DAVID COHEN, Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Byron A. Crowe moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) to correct the underlying judgment in this case to include an award of $3,437.44. See Plaintiff's Rule 60(a) Motion To Correct Judgment To Include Prejudgment Interest ("Motion") (Docket No. 53). In so doing, Crowe relies upon this court's decision in Mirra Co. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, No. 01-165-P-DMC, 2003 WL 21026786 (D. Me. May 6, 2003), which in turn relies upon Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1986). See id.
Defendant J.P. Bolduc opposes the Motion primarily on the ground that the Supreme Court abrogated Aubin `s construction of Rule 60(a) in Osterneck v. Ernst Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989), effectively obliterating that rule as a vehicle through which to seek prejudgment interest in circumstances such as these. See Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Rule 60(a) Motion To Correct Judgment To Include Prejudgment Interest, etc. ("Objection") (Docket No. 57). He argues that in the wake of Osterneck, litigants such as Crowe may seek to amend a judgment to add prejudgment interest solely through the vehicle of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See id. He reasons that inasmuch as a Rule 59(e) motion must be brought within ten days of issuance of a judgment, and Crowe has missed that deadline by a mile, the Motion should be denied. I am unpersuaded.
Bolduc opposes the Motion on a second basis — that it is procedurally defective inasmuch as it seeks amendment of the initial judgment dated September 19, 2002 rather than the operative amended judgment dated November 12, 2002. See Objection at 2 n. 2. I decline to deny the Motion on this basis. Crowe plausibly explains that his citation to the initial judgment was a mistake. See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion To Correct Judgment To Include Prejudgment Interest (Docket No. 60). I therefore construe the Motion to refer to the amended judgment.
"In a diversity action, such as the present one, state law must be applied in determining whether and how much pre-judgment interest should be awarded." Saint-Gobain Indus. Ceramics Inc. v. Wellons, Inc., 246 F.3d 64, 69 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). What is at issue here is so-called "mandatory" prejudgment interest. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-D (as amended effective July 1, 2003 by P.L. 2003, ch. 460) ("The clerk shall set costs under section 1502-B and interest under section 1602-B to the extent they appear from the record.").
The Supreme Court in Osterneck held that "a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest is a Rule 59(e) motion[.]" Osterneck, 489 U.S. at 177. The Court stated in dictum, in a footnote: "We do not believe the result should be different where prejudgment interest is available as a matter of right." Id. at 176 n. 3. Osterneck accordingly does not itself abrogate that portion of Aubin upon which I relied in Mirra and Crowe relies in pressing the instant Motion. Nor has the First Circuit subsequently abrogated it either on the strength of Osterneck or for any other reason. To the contrary, in an "unpublished" opinion decided as recently as 2000, the First Circuit signaled the continuing vitality of the Aubin rule. See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Gallucci, No. 99-1386, 2000 WL 1160443 (1st Cir. Jul. 14, 2000) (holding that district court had not erred in failing to grant prejudgment interest pursuant to Rule 60; noting that "[w]hile Rule 60(a) has sometimes been used to correct an omission of mandatory prejudgment interest, those cases are factually distinguishable from this one. Here, the computation of the amount of prejudgment interest to which Trustmark would be entitled under the statute was not `simple, clear and mechanical.' Compare Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1986). . . .").
Inasmuch as the portion of Osterneck upon which Bolduc relies is dictum, it is for the First Circuit, rather than this court, to decree Aubin overruled. See Ross v. State of Alabama, 15 F. Supp.2d 1173, 1191 n. 10 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("It is not the province of this court to expand the Supreme Court's [narrow] holding to cover issues squarely addressed by the Eleventh Circuit."); Donald H. Hartvig, Inc. v. Kellas (In re Kellas), 113 B.R. 673, 677-78 (D. Or. 1990) (finding "persuasive" Bankruptcy Court's logic that "even if US West is correct that Mackey [ v. Lanier, 486 U.S. 825 (1988)] impliedly overrules Daniel [ v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel)], 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985)], it is not the role of the Bankruptcy Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit. Daniel remains good law until the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court overrule it. Dicta are not enough.").
This case being indistinguishable in all material respects from Aubin and Mirra, the Motion, as construed to apply to the amended judgment dated November 12, 2002, is granted. SO ORDERED.
Crowe seeks prejudgment interest in accordance with applicable Maine state law as construed in Mirra. See generally Motion. Effective July 1, 2003 the Maine legislature amended the state's prejudgment- and postjudgment-interest laws to clarify "the proper methodology for calculating prejudgment and post-judgment interest[.]" An Act To Simplify Calculation of Legal Interest, P.L. 2003, ch. 460 (emergency preamble). While the amendments apply only to judgments entered on or after July 1, 2003, see id. § 13, they would have directed application of the same calculation formula used in Mirra if applicable in this case, compare id. § 6 (enacting 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602-B(7)) with Mirra, 2003 WL 21026786, at *2-*3.