BROWN, C.J.
Frank Brooks appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his claim for declaratory judgment and damages concerning a property transaction involving Hugh A. Carlson and Edna M. Carlson. He contends material facts remain in dispute regarding whether his property is landlocked. Mr. and Mrs. Carlson died after this litigation commenced and this appeal is defended by Mr. Carlson's personal representative, H. David Carlson. The City of Grandview was dismissed as a party by an unappealed summary judgment in 2000.
We agree with the trial court; under this record no material facts remain on the question whether the subject property is landlocked. It is not. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Without specific reservation of an ingress easement, on June 24, 1993, Mr. Brooks and the Carlsons signed an option for the Carlsons to buy property owned by Mr. Brooks. Forrest Road, apparently a county road, is to the west nearby the lot to be retained by Mr. Brooks. At the time, Wallace Way was apparently a dedicated, but not yet constructed road further to the east from the property to be retained by Mr. Brooks, and within the City of Grandview. The property was to be divided, with Mr. Brooks retaining one of the lots. The parties agreed Mr. Carlson would handle the paperwork for Mr. Brooks to be prepared by a surveyor to annex, rezone, and short plat the property. Through this litigation, Mr. Brooks seeks at least a 50-foot connection to Wallace Way. Initially, Mr. Brooks argued his connection to Wallace Way should match the approximate 186-foot boundary of his retained lot. Douglas Gray prepared the short plat. The short plat divided the property into four lots, with Mr. Brooks retaining lot one. The short plat did not show ingress and egress for lot one. Nevertheless, Mr. Brooks signed the short plat before a notary public on October 7, 1994, certifying that he was the owner of the land and `caused the same to be surveyed and short platted as shown hereon{.}' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 29. Ten days later, Mr. Brooks deeded the property to the Carlsons. Along with the statutory warranty deed, Mr. Brooks signed several documents at the city clerk's office. He alleges he never saw a map and concluded it could have been folded under other documents at the clerk's office, but he did not look.
The Carlsons allege the lack of ingress and egress on the short plat was not questioned because there was a very old driveway across the property to the west of lot one for access to the nearest public road, Forrest Road.
The property to the west of lot one is owned by Mr. Brooks' brother. Soon after deeding the property, Mr. Brooks approached Mr. Carlson about access to lot one. The Carlsons assumed Mr. Brooks' access across his brother's property was valid. Nevertheless, the Carlsons granted Mr. Brooks a 15-foot easement over their adjacent property for access to Forrest Road. This easement satisfies Grandview City Ordinance, sec. 16.20.040(C) (1993), which addresses the City's requirements for legal access, but did not abate Mr. Brooks' interest in a connection to Wallace Way. Mr. Brooks filed suit against the City and the Carlsons. Mr. Brooks alleged the City negligently approved the short plat even though it did not comply with city ordinances. Pertinent here is Mr. Brooks' allegation against the Carlsons, which centers on their alleged failure, after receiving notice, to amend the survey map `to comply with the pertinent municipal code sections.' CP at 123. No fraud or reformation allegations are contained in the complaint filed by Mr. Brooks' previous counsel. During his deposition, Mr. Gray specified, with the easement granted by the Carlsons, the short plat did not need to be amended.
The Carlsons successfully requested summary judgment dismissal. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred by granting the Carlsons' request for summary judgment, and deciding no material facts remained on the issue of whether lot one is landlocked. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hubbard v. Spokane County, 146 Wn.2d 699, 707, 50 P.3d 602 (2002); CR 56(c). After the moving party has produced evidence showing no factual dispute exists that might affect a trial's outcome, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing a remaining genuine issue of material fact. Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wn.2d 267, 279, 937 P.2d 1082 (1997). We review summary judgments de novo, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hubbard, 146 Wn.2d at 706-07. If reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion, summary judgment is proper. Id. at 707.
Mr. Brooks argues material facts remain in dispute regarding whether his lot is landlocked. However, mainly Mr. Brooks wants an additional access to the east to connect to Wallace Way. According to his undocumented understanding, the Carlsons deceived him into signing the short plat by unilaterally changing the boundaries of the lots. However, this allegation is not contained in Mr. Brooks' complaint, and as noted by the trial judge, is not an issue on summary judgment.
Grandview City Ordinance sec. 16.20.040 relates to review of an application for a short plat. Section (C) requires: `The proposed lots have adequate means of ingress and egress of a minimum width being fifteen feet.' CP at 159. After learning of Mr. Brooks' concern, the Carlsons granted Mr. Brooks a 15-foot easement, linking his property to Forrest Road. Mr. Brooks overlooks this easement in his argument in his pursuit of a connection to Wallace Way. Instead, he relies on another Grandview City Ordinance requiring lots in a short subdivision to have minimum frontage upon a dedicated public street of a width of `fifty feet.' CP at 162. Apparently, his theory is access solely to Forrest Road, a county road, makes his property landlocked as to the City's minimum frontage ordinance. This argument relates back to his claim against the City for negligently approving the short plat when it did not comply with city ordinances. Mr. Brooks' claims against the City were summarily dismissed in 2000 without appeal. Mr. Brooks fails to explain how this dismissed claim can be revived in this appeal concerning the Carlsons.
With access to Forrest Road undisputed, no material facts remain in dispute regarding whether Mr. Brooks' property is landlocked. It is not.
Mr. Brooks argues he should not be bound to his signature on the short plat because he did not see or review the map. However, "a party who signs an instrument manifests assent to it and may not later complain about not reading or not understanding." Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 799, 64 P.3d 22 (2003) (quoting JOHN D. CALAMARI JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 376 (4th ed. 1998)). An exception is when a party is "deprived of the opportunity to read" the contract or is a victim of "fraud, deceit, or coercion." Michak, 148 Wn.2d at 799 (quoting Yakima County (W.Valley) Fire Prot. Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 122 Wn.2d 371, 389, 858 P.2d 245 (1993)).
Mr. Brooks claims he was deceived into signing and misled by the Carlsons. As the trial court correctly pointed out, the complaint is devoid of such allegations. Thus, whether material facts might remain on those allegations is immaterial here. Therefore, Mr. Brooks' arguments miss the mark on the limited issue within the pleadings of whether lot one is landlocked. Because no material facts remain on that issue, we conclude, as did the trial court, that summary judgment dismissal is proper. Lot one belonging to Mr. Brooks is not landlocked.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KURTZ, J. and KATO, J., concur.