The IAS court properly denied petitioner's cross motion to vacate the award. In the absence of impropriety (CPLR 7511[b][1]), a court may vacate an award that "is violative of a strong public policy, is totally irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" (Matter of Town of Callicoon [Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Town of Callicoon Unit], 70 N.Y.2d 907, 908). The arbitrator did not exceed the scope of the authority conferred upon her by the broad arbitration provision of the contract. Nor has petitioner established that the award was irrational or violative of public policy. A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator either with respect to the interpretation of facts or the application of remedies (Matter of New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Assn. v. State of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 321, 326; Azrielant v. Azrielant, 301 A.D.2d 269, 275, lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 509). Judicial intervention would contravene "the strong public policy of this State to favor the resolution of disputes in arbitration as a means of conserving scarce judicial resources" (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. v. Kvaerner a.s., 243 A.D.2d 1, 9, citing Rio Algom v. Sammi Steel Co., Ltd., 168 A.D.2d 250, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 853).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.