Third-party defendant is not bound by the trial court's prior determination granting plaintiff summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, since that determination was rendered before third-party defendant was joined in the action (see Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 486). Thus, notwithstanding the prior grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant/third-party plaintiff, third-party defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint because the record establishes that the complaint is without merit as a matter of law (see CPLR 1008; Prigent v. Friedman, 264 A.D.2d 568, 569). Specifically, the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action is without merit because, at the time of his accident, plaintiff was performing routine maintenance work outside the ambit of the statute (see Jehle v. Adams Hotel Assocs., 264 A.D.2d 354); the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action are without merit because the record establishes that defendant/third-party plaintiff exercised no authority or control over the work in question (see Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343, 352); and the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action is without merit because there is no evidence that plaintiff's injury resulted from a violation of a sufficiently specific provision of the Industrial Code or other safety regulation (see Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 878; Brown v. New York City Econ. Dev. Corp., 234 A.D.2d 33, 34).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.