Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

S03A1257.

Attorney(S)

Olmert, Hunnings Hasty, Jason R. Hasty, for appellant. Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Timothy B. Lumpkin, Amy H. McChesney, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jason C. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Judges

Hugh P. Thompson

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Boynton v. The State (Supreme Court of Georgia, Sept. 22, 2003)

Factual and Procedural Background

Nicole Boynton and her boyfriend, Ronnie Moss, lived together with their nine-month-old baby. On September 30, 1999, the couple quarreled and the argument escalated into a physical fight. The disturbance was briefly interrupted when several young girls knocked on the door; Moss answered and closed the door. Boynton went into the kitchen, took a steak knife, confronted Moss while holding the knife overhead, and during a struggle in which Moss grabbed her arm, Boynton plunged the knife deep into Moss' chest. An autopsy showed several superficial chest wounds and a single deep penetrating wound to the heart, which was the cause of death. Boynton called 911, but Moss died from the single fatal wound.

Boynton was indicted on December 20, 2001 on charges including malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and a separate incident of aggravated assault. The trial concluded November 15, 2002; the jury found Boynton guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. She was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and a concurrent five-year term for aggravated assault. Boynton's motion for new trial was denied April 15, 2003; she filed a notice of appeal on April 24, 2003. The case was docketed in the Georgia Supreme Court on May 7, 2003 and submitted on briefs June 30, 2003. The Supreme Court issued its decision on September 22, 2003.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Boynton's convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether the trial court erred by declining to recharge the jury on the law of accident after the jury requested further guidance on felony murder.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting Boynton's videotaped statement, as challenged in a Jackson-Denno hearing (i.e., whether the statement was voluntary and Miranda warnings were adequate).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)	Standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence (whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).	Applied to conclude the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault.
Henderson v. State, 256 Ga. 486 (350 S.E.2d 236) (1986)	Supportive precedent cited in connection with sufficiency review.	Used alongside Jackson to support the conclusion that the evidence was sufficient.
Mitchell v. State, 275 Ga. 42, 43 (561 S.E.2d 803) (2002)	Supportive authority cited in the court's sufficiency analysis.	Referenced as additional support for finding the evidence sufficient.
Duffie v. State, 273 Ga. 314, 316 (540 S.E.2d 194) (2001)	Principle that when a jury requests additional instructions, the trial court has discretion to recharge in full or limit the recharge to the scope of the jury's request.	Applied to uphold the trial court's discretion in recharging only on the subjects requested by the jury (felony murder and justification).
Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (343 S.E.2d 684) (1986)	Authority that a trial court may limit recharges to the jury's request and that refusal to recharge on accident is not error when the jury seeks a recharge on related offenses or elements.	Cited to support the proposition that the court did not err in declining to recharge on accident when the jury sought guidance on felony murder.
Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 639 (469 S.E.2d 188) (1996)	Holding that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to recharge affirmative defenses when the jury seeks a recharge on the elements of an offense.	Applied to affirm the trial court's refusal to recharge on accident because the jury's request focused on felony murder.
Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365 (541 S.E.2d 369) (2001)	Standard that, unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations at a Jackson-Denno hearing are upheld on appeal.	Used to uphold the trial court's finding that Boynton's videotaped statement was admissible based on the State's proof regarding Miranda warnings and acknowledgment.
Jackson v. Denno	Reference to the type of hearing used to determine admissibility/voluntariness of a defendant's statement (Jackson-Denno hearing).	Contextual reference: the court evaluated admissibility of Boynton's videotaped statement under the Jackson-Denno framework and upheld admission.
Edge v. State, 275 Ga. 311, 312 (567 S.E.2d 1) (2002)	Supportive authority regarding admissibility of defendant statements following proper Miranda warnings and acknowledgments.	Cited to reinforce the conclusion that the videotaped statement was properly admitted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in three principal parts as reflected in the opinion:

Sufficiency of the Evidence. The Court applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard for sufficiency of the evidence, along with state precedents (Henderson; Mitchell), and concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Boynton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and aggravated assault.
Refusal to Recharge on Accident. The trial court initially instructed the jury on felony murder, aggravated assault, justification, and accident. During deliberations, the jury requested additional guidance specifically on felony murder. The trial court recharged on felony murder and justification but declined to recharge on accident because, in the court's view, the evidence indicated intentional action and because the jury had not asked for a recharge on accident. The Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's action for abuse of discretion, citing authorities (Duffie; Appling; Hobson) that a trial court may limit a recharge to the scope of the jury's request and may refuse to recharge on affirmative defenses when the jury requests recharging on offense elements. The Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in tailoring the recharge to the jury's request and in refusing to recharge on accident.
Admissibility of Videotaped Statement (Jackson-Denno Hearing). The Court applied the standard from Grier that factual findings and credibility determinations at a Jackson-Denno hearing will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. The record showed that Boynton was advised of her Miranda rights on two occasions and that she acknowledged understanding her rights both verbally and in writing. Based on that showing and the trial court's non-erroneous findings, the Court concluded the videotaped statement was admissible, citing Edge as supportive authority.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Direct effect: Boynton's convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault and the sentences imposed by the trial court were affirmed. The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications or announce a new rule of law; it affirms the result on the record and applies existing precedent.

All the Justices concurred.

Show full summary ...

BOYNTON v. THE STATE.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Defendant Nicole Boynton was convicted of felony murder, predicated on the underlying felony of aggravated assault, in connection with the stabbing death of her boyfriend, Ronnie Moss. She appeals asserting, inter alia, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of accident. Finding no error, we affirm.

Moss was killed on September 30, 1999, and Boynton was indicted on December 20, 2001, on charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, as well as a separate incident of aggravated assault upon Moss. The trial concluded on November 15, 2002, and the jury returned its verdict finding Boynton guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. Boynton was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and a concurrent five-year term for aggravated assault. Boynton's timely filed motion for new trial was denied on April 15, 2003, and Boynton filed a notice of appeal on April 24, 2003. The case was docketed in this Court on May 7, 2003, and submitted for decision on briefs on June 30, 2003.

Boynton and Moss lived together with their nine-month-old baby. On the day in question, the couple quarreled and their quarreling escalated into a fight. The fight was interrupted when several young girls, who heard the commotion, knocked on the door. Moss answered, assured the girls that everything was all right, and closed the door. In the meantime, Boynton went into the kitchen, grabbed a steak knife and confronted Moss, holding the knife overhead. Moss approached her and grabbed her arm. In the course of the ensuing struggle, Boynton plunged the knife deep into Moss' chest.

Boynton called 911 and an ambulance rushed to the scene. But it was too late to save Moss.

An autopsy revealed a number of superficial knife wounds to Moss' chest, as well as a single deep penetrating wound to the heart. Moss died as a result of that single wound.

1. The evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find Boynton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and aggravated assault. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Henderson v. State, 256 Ga. 486 ( 350 S.E.2d 236) (1986). See also Mitchell v. State, 275 Ga. 42, 43 (2) ( 561 S.E.2d 803) (2002).

2. In its original charge, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of felony murder, aggravated assault, justification and accident. In the midst of deliberations, the jury sought further guidance on the law of felony murder. Thereupon, the trial court recharged the jury on felony murder and justification. Noting that Boynton's actions appeared to be intentional, the trial court declined to recharge the jury on accident. Boynton asserts the trial court's failure to recharge on accident was harmful error. We disagree.

When a jury requests additional instructions on a point of law, the trial court in its discretion can recharge in full or limit its recharge to the scope of the jury's request. Duffie v. State, 273 Ga. 314, 316 ( 540 S.E.2d 194) (2001); Appling v. State, 256 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 343 S.E.2d 684) (1986). It does not abuse its discretion by refusing to recharge affirmative defenses when the jury seeks a recharge on the elements of an offense. Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 639 ( 469 S.E.2d 188) (1996). See also Appling v. State, supra (refusal to recharge on accident not error when jury seeks recharge on felony murder and involuntary manslaughter).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to recharge on accident inasmuch as the jury did not seek a recharge on that point of law. Simply put, the recharge addressed, and was adjusted to, the jury's recharge request. Hobson v. State, supra.

3. "Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a defendant's statement at a Jackson v. Denno hearing will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.]" Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 365 ( 541 S.E.2d 369) (2001). At a Jackson-Denno hearing, the State established that before Boynton gave a videotaped statement to the police, she was advised of her Miranda rights on two occasions; and that she acknowledged verbally and in writing that she understood her rights. Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in ruling that the videotaped statement was admissible. Edge v. State, 275 Ga. 311, 312 ( 567 S.E.2d 1) (2002).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.