DUDLEY H. BOWEN, JR., Chief Judge, District
Plaintiff Leroy Bunyon (" Bunyon ") filed suit in the above-captioned case pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against twelve defendants: (1) Burke County, Burke County Sheriff's Department, Gregory T. Coursey, Johnny Patterson, Robert Saulsberry, Wayne Scott and John H. Bush, Jr. (collectively "the Burke County defendants "); and (2) City of Midville, Midville Police Department, Bruce Anderson, Leroy Morgan, and Wesley Lewis (collectively "the Midville defendants "). Presently before the Court are three motions: (1) a motion for summary judgment by the Burke County Defendants (Doc. No. 45); (2) a motion for summary judgment by the Midville Defendants (Doc. No. 51); and (3) a motion for partial summary judgment by Bunyon (Doc. No. 57). An Order addressing the Midville defendants' motion and Bunyon's motion regarding the Midville defendants is entered separately on this date. For reasons stated more fully below, the Burke County defendants' motion and Bunyon's motion regarding the Burke County defendants will be held in abeyance until further briefing is complete.
That order granted in part and denied in part the Midville defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part Bunyon's motion for partial summary judgment.
Bunyon has brought both federal and state law claims that arise out of alleged violations that occurred (1) because of his detention and (2) as a result of the allegedly poor and untimely medical care he received at the Burke County Jail. The nature of this case effectively divides the defendants into two groups, the "Burke County defendants" and the "Midville defendants". This dichotomy is important because a recently issued opinion from the Eleventh Circuit has potentially changed the analysis of liability for Sheriffs, Sheriffs' deputies, and jail personnel.
On July 28, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit published an opinion finding that (1) sheriffs and their deputies may be state actors and, thus, able to cloak themselves in Eleventh Amendment immunity and (2) that a county may not be liable for the actions of a sheriff who is acting on behalf of the state. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003). In Manders, a sheriff filed an interlocutory appeal seeking Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1307-08. The particular issue in the case was whether the sheriff was a state actor for purposes of establishing a use-of-force policy at the jail. See id. at 1308-09. The court held that the sheriff was a state actor and was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1328. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals noted that (1) "Georgia's constitution precludes [the County] from having any control over the sheriff's office." id. at 1319; (2) "Deputies, including those serving as jailers, are employees of the sheriff and not the county. . . ."id. at 1311; and (3) "[c]ounties cannot, and do not, grant any law enforcement power to sheriffs and do not assign or control any of the sheriffs' duties. . . ." id. at 1312.
While the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that a sheriff may be a state actor, the Manders case specifically only addressed whether a sheriff was a state actor for purposes of establishing a use-of-force policy. Id. at 1328. The Court specifically refused to decide whether a sheriff "wears a `state hat' for any other functions he performs." Id. The court's decision effectively placed the responsibility on litigants and the district courts to begin the process of deciding whether sheriffs are state or county actors in different sets of circumstances.
The Manders decision may hold great import for the Burke County defendants. The parties were aware that Manders might change the direction of this case as the Burke County defendants noted several times that the issue of who actually employed the sheriff was an unanswered and critical consideration. (Doc. No. 47 at 15 n. 3 ("All of this assumes, without conceding, that Burke County is responsible for the operation of the local jail, a duty delegated under Georgia law to the Sheriff."). Indeed, insofar as Burke County was concerned, Bunyon's brief on his summary judgment motion "assumes, as does Plaintiff's entire motion, that the conduct of the Sheriff of a Georgia County is the conduct of the County itself." (Doc. No. 80 at 7 n. 2.) As Burke County noted in its brief, "the answer to that question remains pending in the Eleventh Circuit as the Court struggles with the en banc arguments of Manders v. Lee." (Id.) The Eleventh Circuit, of course, has now answered the question, at least in part.
I cannot now decide whether Burke County has any responsibility for the actions of Sheriff Coursey and his deputies without first deciding the entity these people served. Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity may now be available to the sheriff and his deputies in their official capacities.
The parties are invited to submit briefs on the effect of theManders case on the liability of the Burke County defendants within ten (10) days from the date of this Order.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this 29th day of September 2003.