (2000) (defendant failed to prove that language in plea amounted to a bargained-for assurance where he presented no evidence of plea negotiations or a plea agreement).
Affirmed.
GROSSE and AGID, JJ., concur.