SARAH VANCE, District Judge
Donald Ray Martin, Sr. moves for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES his motion as time-barred by the statute of limitations.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2001, the United States indicted Donald Ray Martin, Sr. on one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and on three counts of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Martin pleaded guilty to all counts on August 22, 2001. In his written plea agreement, Martin waived all right to appeal his sentence, including an appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless the sentence imposed was in excess of the statutory maximum or the punishment constituted an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines.
On April 17, 2002, this Court sentenced Martin to 168 months, the bottom of his guideline range. Martin did not appeal his sentence. On May 19, 2003, Martin filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody.
II. DISCUSSION
Congress enacted a strict statute of limitations for habeas corpus proceedings as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Section 2255 provides, in pertinent part,
A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Therefore, the one-year period of time in which Martin was to file his petition for relief under § 2255 began to run on the date his judgment of conviction became final.
Although AEDPA does not define when a judgment of conviction becomes "final," the courts have consistently held that a judgment of conviction for purposes of relief under AEDPA becomes final after the time to file a notice of appeal has expired, regardless of whether the defendant actually files such notice. See United States v. Adams, No. Crim. A. 99-88, *1, 2002 WL 826770 (E.D. La. April 30, 2002); United States v. Gambini, No. Civ. A. 99-225, * 1, 2002 WL 1767418 (E.D. La. July 30, 2002) (citing United States v. Gamble, 208 F.3d 536, 537 (5th Cir. 2000)); United States v. Cuero-Conga, No. Civ. A. 92-098, *1, 1997 WL 346722 (E.D. La. June 23, 1997); Rodriguez v. United States, No. 99 CV 6803, * 2, 1999 WL 1487600 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1999). Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within ten days after the entry of the judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
This Court entered judgment: against Martin on April 22, 2002. Because he filed no notice of appeal, his judgment of conviction became final on May 2, 2002. Martin therefore had until May 2, 2003 to file his petition for relief under § 2255. Margin filed his petition on May 19, 2003, nearly seventeen days after the statute of limitations had expired. Martin's petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is therefore time-barred.
The Court recognizes that Martin filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice and Motion to be Heard Via Supplemental Memorandum of Law on May 16, 2003. Even if such a motion were to interrupt the statute of limitations, the Court notes that it too was filed after the statute of limitations had run.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES petitioner's motion as prescribed.